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Introduction
As of 27 January 2021 there have been nearly 100 million reported cases
of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) worldwide resulting in over 2.1
million deaths.1 The number of infections and fatalities continues to rise
and new waves of infections have devastated many countries, including
those that had initially managed to contain the virus. Many govern-
ments failed to initiate prompt and effective interventions to tackle the
pandemic. This resulted in death rates well beyond what would have
been seen in the presence of a quicker response. The failure to act in a
timely manner has resulted in outcomes in line with worst case scenarios
predicted at the onset of the pandemic for some countries.2
Beyond the human costs, COVID-19 has severely affected the
economic, social, and political lives of people around the world. The inter-
national community has had to contend with a global recession.3 Govern-
ments have scrambled to implement measures to curtail the economic
costs of the global health crisis and to provide support for individuals
and businesses affected by COVID-19.4 The health crisis also has clear
political implications. Some states have responded to the pandemic with
extreme measures, including international border closures, travel restric-
tions and prohibitions, as well as far-reaching controls like curfews and
stay-at-home orders. In some contexts, leaders and politicians have used
the situation to advance nationalist political agendas,5 spread extremist




The health crisis has also radically altered people’s social lives. Isola-
tion, whether voluntary or imposed, has increased separation between
people and reduced opportunities to connect. Where people are still able
to interact, whether in person or virtually, the social costs of the crisis have
manifested in a variety of ways. For example, people have questioned or
sought guidance regarding norms of etiquette related to ‘social distanc-
ing’ practices.8 Physical altercations in supermarket aisles over toilet paper
at the onset of the pandemic were a clear indication that norms of polite-
ness and etiquette would come under threat.9 Furthermore, we have
witnessed more frequent instances of self-interested behaviour and disre-
gard for the common good, as citizens have often ignored mandates
regarding congregating and socializing in public spaces like beaches, bars,
and nightclubs. This has sometimes resulted in various forms of public
shaming targeting perpetrators.10
This book examines many of the challenges posed by the COVID-
19 pandemic through the distinctive lens of civility. The idea of civility
appears often in both public and academic debates, and a polarized polit-
ical climate frequently leads to allegations of uncivil speech and behaviour.
Norms of civility are always contested, even more so in moments of crisis
such as a global pandemic. A focus on civility provides crucial insight and
guidance on how to navigate the social and political challenges resulting
from COVID-19. Furthermore, it offers a framework through which citi-
zens and policymakers can better understand the causes and consequences
of incivility, and devise ways to recover civility in our social and political
lives.
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the human, economic, social, and
political costs of COVID-19. In doing so, it offers the background against
which we develop our analysis in the subsequent chapters. Chapter 2
introduces the concept of civility and identifies its two main components.
The first, politeness, is related to norms of etiquette and good manners.
We illustrate the structural and agential dimensions of politeness as well
as the importance for individuals to critically assess politeness norms in
different contexts. We also analyse the functional dimensions of polite-
ness, namely the way it can be used to signal respect and consideration
for others as well as its role in facilitating social cooperation. The second
dimension of civility, public-mindedness, involves treating others as free
and equal. This requires avoiding, for example, hateful and discrimina-
tory speech and behaviour (moral civility), and refraining from justifying
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political rules based on self-interested or sectarian reasons (justificatory
civility).
Chapter 3 considers how norms of politeness have become unclear or
contested during the pandemic, and how this has led to several additional
problems: politeness signals may go awry; unclear politeness norms can
hinder social cooperation and exchange; and citizens and politicians can
exploit this uncertainty to engage in what would normally be consid-
ered impolite behaviour. Chapter 4 examines the way COVID-19 has
contributed to various types of morally uncivil behaviour such as discrim-
ination and hate speech. It also considers how a number of challenges
can hinder justificatory civility: people may use the pandemic as cover to
pursue individual and sectarian interests; some policies may result in addi-
tional burdens on some sectors of the population more than others; and
governments may rely on limited or flawed scientific evidence, while some
policymakers politicize science for personal or partisan advantage. In both
chapters we also identify potential solutions that can mitigate the negative
effects of these challenges.
The book draws from primary and secondary sources to illustrate the
problems that arise from shifts in politeness norms and challenges to
public-minded goals. We provide anecdotal evidence from cases across the
globe and base our analysis on material from emerging academic research,
government reports, and popular media outlets. We supplement these
materials with personal interviews drawn from our social networks. The
interview subjects included scholars, leaders from civil society organisa-
tions, business owners, and members of the broader public that could
provide insight into specific economic, social, or political challenges
brought on by COVID-19.
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CHAPTER 1
TheHuman, Economic, Social, and Political
Costs of COVID-19
Introduction
The origins and evolution of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) can be
traced back to the Chinese province of Hubei, where the first cases were
identified in December 2019.1 The World Health Organization Director-
General officially declared a global pandemic on 11 March 2020 as the
virus spread rapidly around the world.2 The virus initially took hold in
Western Europe and the United States, with disproportionate spread in
specific high-traffic cities that serve as transportation hubs for interna-
tional travel. Some studies suggest that SARS-CoV-2 genomes might have
already been present in Spanish wastewater from as far back as March
20193 and in Italy from December 2019.4 This chapter offers an overview
of the human, economic, social, and political costs of the pandemic
in order to prepare the ground for our analysis of the implications of
COVID-19 for civility in the remainder of the book.
The Human Cost
The human cost of COVID-19 is significant, yet its true scale is still
uncertain. In addition to its immediate negative health effects, it is likely
that the pandemic will also lead to a number of long-term health prob-
lems such as persistent pulmonary damage, post-viral fatigue, and chronic
cardiac complications.5 Furthermore, researchers have already connected
policies aimed at reducing the spread of COVID-19 through social
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isolation to other negative outcomes, such as a spike in suicide rates.6
Moreover, it has become apparent that COVID-19 is having dispropor-
tionate effects on specific subsections of the population in many of the
countries affected. Factors may include age, race and ethnicity, class, and
gender, among others. It is well known, for example, that older people
face a higher risk of experiencing severe illness from COVID-19.7 In
many countries, aged care facilities have become hotspots of infection
and residents experienced higher-than-average death rates.8 Gender also
seems to be a factor in mortality rates. There is growing evidence that
men are more likely to die from COVID-19 than women, although the
reasons are not yet clear.9 Furthermore, public health experts estimate
disproportionate effects on maternal and child mortality rates in lower-
and middle-income countries as a direct result of the virus, the subsequent
strain on health systems, and reduced access to food.10
When it comes to race and ethnicity, some groups have been affected
more than others. For example, black Americans have been dispropor-
tionately susceptible to infection and died at higher rates early on in
the pandemic.11 The Center for Disease Control (CDC) in the US
found that racial and ethnic minority groups have been particularly
affected by COVID-19 due to such diverse factors as discrimination; low
levels of health insurance, access, and service utilization; disproportionate
representation in occupations with greater exposure to COVID-19;
educational, income, and wealth inequalities; and housing conditions
that render prevention strategies more difficult to implement.12 Other
categories of vulnerable people who have been especially affected by
COVID-19 include prisoners,13 as well as asylum seekers and refugees
in camps and detention centres.14
Social class has also had a profound effect on the ability of people to
protect themselves or recover from the virus. Data suggest, for example,
that wealthier people have the resources to better adhere to social
distancing policies and norms; are less likely to suffer from pre-existing
health conditions; can more easily afford to stock up on food, medical,
hygiene, and cleaning supplies; and are more likely to perform higher-
skilled jobs that allow them to work from home.15 At the extreme end
of the wealth spectrum, global elites have been able to stockpile supplies
and make use of remote properties16 or yachts17 to isolate from broader
society during the pandemic.
Socio-economic inequalities have had an impact on the effects of
COVID-19 not only within individual countries, but also on a global
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scale. Many lower- and middle-income countries face significant economic
contractions in terms of growth and income levels as a result of the
pandemic.18 However, the challenges go beyond economic production
and outputs. In some cases, healthcare systems already under stress have
faced additional pressure. Furthermore, in the case of India, to cite just
one example, the government has had a limited capacity to reach rural
areas and experienced political pressure to limit testing to keep official
case tallies low.19 The effects have been disastrous, with infection rates
and death tolls well beyond the reported numbers. This will have carry-
on effects on social welfare services aimed at those in need as resources are
diverted to help combat the pandemic. But there are also success stories.
Cuba, for example, has been able to respond to the pandemic promptly
and efficiently, at least compared to other countries in the Caribbean and
their Central and South American neighbours. Its free universal healthcare
system proved crucial, combined with the highest doctor-to-population
ratio in the world and the presence of an efficient national emergency
planning structure.20
The Economic Cost
In addition to the human costs, COVID-19 has also taken a significant
toll on the global economy, particularly due to severe travel restric-
tions and lockdown measures aimed at reducing its spread. A significant
number of workers across various sectors have lost their jobs, and this
trend is likely to continue for the foreseeable future.21 From early on, the
World Bank predicted the worst global recession since WWII, with the
global economy expected to shrink drastically.22
The pandemic has also disrupted international trade relationships. For
example, it rendered post-Brexit trade negotiations between the United
Kingdom (UK) and the European Union (EU) more challenging23 and
has exacerbated existing tensions in the trade relationship between the
United States (US) and China.24 Furthermore, some regional markets
(e.g. in Latin America) are experiencing significant economic downturns
as a result of the pandemic.25 Moreover, financial markets have become
increasingly volatile26 and the pandemic has also significantly disrupted
global supply chains.27 Economic downturns in states like Victoria,
Australia may be especially strong compared to other parts of the country.
Waves of coronavirus cases have resulted in border closures that make
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interstate and international migration nearly impossible in Australia. The
tourism, hospitality, and education sectors that rely heavily on migrant
labour and international travel have been the most affected.28
Some sectors of the economy have been particularly affected by the
pandemic and are experiencing significant contraction, as is the case
with higher education. In some countries, such as the US, the UK, and
Australia, many universities rely heavily (from a financial point of view) on
the recruitment of international students, who generally pay higher enrol-
ment fees than their domestic counterparts. Travel and visa restrictions
during the pandemic have resulted in withdrawals and lower enrol-
ment numbers among international students, with significant financial
implications for the universities most affected.29
The creative arts sector has also struggled to cope with and adapt
to the pandemic. Many music venues, theatres, and cinemas around
the world were forced to keep their doors closed in the first half of
2020 due to social distancing rules and to reduce risks associated with
the spread of COVID-19 in indoor environments. Some places reintro-
duced these measures during subsequent waves of the pandemic. The
music industry has been significantly affected, with shows and festivals
cancelled and album releases postponed.30 Unable to perform in person,
production companies have had to reimagine theatrical performances for
online audiences that still want to see a live show.31 Furthermore, many
major theatres and opera houses across the world have made some of
their performances freely available to the public via online streaming
platforms.32 The global film industry has also been severely hit by the
pandemic, with many cinemas closed, film festivals cancelled or moved
online, and significant delays in the release of major motion pictures for
fears that studios would be unable to recoup investments.33 The movie
industry has been forced to evolve as movie theatre chains have responded
to these challenges by negotiating agreements with movie studios on how
to release films and charge audiences for access.34 In some cases, cinemas
have tried to adapt to the new social distancing rules by rearranging their
spaces and implementing strict health and safety checks.35 In other cases,
we have witnessed unexpected changes, such as the revival of drive-in
cinemas.36
The transportation sector will also feel the economic impact of the
pandemic for the foreseeable future. Industry experts forecast a record-
breaking financial loss for the commercial aviation sector. International
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flights in and out of many countries have been severely restricted, demand
for air travel has plummeted, and airlines must take costly safety precau-
tions to limit proximity to other passengers such as leaving middle seats
empty. Cruise ship operators have not been immune to the pandemic
either, especially due to people’s concerns regarding difficulties in abiding
by social distancing rules in confined spaces.37 Likewise, those working in
the ‘gig economy’ as drivers for rideshare services like Uber or Lyft face
restrictions and lowered demand for service.38 Yet, some industry opera-
tors have benefitted from changing travel patterns and preferences among
the general public. For example, sleeper trains have regained popularity
among European travellers who are reluctant to fly between different
cities and countries.39
Relatedly, the tourism industry faces unprecedented economic chal-
lenges due to travel restrictions and lower levels of disposable income
among consumers who have been financially hit by the pandemic,
resulting in hundreds of billions US$ in losses across the sector.40 The
hotel industry has suffered similar hardships due to a sharp decline in
hotel bookings.41 COVID-19 will force the entire tourism industry to
rethink its focus and priorities to reduce susceptibility to shocks related
to the pandemic and looming crises tied to global warming.42 The public
may be forced to reimagine how it travels and start to prioritize local
destinations, transforming the economic outlook of the sector.43
The restaurant and food services sectors have faced significant obstacles
to profitability, and many businesses have been forced to shutter their
doors. In some cases, the government has stepped in to force temporary
closures or implement measures that require significant adjustments to a
standard restaurant business model. Restaurants have had to contend with
a severe reduction in consumer demand, a lower capacity to seat patrons,
and unexpected expenditures to address safety concerns like adding plastic
partitions to protect staff or redesigning seating arrangements, sometimes
by prioritizing outdoors spaces.44 Many of them have adapted to this new
environment by finding new ways to reach their customers. For example,
an employee at one restaurant in Melbourne explained:
We knew that our restaurants would be very quiet so we immediately
pushed our online orders when COVID-19 restrictions came into play.
We’re lucky that we manufacture all our own pasta, sauces, pizzas and other
products so pushing [these products] through clever marketing worked
well for us. We introduced our ‘Door-to-Door Service’ which saw us
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visiting various suburbs on various days and this was very well received…
It’s something our customers love and therefore something we’ll continue
even when restrictions lift… We also decided to hold an online event. Like
a dinner dance, but streamed online where customers purchase tickets to
watch the entertainment and then they also have the option of purchasing
a dinner pack that’s delivered to them before the event. This has also been
well received.45
Following the easing of restrictions after the first wave of the pandemic,
some governments stepped in to provide financial support for the industry
by encouraging people to dine out.46 Cafes and the coffee industry
have also been negatively impacted from an economic perspective.47
Conversely, grocery stores have generally benefited from changes in
consumer behaviour as more people eat at home. However, they have
also had to adapt their business model to the changing retail environ-
ment, prioritizing online shopping, expanding delivery services, and even
exploring the potential to introduce mobile stores to replace brick-and-
mortar markets.48
The sports industry has also been significantly affected by the
pandemic, with major sporting events cancelled or postponed all over
the world. Mass gatherings and large-scale events generate crowds where
the risk of COVID-19 transmission rises exponentially. In March 2020,
Japan’s Prime Minister and the president of the International Olympic
Committee announced the postponement of the 2020 Tokyo Games,
marking the first time the Olympics have been rescheduled for a reason
other than war.49 The pandemic has forced diverse forms of profes-
sional and college sports leagues to halt play or devise alternative ways
to reach audiences if they are to weather the storm. Many leagues and
franchises have been unable to generate previous levels of advertising
revenue because of postponements and find themselves in dire financial
straits. Players themselves have been apprehensive about resuming play
and moving forward with seasons. Sports like Major League Baseball
could suffer losses in the billions of dollars, leading to tense negotia-
tions between team owners and players regarding compensation and risk,
with some asking whether athletes should be seen as ‘exploited workers or
greedy millionaires’.50 US and Australian rules football leagues have faced
similar challenges, with some players simply deciding to opt out.51 Foot-
ball (soccer) leagues throughout Europe made the decision to simply
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suspend or cancel their seasons in 2020.52 When play resumed, it gener-
ally occurred behind closed doors. As sports teams and players suffer
the financial costs of these disruptions, the public should be aware of
the disparate capacity elite men’s clubs may have to contend with the
financial challenges compared to women’s clubs, as is the case of English
football.53
The agricultural sector has also faced considerable challenges. At the
early stages of the pandemic, the prices of agricultural goods fell signif-
icantly, particularly due to lower demand from hotels and restaurants.54
While growing demand from grocery stores seems to have gradually offset
those initial losses, farmers face new difficulties resulting from labour
shortages and from the need to adapt to new social distancing rules.55
Labour shortages may also result in higher prices for fruit and vegeta-
bles.56 Furthermore, the meat industry has been particularly hard-hit by
the pandemic. Many meat-processing plants have been the epicentres of
COVID-19 outbreaks, resulting in shutdowns and meat shortages in the
food supply chain.57
In addition to the areas examined in the foregoing analysis, other
sectors that have been affected by COVID-19 include the manufac-
turing industry, the financial sector, the healthcare and pharmaceutical
industry, and the real estate and housing sector.58 Other businesses on the
economic fringes have also been hard-hit, especially those related to vice.
For example, gambling hotspots in Las Vegas had to shutter their doors
for some time, but gambling online has thrived even while sports betting
has declined.59 Illicit drug trafficking and local distribution markets have
faced novel challenges in supply chain and consumer demand too.60
Sex workers have also been affected by the social distancing restrictions
implemented during the pandemic, given the central role that physical
contact plays in the industry. Moreover, the stigma and discrimination
that those working in this industry already experience has increased
during the pandemic, further contributing to economic hardship across
the sector. Some have responded by either demanding government
support or by adapting their business model to emphasize other online
services.61 The Australian Sex Workers Association clearly articulated the
difficulties for sex workers who have been ‘placed in the impossible
position of having to balance the need to protect [them]selves and the
community against the prospect of no income and no access to financial
relief’.62
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The Social Cost
In addition to its extensive economic implications, COVID-19 has also
had a drastic effect on social life around the globe. Government measures
related to social distancing rules, stay-at-home orders, business lock-
downs, and curfews have in many cases eroded community relationships
by drastically reducing opportunities for physical face-to-face interaction.
These measures have significantly affected family life, both by increasing
proximity among those forced to shared confined spaces during lock-
downs63 and by keeping families apart to prevent risk of infection.
For example, one grandmother we spoke with who lives in California
described what interactions with her granddaughter looked like during
the pandemic:
[My husband and I] were both looking at her and she’s looking at us and
she’s hugging a dolly. And they’re through the glass. It was her birthday.
And she came up to the glass, she puts her hand up [to ours] and she
kissed the glass and I kissed the glass. We kissed each other through the
glass and it was just heart-wrenching… I said, ‘I wish I could hug you, I
miss you, I’m gonna throw you kisses’. We would go out into the yard and
we stayed far away. We kind of did it all. [At first] we just did FaceTime.
Then we started between the windows—we could at least see her there.64
Likewise, a grandmother in Italy whom we also interviewed explained:
The pandemic has taken away spontaneity from normal gestures of affec-
tion. There is fear but, at the same time, there is also a desire to hug
grandchildren, children, and friends during the lockdown. [The pandemic]
has taken away physical contact and people have had to replace this with
video calls or messages, both with relatives and friends, in an attempt to
exorcise fear.65
The pandemic has clearly rendered relationships among family and
friends more difficult for many.66 However, it has also brought some
people closer together thanks to greater flexibility in time schedules,
alternative working arrangements, and reduced opportunities for other
social activities.67 Relationships with both family and friends have also
been sustained by the use of communication technologies during the
pandemic.68 Furthermore, social media have played a key role in reducing
isolation for both older69 and younger70 people, even though these plat-
forms have also contributed to spreading rumours and misinformation.71
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Romantic relationships and dating have also had to adapt to the new
social distancing and travel restrictions. Some dating apps, for example,
have altered user guidelines and introduced new video technology options
so users can continue to interact with others while minimizing risks and
adhering to social distancing guidelines.72 More generally, COVID-19
has had an impact on romantic love,73 and in some cases contributed
to increasing stress among romantic partners, compounding factors that
may lead to greater infidelity.74 Big social events like weddings had to
be postponed in places like metropolitan Melbourne, Australia during its
strict Stage 4 lockdown.75
Relationships between humans and non-human animals, and social
practices surrounding them, have also been impacted. For example, data
show that there has been a significant increase in pet ownership and adop-
tion, as pets help reduce stress and loneliness, or encourage healthier
and more active lifestyles.76 There has also been contention around the
implications of the pandemic for certain animals. For example, the dog
racing industry in Victoria, Australia saw an exemption from strict Stage 4
lockdown measures amid debates about potential animal welfare issues.77
The pandemic has also resulted in a housing crisis, as many people can
no longer afford their rent or mortgage payments, thus risking eviction
and homelessness.78 This has sometimes generated extreme and violent
responses.79 In other cases, it has compounded pre-existing social harms
like increased violence between intimate partners and other forms of
abuse. Early indicators show that households in Brazil, Spain, the UK, and
Cyprus saw spikes in domestic and family violence.80 A study in Dallas,
Texas found a spike in domestic violence during the first two weeks of the
stay-at-home order that subsided afterwards.81 The long-term isolation,
stress, and uncertainty during the pandemic may also exacerbate alcohol
and drug consumption. Furthermore, these conditions can increase the
likelihood of relapse among recovering alcoholics and drug addicts too.82
There has also been a rise in online gambling.83
COVID-19 has also changed social practices in various everyday envi-
ronments due to the need to re-imagine spaces and people’s interaction
within them in ways that comply with social distancing norms.84 There
are obvious logistical challenges to in-person education and how to
manage students on school campuses. Options have included a combina-
tion of closures and social distancing practices.85 Educational institutions
now rely on online learning to a greater degree, raising new challenges.86
For example, we spoke with a school teacher in Italy who explained that
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the transition to distance learning had several advantages, but suffered
from a number of shortcomings. The new teaching format was not always
suitable for younger pupils or students with disabilities. Furthermore,
online teaching tended to sharpen the ‘digital divide’ between families
with different levels of access to suitable spaces in the home, tablets,
and highspeed Internet connections. He also described ongoing unruly
behaviour and cheating among students, then added:
When our school reopened… the space was reorganized with single-seat
desks… pupils always had to wear surgical masks and could only remove
them in ‘static’ moments, sitting at their desks. They could not move nor
could they pass materials among themselves… The interaction between
teachers also profoundly changed. Teachers used to gather in the faculty
lounge, which could no longer be used due to COVID-19. Opportunities
for meetings and interactions with colleagues were clearly reduced; at the
same time, teachers began to meet in online spaces like Google Meet, espe-
cially to share teaching practices. Yet, the ability to interact was decidedly
reduced.87
Universities have also been forced to adjust courses and curricula for
online delivery. While this is practically feasible, students may have fewer
opportunities to participate in the off-line social networking that is
crucial for career development.88 Furthermore, many universities may not
survive the financial hit resulting from the pandemic.89
The pandemic has also affected the way people eat and drink. Restau-
rants, for example, have had to undergo several changes, including
redesigning their spaces, accommodating lower numbers of customers in
order to respect social distancing rules, making greater use of smart tech-
nologies (e.g. for menus and meal orders), and expanding their takeaway
and delivery services.90 Some of them have adopted creative strategies in
order to guarantee social distancing between patrons.91
Likewise, government restrictions have forced some bars to close for
extended periods of time in many locations. Those that have reopened or
remained open had to reimagine how they serve customers and manage
interactions between staff and patrons. Complex rules around indoor
and outdoor spaces, as well as food service as it relates to the sale of
alcohol, affect whether we visit these establishments and our experiences
while there.92 An array of ‘multi-touch’ items like menus, salt and pepper
shakers, cutlery, and coasters are now kept away from customers.93 One
Irish pub in Spain’s Canary Islands used humour to communicate some of
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the real dangers associated with social practices in bars, putting up a notice
that patrons should avoid singing the Neil Diamond hit ‘Sweet Caroline’
at all costs. Employees wrote some lyrics on a chalkboard explaining that,
as a health precaution under COVID-19, ‘[t]here will be no: touching
hands, reaching out, touching me, touching you’.94
Cafes have been forced to respond to the pandemic in creative ways
as well, with some selling their stock as groceries and expanding their
takeaway and delivery services.95 Furthermore, in many countries the
pandemic has undermined the role of cafes as ‘third spaces’ between home
and work, crucial for socializing and networking.96 The pandemic may
have long-term effects on coffee culture around the globe.
Barbershops and hairdressers have also been at the epicentre of
public debate concerning lockdown measures during the pandemic, with
disagreement as to whether they constitute ‘essential’ businesses that
should be exempt from lockdown restrictions. Barbershops traditionally
serve important social functions for some cultural groups as spaces for
community building, leisure and entertainment, gossip and local political
engagement,97 as well as local education initiatives.98 They can also be
important for men’s mental health.99 Likewise, hair salons can provide
‘a comforting source of self-care and community’100 and serve as ‘an
important channel between members of the community and services such
as family violence shelters’.101 This partly explains why many customers
opposed and, in some cases, managed to revert government decisions to
close down these businesses during the pandemic.102 In one extreme case,
an armed militia group helped keep a barbershop open in a small US town
in the state of Michigan.103
Beyond its direct effect on people’s health, COVID-19 has also
indirectly affected people’s ability to stay healthy. For example, lock-
down and social distancing restrictions aimed at reducing its spread have
changed the way people exercise,104 with online streaming classes and
programmes becoming a popular way for people to connect and partic-
ipate in workout activities.105 Furthermore, when they have not been
forced to close down, gyms have had to comply with strict health and
safety measures, including the introduction of ‘hygiene marshals’.106
Partly due to risks associated with exercising in closed spaces, outdoor
exercise has become increasingly popular.107 However, research shows
that overeating and other unhealthy eating behaviours have also increased,
thus posing additional challenges to individual and public health.108
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The pandemic has affected other areas of social life related to leisure
and recreation. Event-based social networks like Meetup, for example,
have been forced to transition to virtual platforms in order to interact.109
A recent study in Australia found that activities within Meetup decreased
by 86% during the pandemic. The researcher explains:
Participants in this study mentioned that Meetup was one of the main
avenues in which they were exposed to new, potential relationships and
that, due to lockdown measures, they had no way of expanding their social
networks and thus making new friends. COVID-19 also had an amplifying
effect on existing relationships within Meetup groups in the sense that close
relationships became closer, and weak ones, weaker. Where relationships
were strong enough, participants often used other social networking sites
such as Facebook, WhatsApp and Instagram to maintain contact during
lockdown, which highlights the importance of polymedia use.110
The way people travel for holidays and tourism has also changed.111 For
example, both customers and business owners at beach destinations face
unprecedented challenges that include new social distancing rules as well
as stigma and public shaming for those who fail to respect them.112
People’s ability to access and experience national113 and local114 parks,
as well as public spaces more generally,115 has also been deeply affected
by the pandemic.
Travelling by public transport now includes additional demands to
maintain social distance on crowded buses and subways. Passengers must
also take new precautions to avoid handles and other surfaces that could
spread the virus. Forward-thinking researchers will need to develop safer
public transport infrastructure116 and new transport technologies to
prevent an unsustainable shift back to a car-driven transport system.117
When it comes to pedestrians, proposed measures to contain the spread
of the virus include touchless pedestrian crossings118 and crowd simu-
lation technology to encourage social distancing.119 Rideshare services
such as Uber have had to find ways of responding to reduced customer
demand. For example, at times they have emphasized food delivery rather
than taxi service to help keep drivers working and to mitigate issues of
food insecurity.120 However, disruptions to their business model have had
important social implications for sectors of the population with disabilities
who normally depend on rideshare transportation services.121
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The broader social effects of COVID-19 also concern the tensions that
may arise between different individuals and social groups. Instances of
social hoarding were particularly common at the onset of the pandemic,
with people fighting over such products as toilet paper, hand sanitizer,
flour, and pasta in shops and supermarkets.122 There have also been inci-
dents of extreme rage over facemask policies, leading to the death of
innocent bystanders and fatal confrontations with law enforcement.123
Furthermore, ageism and intergenerational tensions are on the rise in
online spaces, especially between the ‘millennial’ and ‘baby boomer’
generations.124 Social stigma targeting infected people and those who
have recovered from the illness, as well as doctors and health workers, has
also become a widespread phenomenon.125 COVID-19 has also fuelled
racism and xenophobia.126 Hate speech, hate crimes, and discriminatory
practices targeting people with Chinese and East Asian backgrounds,127
Muslims,128 Jews,129 and Romani communities130 have been especially
common. At the international level, the pandemic has generated nega-
tive attitudes towards countries with high levels of infections.131 One
study, for example, revealed spikes in incivility directed at China on South
Korean social media.132
The Political Cost
The global pandemic has generated a range of international and domestic
political problems. The COVID-19 health crisis constitutes an exoge-
nous shock to the broader international system, disrupting international
politics and creating new tensions between adversaries and allies alike.
It will undoubtedly have profound implications for and lasting effects
on geopolitics for years to come.133 Political leaders from major powers
like the US and China may seek to use the crisis to find advantage
in an ongoing contest for hegemony in the global political order.134
In many contexts, states have been left scrambling to secure sufficient
supplies and resources to effectively contend with the virus, prioritizing
national interest and the well-being of their own citizens. The US, for
example, requested that the firm 3M refrain from selling protective masks
to Canada and countries in Latin America to keep them for domestic
use.135 A form of ‘vaccine nationalism’ took hold in a race to develop a
vaccine for the virus that created barriers to cooperation and prioritized
domestic delivery when mass production got underway.136
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The pandemic has the potential to exacerbate ongoing political
conflicts between states. For example, COVID-19 risks inflaming tensions
between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. As political leaders in both
countries focus on fighting the virus, we could see further entrench-
ment of the militarized status quo, as well as local efforts to highlight
the inadequacy of Indian governance in Kashmir. There is the potential
that hardline Indian nationalist policies might be used to divert public
attention from the COVID-19 crisis. However, the scale of the pandemic
threat will most likely shift attention in India and Pakistan to the imme-
diate demands of public health services and the need to alleviate economic
hardship domestically.137
Polities with supranational governance structures like the European
Union have experienced discord over new policies. EU member states
eventually managed to compromise on an economic recovery plan in
July 2020, despite tensions during the negotiation process, especially
due to concerns of so-called ‘frugal’ countries about the cost of the
plan.138 However, tensions within the EU have also been driven by
disputes concerning seasonal migrant labour, with some business, espe-
cially farmers, demanding access to foreign workers, and some populist
leaders calling instead for tighter restrictions on immigration.139
The pandemic has also compounded pre-existing international prob-
lems related to the movement of people. Asylum seekers and refugees
have been particularly affected,140 especially since the pandemic risks
exacerbating existing humanitarian crises.141 The pandemic has also had
an impact on temporary economic migrants, particularly as a result of
the economic downturn that has forced many companies to lay off
employees. Even when governments have introduced economic measures
to support businesses, temporary migrants have often been excluded from
these programmes.142 Some governments are also considering changes
to migration rules143 and taking drastic steps in modifying the way
they address asylum claims, including limitations to face-to-face inter-
views, introducing new physical barriers, or even encouraging applicants
to ‘bring [their] own black or blue ink pens’.144 Internal migration has
also been affected by the pandemic, as many governments have imposed
restrictions on internal travel.145
The public health crisis is also affecting domestic political divi-
sions in multiple contexts. For example, during post-Brexit negotiations
between the UK and the EU, some politicians exploited the pandemic
for partisan political gain.146 In some cases, politicians have challenged
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the authority of experts, undermining citizens’ trust in evidence-based
knowledge.147 They have also mischaracterized or appropriated scientific
expertise around issues like mask wearing to advance their positions.148
Debate about the pandemic in some countries has been driven by and
exacerbated pre-existing political polarization, stoking tensions between
regional/state and national/federal political authorities. However, calls
for unity and coordinated action has sometimes also helped to reduce
ideological and partisan divides.149
The pandemic poses unique challenges to state stability and could
compound risks of political violence, internal armed conflict, and inci-
dents of state failure. Rebel groups and other militant actors have seized
opportunities to expand control, advance political objectives, and demon-
strate a capacity to govern and enforce rules. For example, armed actors
operating along the southwest coast of Colombia made public decla-
rations that curfew violators would be treated as ‘military targets’.150
COVID-19 has provided a chance for armed opposition groups to scale
up attacks and target government opponents in some cases, while in
others groups have seized on the opportunity to improve claims of
legitimacy and demonstrate their capacity to provide public services and
govern. For example, the Islamic State, the Taliban, and al-Qaeda affil-
iates have all provided guidance and local support to contend with the
pandemic.151
Political participation has also been affected by the pandemic. Protest
politics, for example, has been at the epicentre of public debate. On the
one hand, citizens in some countries have taken to the streets to protest
against government restrictions to contain the virus, such as lockdown
and stay-at-home orders.152 On the other hand, protests such as those
organized by Black Lives Matter activists around the world became a
topic of contention as citizens and political leaders disagreed as to whether
those gatherings may have contributed to new COVID-19 outbreaks.153
The effects on political participation also extend to electoral politics.
For example, in some countries local and national political authorities
decided to postpone elections154 or reimagine electoral procedures and
practices. Governments have taken steps like increasing the use of postal
voting155 or introducing measures to guarantee social distancing, health,
and safety during the voting process.156 There has also been an impact on
campaign practices due to the need to restrict traditional rituals and habits
like shaking hands.157 Furthermore, political rallies constitute extreme
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health risks for the spread of the virus.158 This point became espe-
cially prominent after former US President Donald Trump resumed large
political campaign events shortly after his hospitalisation from COVID-
19 treatment.159 Other politicians experimented with virtual rallies and
events to mark important milestones in campaigns like the Democratic
Party’s announcement of a presidential candidate in August 2020.160 The
content of political campaigns and party politics has also evolved as a
result of COVID-19. Issues such as public health and socio-economic and
racial inequality, for example, have become more salient,161 and parties
traditionally divided over fiscal responsibility and public spending have
sometimes converged on more similar positions.162
Trust is an important aspect of political life as it relates to politicians,
law enforcement, and the media, among others. High-profile incidents of
politicians who ignore their own stay-at-home orders163 or who publicly
contradict or undermine health experts164 can lead to general confusion
and the erosion of trust in public officials. The politicization of issues like
mandatory mask wearing illustrates how a lack of consensus and divergent
policies can frustrate public health measures and lead to greater distrust
not only towards politicians but also towards law enforcement officials
tasked with ensuring compliance. In extreme cases, law violators have
lashed out in violence against police officers enforcing these new laws.165
In a particularly sensational case, members of an extremist militia were
arrested in relation to alleged plans to kidnap Michigan’s Governor and
put her on ‘trial’ for restrictive pandemic policies.166 Furthermore, the
media can have a compounding effect on public trust (or lack thereof), by
employing framing techniques167 or prioritising specific content as they
deliver information to the public.168 Social media can further compli-
cate political trust, as they are a popular channel for politicians to spread
misinformation about COVID-19 and related policies.169
Conclusion
This chapter provided an overview of the human, economic, social, and
political costs of the pandemic. The world faces unprecedented challenges
related to COVID-19, including an immense strain on relationships and
the way people interact with one another in different aspects of their
lives. Uncertainty and disruptions to social and political life will require
a better understanding as to how the broader public needs to prepare
and respond. Politicians and other decision-makers will face increasing
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pressure to come up with policies that are effective at containing the
pandemic, limiting its economic impact, and minimising harmful social
and political consequences. They face the difficult task of balancing
diverse interests, values, and demands, while also having to ensure that
they rely on sound scientific evidence. In the remainder of this book, we
will examine all these challenges through the lens of civility.
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This book examines COVID-19 through the lens of civility. A focus on
civility is important for two reasons. First, the concept of civility often
features prominently in public debate. Society expects people to adhere to
acceptable behaviours in a range of contexts in public life. Some individ-
uals are quick to levy accusations of incivility against those deemed to have
violated these norms of behaviour. For example, when American football
player Colin Kaepernick began to kneel during the national anthem as
a protest against racial and social injustice, US President Donald Trump
viewed the action as uncivil and disrespectful. Trump suggested: ‘[y]ou
have to stand proudly for the national anthem or you shouldn’t be
playing, you shouldn’t be there, maybe you shouldn’t be in the coun-
try’. He went on: ‘[t]hat’s a total disrespect of our heritage. That’s a
total disrespect of everything that we stand for’.1 Kaepernick’s actions
infuriated Trump, who offered vocal support when former Vice President
Mike Pence and his wife left the stadium as a counterprotest before a 2017
49ers-Colts NFL game in Indianapolis.2 Kaepernick faces ongoing accu-
sations of incivility. But his case also raises an important question: should
we always be civil? As Kaepernick himself more recently reasoned, ‘When
civility leads to death, revolting is the only logical reaction’.3 Sometimes
we need to be uncivil in order to highlight injustice and fight against it,
especially when other means of doing so are not (or no longer) effective.4
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In another recent high-profile US incident, the owner of a restau-
rant in Lexington, Virginia asked former White House press secretary
Sarah Huckabee Sanders to leave the premises. Several LGBTIQ + wait-
staff objected to her defence of President Trump’s discriminatory policies
aimed at transgender people. The incident raised important questions
regarding moral and tactical choice in an ‘age of outrage’ and contentious
politics.5 Those who supported the action viewed the request as appro-
priate given the administration’s violation of moral principles of equal
respect for all citizens—a key dimension of civility, as we will explain later
in this chapter. However, pundits from the political right also saw the
restaurateur’s action as uncivil, since asking Huckabee Sanders to leave
the premises violated widely recognized politeness norms. This deteriora-
tion of civil exchange can have far-reaching effects.6 Both sides identified
transgressions of civility norms by the other party but each focused on a
distinct dimension of civility.
This leads to the second reason why it is important to focus on civility:
the contested nature of the concept in the scholarly literature, particularly
in political theory and philosophy. There is disagreement, first, regarding
the meaning of civility (and therefore incivility). Second, even when there
is agreement on the meaning of (in)civility, there may be disagreement as
to whether specific instances of speech or behaviour should be considered
civil or uncivil based on the agreed upon conception.
So, what is civility? Existing academic work provides different and often
contrasting definitions of the concept. However, we identify two main
understandings. On the one hand, civility is often associated with norms
of etiquette and politeness: to be civil, in this first sense, implies to speak
and act in ways that comply with these norms. On the other hand, it is
linked with the idea of public-mindedness: to be civil, in this second sense,
means to display a commitment to the public good, not just to one’s
personal or sectarian interest, and to treating others as free and equal.
This second understanding of civility is famously captured by John Rawls’s
claim that we have a ‘duty of civility’ to only appeal to public reasons
(i.e. reasons that our fellow citizens could understand and find persua-
sive) when we justify political rules.7 But civility as public-mindedness,
we will see, can also be understood in a non-justificatory sense, requiring
that we refrain from treating others in ways that are discriminatory or
hateful. In this chapter, we provide an overview of the politeness and
public-mindedness dimensions of civility in order to set the stage for our
analysis in the subsequent chapters, which will focus on how COVID-19
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challenges our ability to be civil, but also creates opportunities for people
to find new ways of being civil towards one another in these challenging
times.
Civility as Politeness
Much of the scholarly literature in political theory and philosophy views
civility as a virtue linked to etiquette and good manners. Derek Edyvane,
for example, argues that ‘civility is bound up with the idea of what it
means to be civilised, to be well-mannered or polite; its focus is on
standards of behaviour in our dealings with others in everyday life’.8
Likewise, Cheshire Calhoun refers to ‘polite civility’, which ‘has been
understood as the mark of the competent participant in the social settings
of everyday life’.9 According to her, ‘polite civility enables the social
participant to avoid barbaric and potentially disgusting bodily displays’.10
In line with these accounts, we view politeness as a feature of speech
or action that complies with certain social norms prescribing appropriate
modes of exchange and interaction.
A key feature of civility as politeness is that it is intrinsically dependent
on ‘generally agreed upon, often codified, social rules’.11 Importantly,
such rules are always contextual, since they are based on norms and
customs that vary between (and within) different societies. Furthermore,
these norms constantly evolve.12 Partly for these reasons, Strachan and
Wolf observe that ‘measuring the level of civility present in society…is
especially difficult because the specific behaviours defined as appropriate
in one culture, or even in different settings within the same culture, can be
inappropriate in others’.13 Likewise, in his analysis of what he calls ‘repub-
lican civility’, Daly observes that ‘the bodily and linguistic techniques that
constitute civility [as politeness] are highly encoded partly because they
embrace a situational or cultural specificity which will appear arbitrary
and perhaps incomprehensible to those not already endowed with it’.14
In summary, civility as politeness is grounded in cultural and social norms
that vary between contexts and may evolve over time, sometimes rather
quickly.
The politeness dimension of civility involves both structural and agen-
tial elements. We will examine them in turn in the following subsections.
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Structural Elements of Politeness
The social norms of politeness constitute its structural elements. These
norms are generally based on social or cultural identities, as well as on
social actors’ role(s) and context, and may reflect different degrees of
formality depending on the situation.
Social identity is a clear source of politeness norms. As individuals, we
all occupy multiple and simultaneous identities. These include identities
based on gender, race/ethnicity, class, religion, culture, and language,
among others. These different identities can be sources of various polite-
ness norms. For example, a person’s religious faith may contain norms
of politeness concerning how one should relate to or greet other indi-
viduals (both co-religionists and not) or how one should dress when
entering a place of worship.15 Some of these norms may interact with
gender dimensions of identity, establishing more specific guidelines on
how one should relate to people of the opposite sex or how men and
women should dress in public.16 And gender itself can be tied to polite-
ness norms independently of religion.17 Language may also be a source of
politeness norms, by providing its speakers with socially legible ways (e.g.
through its lexicon, grammar, idiomatic expressions, or even the tone and
pitch in the way we speak) of expressing politeness.18
Norms of politeness also arise from the many social roles that we
occupy, regardless of whether they are connected to specific social iden-
tities. For example, particular norms often guide our interactions with
family and friends. Those norms may differ from those of other fami-
lies or other groups of friends, for example with regard to eating times
and etiquette, or the way we make interpersonal requests.19 Similarly,
norms of politeness also exist in the workplace. Co-workers greet each
other on a daily basis following specific norms, and may adhere to polite-
ness norms that regulate the use of a shared kitchen or a shared printer.
Norms of politeness can regulate interactions between employers and
employees, in ways that may reflect the hierarchical relationship between
them.20 Furthermore, politeness norms may influence forms of participa-
tion in political and social movements21 and can structure the relationship
between leaders and followers.22 For example, followers may be expected
to bow or not turn their back to leaders in public/official settings and
those same leaders must abide by norms of politeness to maintain status
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and respect. This may involve restraint in speech or behaviour, acknowl-
edging and greeting their followers, and more generally maintaining the
so-called ‘dignity of the office’.23
In addition to social identity and roles, the context of politeness
matters too. In the above situations, different factors affect how much,
when, and where different social norms apply. Context involves, first of
all, power and authority relations. These clearly affect the intensity with
which different social norms apply in asymmetrical contexts, such as the
aforementioned workplace context and leader/follower relationships.24
The latter may affect the predominant direction and quality of polite-
ness norms, regulating the behaviour of those in subordinate positions
more (or, at least, in different ways) than in the case of those who occupy
dominant positions.25 In summary, power and authority affect the form
of, and compliance with, social norms.
Politeness is also linked to environmental considerations. For example,
since politeness is often understood as regulating social distance (as well
as psychological distance), spatial considerations are relevant,26 espe-
cially in public spaces and urban environments.27 In this sense, different
norms of politeness may often apply in physical as opposed to digital
spaces. Moreover, even though norms of politeness often mandate main-
taining a certain distance from other people in public spaces (unless other
constraining factors—e.g. a crowded bus—prevent one from complying
with them), maintaining too much distance from others may sometimes
also be perceived as impolite, as when someone decides to sit in the last
row of an empty seminar room during a talk.
Furthermore, one might speculate that certain features of our environ-
ments can constitute an affront to senses (e.g. loud noises, unwelcome
sights, or bad smells), something that Joel Feinberg famously labels
‘offensive nuisances’.28 This seems to suggest that politeness norms may
also be tied to the design and form of that environment, and that
certain buildings, materials, and colours (and not only the people who
act within them) could sometimes be perceived as offensive or impo-
lite. And, indeed, Welsh architect Trystan Edwards once famously claimed
that we could distinguish between ‘rude’ and ‘polite’ buildings.29 Take,
for example, the so-called ‘Walkie Talkie Building’ in London, which
has been criticized for reflecting intense sunlight off its glass windows.30
Likewise, the use of certain colours in the visual environment might be
perceived as more or less impolite in different contexts depending on the
relevant social and cultural norms.31
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Digital spaces may also involve different degrees of spatial proximity.
For example, recent research has shown that the kind of online forum
through which people interact creates higher or lower levels of virtual
spatial proximity among users, resulting in different levels of politeness
and impoliteness. More specifically, forums to which users contribute
anonymously and on a one-off basis create a greater virtual spatial distance
between them, resulting in higher levels of impoliteness. Conversely,
forums in which users engage in more individual one-to-one iterated
interactions tend to result in higher levels of politeness.32
Norms of politeness also vary in their degree of formality and infor-
mality. Most politeness norms tend to be informal, and violations are
only accompanied by social sanctions. Think, for example, of norms
concerning the practice of gift giving at Christmas.33 In other cases,
politeness norms may become codified via law and rigid etiquette (or
protocols within organizational contexts). Consider, for instance, norms
of etiquette preventing people from accessing certain venues unless they
wear a suit and tie, or laws that make swearing illegal.34 In some cases,
informal or non-legal social norms may gradually acquire legal status, as
when norms that attach impoliteness to certain behaviours in relation to
sacred places become legally enforced. Moreover, norms of politeness may
include norms of display and norms of concealment, where one can be
polite either by saying/doing something or by refraining from doing so.35
Finally, we should consider two additional dimensions of politeness
norms. First, so far we have focused on norms that are linked to specific
social identities and roles, and which are in many ways contextual. There is
general consensus around the view that politeness norms are socially and
culturally specific.36 However, one might argue that at least some polite-
ness norms have a (nearly-)universal scope. Some scholars, for example,
have pointed to a universal desire for not ‘losing face’ as evidence of
the presence of universal norms of politeness.37 Furthermore, one might
also argue that some of the aforementioned affronts to the senses38
may also constitute instances of impoliteness across different social and
cultural contexts, perhaps because they are generally types of offenses not
mediated via culturally specific beliefs. Second, politeness norms are not
static.39 The structural factors that we examined in this section are not
fixed or rigid—politeness norms continually evolve. The actors involved,
whether in a family, a workplace, or a broader political community,
continually (re)negotiate those norms. The next section focuses on these
agential dimensions of politeness.
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Agential Elements of Politeness
In addition to the structural elements of politeness—i.e. the sources of
social norms that define what it means to be polite—scholars must recog-
nize the role of agency in acting politely. Not only do norms of politeness
change and evolve, but individuals also need to navigate such norms. As
one scholar observes, civility [as politeness] is the ‘practical ability of indi-
viduals to distinguish between different social roles and contexts and to
differentiate their behaviour accordingly…[which] crucially involves an
element of judgment.’40 So, how is this practical ability or judgment
exercised?
Agents need to exercise a degree of critical engagement in order
to be polite. Humans learn what norms of politeness are and subse-
quent practices usually reinforce expected behaviours.41 Under normal,
everyday circumstances, politeness norms are reasonably clear. People
mostly understand the demands of a situation and how to interact with
others. Decisions about how to comport oneself on public transporta-
tion42 or how to greet a stranger can be routine in familiar contexts
and require minimal reflection.43 Yet, some situations prove more chal-
lenging to navigate. For example, travelling to culturally distinct tourist
destinations or attending an unfamiliar religious site during an inter-
faith wedding ceremony may introduce moments of uncertainty regarding
polite behaviour. The uncertainty and challenges can become even more
pronounced in moments of crisis that disrupt social life in unprecedented
ways—the COVID-19 pandemic is one of those moments.
Critical engagement requires recognising and learning new politeness
norms, as well as how they apply when we interact with others across a
range of contexts. This involves several dimensions. First, people need to
undertake information-seeking actions that include identifying, studying,
and questioning new behaviours. They also need to observe and inter-
pret the actions or others. Furthermore, critical engagement involves
self-awareness and the ability to identify and rationally assess one’s own
behaviour and how it relates to old and new expectations. Novel circum-
stances demand that individuals reflect upon new conditions before they
take action, rather than simply relying on disposition or habitus.44
Second, people need to become aware of and overcome addi-
tional cognitive limitations and information access issues. For example,
motivational and confirmation biases, framing effects, and information
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processing capabilities may present obstacles to learning and adaptation
in these environments.45 Access issues related to information infrastruc-
ture, technology, and language issues—as well as imperfect information or
overt attempts to mislead the public—could all complicate the transmis-
sion and adoption of new politeness norms. Situational tendencies related
to risk assessment further complicate decision-making and behaviour.46
Third, an absence of scientific consensus regarding which information
is accurate and appropriate may inhibit the adoption of and adherence
to some politeness norms. People internalize and observe a wide range
of normative social behaviours, and science may support or refute the
assumptions behind those behaviours. For example, party etiquette might
ask that attendees refrain from ‘double-dipping’ a chip into salsa after
taking a bite, and we are encouraged not to eat food that has fallen on
the ground based on a ‘five-second rule’. However, it seems that research
findings confirm the social harms only for the former scenario,47 but not
for the latter.48
Finally, other people and institutional structures may affect the way
in which people navigate norms. This might take the form of political
leaders intentionally passing along biased or distorted information based
on politicized or self-interested agendas. For example, the prominent
Italian politician Matteo Salvini, as well as some Italian right-wing media,
often accuse their critics of being impolite.49 This is problematic since
the ability to discern when norms of politeness ought to be complied
with and when they might be breached should be central to our critical
engagement with such norms. Indeed, in some cases incivility expressed
as impoliteness can be used as a tool for signalling and contesting unjust
policies or institutions.50 Public accusations of impoliteness, while tech-
nically correct (e.g. Salvini’s critics may well be impolite when they swear
at him), might delegitimize some people’s use of impolite speech or
behaviour in ways that prevent the audience from critically assessing their
appropriateness in certain circumstances (e.g. protesting against restrictive
policies targeting migrants, such as those Salvini himself endorses).
Various forms of censorship could prevent people from learning about
relevant politeness norms as well. Those who lack exposure to norms of
polite behaviour or speech, for instance, could (un)intentionally stigma-
tize others. Education levels, generational gaps, and class divides could
hinder people’s ability to identify and fully understand the content and
meaning of different norms of politeness. For example, older white
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residents in the American South may not observe shifts in politically
correct racial references to blacks.51
Overcoming all these obstacles involves individual costs, both finan-
cial and in terms of time and effort. Learning new things when filling
a new role or in the context of cultural difference may require signifi-
cant investment in time and information-seeking activities. Intercultural
competencies are crucial in many settings, including tourism, where a
traveller or volunteer may need to acquire translation dictionaries or
take short language courses in preparation for a visit.52 Alternatively,
the investment in training for scenarios like international disaster deploy-
ment53 or relationship-building during counterinsurgency campaigns54
can have much higher stakes. There are also various kinds of social and
cultural costs. These may involve ‘individual compromising’ if certain
actors temporarily give up preferred norms to comply with those that
apply to the relevant situation they find themselves in. Individuals might
also incur social and political opportunity costs associated with various
forms of in-group stigma and loss of legitimacy or authority within their
group. For example, some former white supremacists are often stigma-
tized by other extremists when they attempt to politely engage with
members of minority groups they used to target.55
The Functionality of Politeness: Signalling and Social Cooperation
The politeness dimension of civility serves an important function in social
and political life. Acts of politeness can be used as a signal. For example,
for Edyvane, civility as politeness represents a mode of interaction that
displays or communicates a recognition of ‘one another as people among
whom [we] must live’,56 through compliance with a particular set of
social norms. Furthermore, some expressions of politeness norms can
move beyond simple recognition and communicate respect to others and
acknowledge their dignity.57 For example, Calhoun argues that politeness
‘involves a display of respect, toleration, or considerateness’.58 Central to
Calhoun’s conception of civility is the idea that ‘civility…is an essentially
communicative form of moral conduct’.59
The signalling function of politeness is important for several reasons.
While there are obvious implications for economic exchange, we focus
on the social and political aspects. Politeness norms facilitate and rein-
force social cooperation in the presence of disagreement—they allow
for and promote a healthy and well-functioning society. Sune Lægaard
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actually describes this aspect as the primary function of civility; it has
the pragmatic role ‘to ease social tensions in order to facilitate social
interaction and collaboration across differences and the resulting disagree-
ments’.60 Civility as politeness essentially acts as a ‘lubricant’ for social
cooperation.61
The politeness dimension of civility affects social interactions and
behaviours across a range of sites including the home,62 the workplace,63
educational settings,64 and public places in the community.65 Politeness
also influences interactions in familial, friendship, romantic, and busi-
ness relationships. For example, (im)politeness in the workplace can have
significant and far-reaching effects on important outcomes like team cohe-
sion,66 as well as employee productivity.67 Furthermore, polite behaviours
can reinforce cooperative relationships in an office setting, while incidents
of impoliteness can harm prospects for ongoing productive exchange.68
Overtly rude behaviours have also been shown to reduce performance
levels and helpfulness in experimental settings.69
There are also implications for (im)politeness in the political realm.
Politeness can have direct effects on outcomes related to specific election
debates,70 along with how the public reacts to politicians’ behaviours in
electoral politics.71 Perceptions about even ‘minor incivilities’ can have
far-reaching effects on public perceptions and fears, as well as subsequent
policies.72 Impolite political discourse can have lasting effects on matters
of decorum that help to structure party politics, and a political atmo-
sphere of ongoing impoliteness can further reinforce entrenched political
positions.73 However, an insistence on polite behaviour could also stifle
acts of dissent aimed at unjust policies that threaten desirable political
ideals.74 We should also recognize that political interactions can take place
in public or private spheres and in physical or virtual spaces.75
Politeness is also important for diplomatic relations,76 as well as for
the efficacy of foreign policy77 and prospects for international coopera-
tion more broadly. How states treat migrants and asylum-seekers during
processing may affect their international and domestic reputation. For
example, polite or impolite behaviour by officials at border checkpoints
or during processing can provide an indicator as to whether a state
lives up to the fair assessment of applicants and to practices expected
from liberal democratic countries.78 In the realm of contentious poli-
tics, the form that civil resistance movements take on, including how
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they may or may not comply with social expectations regarding strategy,
influences the likelihood of their success and failure.79 Even in extreme
circumstances like violent armed conflict, civilians can create institutional
mechanisms to encourage polite and respectful behaviour by insurgent
and counterinsurgent forces.80
The COVID-19 crisis has disrupted politeness norms across the globe
in economic, social, and political spaces. These disruptions will undoubt-
edly have implications for how people and states interact with each other.
When politeness norms are uncertain or changing, as during the current
pandemic, it is more difficult for people to comply with them. This will
in turn also affect their ability to use polite speech or behaviour to effec-
tively signal their commitment to social interaction and cooperation, thus
potentially creating or exacerbating social tensions. We will return to these
points in the next chapter.
Civility as Public-Mindedness
Politeness, especially when understood as a communicative virtue, consti-
tutes an important dimension of civility, as we explained in the previous
section. However, it is not the only dimension. Several scholars under-
stand civility mainly as a political virtue, specifically a civic virtue that is
inherently related to liberal politics.81 The political dimension of civility
emphasizes our responsibilities and duties as citizens of a liberal democ-
racy, rather than simply as individuals interacting in different everyday
social settings. Edyvane, for example, points out that this political under-
standing of civility is ‘bound up with the idea of an association of citizens,
and includes cognate ideas of the civic, the civil and the civilian; it
concerns one’s status and duties as a member of a political commu-
nity, as a citizen with certain rights and responsibilities’.82 Central to this
understanding of civility is compliance with fundamental liberal demo-
cratic values, as well as a commitment to the common good rather than
to personal or sectarian interests. To be civil in this political sense means
to engage in ‘a kind of politics, a type of political discourse that does
not harm, injure, or offend fellow citizens’.83 Doing so can contribute to
better democratic governance and social coexistence in the long term.
While this second dimension of civility is often referred to as ‘polit-
ical civility’,84 we prefer the term civility as public-mindedness. The label
‘political civility’ might inadvertently suggest that this kind of civility is
solely relevant to limited aspects of the political realm like institutions,
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political parties, or electoral campaigns. Civility as public-mindedness has
a broader meaning, and involves recognizing others as free and equal
members of society. According to Richard Boyd, for example, civility
involves ‘the mutual recognition of others as our moral equals’.85 Like-
wise, Robert Pippin claims that civility entails acknowledging others’
‘equal status as free agents within a cooperative enterprise’.86 However,
it is important to distinguish between two different sub-dimensions of
civility as public-mindedness. While these two aspects overlap, and both
involve treating others as free and equal citizens, each of them points
towards a specific dimension of public-mindedness and specific duties
associated with it.
Moral Civility
The first dimension of civility as public-mindedness refers to the way
we interact with others via our actions and speech in societies character-
ized by diversity and disagreement. We call this moral civility. According
to this dimension, to respect others as free and equal means to respect
their fundamental rights, liberties, and equal civic standing. It means, for
example, refraining from using physical violence against others,87 discrim-
inating against them,88 or using racist or other types of expression that
portray members of certain groups as physically, intellectually, or morally
inferior. When it comes to the latter point, perhaps the most prominent
defence of moral civility in recent years is provided by Jeremy Waldron in
his book The Harm in Hate Speech.89 As Teresa Bejan points out, ‘[f]or
Waldron…[s]ome speech about others and their fundamental identities
and commitments is simply so uncivil, so intolerant, degrading, and disre-
spectful that it constitutes a form of persecution against which a tolerant
society can and should act’.90 Here two clarifications are required.
First, while apparently overlapping, civility as politeness and moral
civility are not the same thing. In some cases, these two dimensions of
civility can be tightly connected. As we mentioned earlier, civility as polite-
ness can be used to communicate respect to others and acknowledge their
dignity, two key aspects of moral civility. According to Sarah Buss, for
example, ‘by behaving politely we are, in effect, “saying” something to
one another…[and]… acknowledge[ing] one another’s special dignity’.91
Yet, in other cases, politeness and moral civility may come into tension, as
when polite means are used to advance morally uncivil causes, or impo-
lite behaviour or speech is employed to advance morally civil goals.92
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For example, ‘polite Nazis’ may abide by norms of good manners and
etiquette for purely strategic reasons, while advancing political goals that
are morally uncivil since they deny a free and equal status to members
of certain groups.93 Conversely, the use of impolite behaviour or speech
can signal dissent towards unjust policies or institutions to help advance
morally civil goals.94 Second, while moral civility is often tied to liberal
democratic institutions, this is not always the case. For example, while all
liberal democracies have laws against physical violence, not all of them
have laws regulating racist or hate speech, at least not in the same way.
Where (most) racist speech is not regulated (e.g. in the US), it can be
argued that citizens have the legal right, sanctioned by liberal democratic
institutions (e.g. the US First Amendment), to violate moral civility with
particular speech acts.
Justificatory Civility
The second dimension of civility as public-mindedness concerns the
public justification of political rules in liberal democracies. According to
this view, in societies characterized by reasonable pluralism and disagree-
ment, citizens and public officials treat each other as free and equal if they
justify political rules by appealing only to public reasons. These are reasons
that all of them could in principle understand and accept, rather than
reasons grounded in their different worldviews, identities, and beliefs. We
call this justificatory civility. The most influential account of justificatory
civility is perhaps the one provided by John Rawls, for whom the duty to
appeal solely to public reasons during the process of public justification
is a ‘duty of civility’.95 Complying with this duty means renouncing the
use of religious or other controversial arguments when justifying political
rules, thus engaging in ‘reasonable public discourse’.96
Here we should draw a distinction between two different compo-
nents of justificatory civility. The first consists of fundamental political
values that are widely shared in liberal democratic societies, and include
for example civil and political rights and liberties, equality of opportu-
nity, and values linked to the promotion of the common good.97 These
constitute the moral content of justificatory civility. It is important to
stress that justificatory civility demands not only that we appeal to these
values, rather than to sectarian or controversial ones, during the process
of public justification; it also requires that we balance them in reasonable
ways. To do this, we need to provide reasons that ‘represent a plausible
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balance of political values. An argument, even if based on a political and
free-standing value, fails to be a reasonable public justification if it does
not plausibly address other political values that may be at stake’.98 The
second component of justificatory civility includes what Rawls refers to
as ‘guidelines of inquiry: principles of reasoning and rules of evidence in
the light of which citizens are to decide whether substantive principles
properly apply and to identify laws and policies that best satisfy them’,
as well as ‘the methods and conclusions of science when these are not
controversial’.99 These form the epistemic content of justificatory civility.
Accounts of justificatory civility differ in many respects. There is
disagreement, for example, as to whether the duty of civility only applies
to constitutional matters or also more generally to all legislation.100
Furthermore, while some only assign that duty to legislators and public
officials,101 others extend it to citizens more broadly.102 More impor-
tantly, there are different accounts of the structure of public reason. Some,
following Rawls, endorse a consensus approach to public reason and argue
that public reasons (or, at least, the premises and standards on which
public reasons are grounded) should be shared among all (idealized)
members of the public.103 Others reject this position and defend conver-
gence accounts of public reason where justification does not require
shared reasons or premises but only that political rules be justified to each
and every citizen based on reasons that they will find persuasive from the
perspective of their own beliefs and values.104 Convergence accounts of
public reason therefore are in tension with the Rawlsian duty of civility.
The latter demands that we refrain from appealing to religious or other
controversial values during the process of public justification, but such
appeals may be permissible under convergence accounts if they help citi-
zens or legislators to justify political rules to those who endorse those
views, e.g. members of certain religious groups.105 This does not imply
that one is uncivil (in the justificatory sense) if they endorse a conver-
gence account of public justification. However, civility grounded in the
convergence view will have different implications for public justification:
to be civil in this sense will mean to provide each of our fellow citizens
with reasons in support of political rules that they can find acceptable
from their own perspective, rather than striving to articulate widely shared
reasons that all our fellow citizens may accept.
A final aspect should be considered. The duty of civility concerns
the public justification of political rules, which is tied to their aims and
goals, rather than their outcomes and consequences. For this reason it is
often assumed that as long as laws and policies are publicly justified (based
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on whichever conception of public justification one endorses), the fact
that they might end up favouring or burdening certain citizens more than
others is not morally relevant from the perspective of public justification.
However, this constitutes an incorrect, or at least incomplete, account of
public reason and public justification. The outcomes and consequences
of political rules are and should be relevant to public justification. Based
on Rawls’s idea of the ‘strains of commitment’,106 some scholars point
out that it would be unreasonable to implement political rules (even if
in principle justified based on public reasons) that would impose intoler-
able strains upon certain citizens.107 For example, members of religious
groups could not reasonably be expected to accept laws that would make
it overly difficult for them to pursue their religious beliefs and practices,
even if these laws in principle aim to realize public-minded goals.
In this book, our analysis of justificatory civility is based on a number
of premises, which we assume without further defence. First, we contend
that justificatory civility concerns all political rules and not only those
concerning constitutional matters; therefore all legislation related to
COVID-19 ought to be publicly justified. Furthermore, we postulate that
when it comes to the public justification of policies, the Rawlsian duty of
civility applies solely to those who occupy decision-making positions, like
politicians and public officials. We also share the belief that consensus
accounts of public reason are more desirable than convergence ones, and
that justificatory civility should take into account the outcomes and conse-
quences of political rules that result in strains of commitment for some
individuals and groups within society.
At this point it is important to acknowledge that both moral and justi-
ficatory civility, as we presented them in this chapter, may be contested
by some. For a start, only those liberals who, like Rawls, are committed
to political liberalism and public reason, will be prepared to consider
justificatory civility a key dimension of civility as public-mindedness (or
of civility tout court ). Liberal perfectionists who criticize the ideals of
public reason and public justification,108 for example, might embrace
moral civility but reject justificatory civility. Furthermore, some may
consider moral civility itself too demanding. In her book Mere Civility,
for example, Teresa Bejan rejects Rawls’s justificatory civility and criticizes
Waldron’s moral civility. More specifically, she argues.
[f]ollowing Rawls, some theorists invoke civility in arguments about public
reason and other constraints on public deliberation, while others, like
Waldron…, stress the negative effects of uncivil speech on diversity and
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dignity for members of tolerant societies…[T]hese theorists’ robust under-
standings of civility often do create covert demands for conformity that
threaten to civilize disagreement by putting an end to it entirely…[T]he
‘uncivil’ are left only two options: a sincere conversion to the fundamentals
of political liberalism or silence.109
Against the Waldronian and Rawlsian views of civility, which roughly
correspond to what we call moral and justificatory civility, Bejan defends
the idea of ‘mere civility’ advocated by the Puritan exile and dissenter
Roger Williams, who founded the colony of Rhode Island. Mere civility
involves ‘a minimal adherence to culturally contingent rules of respectful
behavior compatible with, and occasionally expressive of, contempt for
others and their beliefs’.110 We stipulate, without further argument, that
Bejan’s conception of civility is too narrow to most effectively engage
many of the social and political challenges posed by COVID-19. We
contend that our more expansive view of civility as public-mindedness,
with its moral and justificatory dimensions, offers a richer framework for
understanding those challenges.
From Civility to Incivility
Based on the foregoing analysis of the different dimensions of civility,
we identify a number of ways in which incivility can manifest in liberal
democracies. Each of these dimensions of incivility will be relevant to our
analysis in Chapters 3 and 4, where we illustrate how COVID-19 has
resulted in a loss of civility across a number of areas and settings, and
what responses have been or could be adopted to recover civility in the
current pandemic and during future crises.
First, incivility can manifest as a failure to comply with norms of polite-
ness. Swearing, not greeting one’s co-workers, failing to say ‘please’ or
‘thank you’, are just some examples of how individuals might be impolite
under this dimension. However, simply identifying instances of incivility
as impoliteness is not sufficient. Based on our earlier analysis, it is also
important to understand why people behave impolitely, and what impli-
cations this might have for their social coexistence, especially in times of
crisis. Answering the former question requires delving into the structural
and agential factors that may prevent individuals from abiding by norms
of politeness and etiquette, especially when those norms may become
uncertain, as during a crisis. Addressing the latter question entails instead
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examining the implications of impolite speech and action for social inter-
action and cooperation. We will consider both aspects in Chapter 3 in
relation to the current pandemic.
Second, incivility may manifest itself as moral incivility. This may
involve speech or behaviour that fails to respect other citizens as free and
equal, by denying or violating their individual rights, liberties, and/or
equal civic status. Physically assaulting other people, destroying prop-
erty, or addressing members of certain groups with discriminatory and
hateful speech, are clear instances of moral incivility. According to Jeremy
Waldron, for example, hate speech denies the civic dignity and equal
social status of those it targets.111 This, as already pointed out by Bejan,
seems to be a clear instance of moral incivility. Here, however, it is impor-
tant to distinguish between moral incivility and incivility as impoliteness.
The latter, unlike the former, only involves a violation of social norms of
politeness and etiquette but not an attack on other individuals’ free and
equal status, or an infringement on their rights and liberties. Of course,
what starts as merely impolite speech or behaviour (e.g. swearing) may
sometimes escalate into moral incivility (e.g. hate speech and physical
violence), but this shift is not inevitable and it is important to keep the
two dimensions of incivility separate for analytical purposes.
Third, incivility can take a justificatory form. To be uncivil, under this
dimension, means to fail to comply with the Rawlsian duty of civility,
which requires appealing to public reasons when publicly justifying polit-
ical rules. Here, we need to disaggregate justificatory incivility into two
subtypes, based on the two elements of the content of public reason
(moral and epistemic) that we illustrated in the previous section.
On the one hand, justificatory incivility may involve a failure to recog-
nize or appeal to the moral content of public reason during the process
of public justification. For example, one might appeal to reasons that
overtly or covertly deny that certain citizens are entitled to basic rights
and liberties. This instance of justificatory incivility clearly presents points
of connection with moral incivility. After all, a racist politician who
verbally abuses or physically assaults members of certain ethnic minority
groups, thus being morally uncivil, is also likely to violate justificatory
civility when defending or opposing certain policies and laws. Yet, the
two sub-dimensions of incivility as non-public-mindedness should be kept
separate. One (moral incivility) concerns how we speak to and act towards
our fellow citizens in our everyday interactions. The other (justificatory
incivility) relates solely to the process of public justification, which is a
distinct dimension of public and political life. But justificatory incivility
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concerning the moral content of public reason does not manifest itself
only through a failure to recognize others’ rights and liberties. It also,
and perhaps more often, occurs when policymakers appeal to reasons
which, while not denying others’ basic rights and liberties, are rooted in
one’s self-interest or in the interest of their family, narrow social group,
or partisan cause, rather than a commitment to the common good. For
example, defending a tax cut based solely on the argument that it will
advantage one’s party and the businesses that support it (rather than,
say, contribute to economic growth for the entire society) constitutes an
instance of justificatory incivility. Relatedly, one can violate justificatory
civility by appealing solely to reasons grounded in controversial religious,
ethical, or philosophical doctrines (e.g. Catholicism, Islam, or Millian
liberalism) to justify political rules. Furthermore, politicians and public
officials are also uncivil in the justificatory sense when they overly priori-
tize certain political values and fail to address others, or when they neglect
the strains of commitment that may result from certain policies.
On the other hand, the content of public reason also involves an
epistemic dimension. From this perspective, employing flawed guide-
lines of inquiry, or relying on controversial scientific arguments and/or
methods, may result in publicly unjustified political rules. Instances of
this kind of justificatory incivility may include, for example, the use of
conspiracy theories to justify or oppose certain laws or policies.112 Like-
wise, one might display justificatory incivility by appealing to flawed or
incomplete scientific evidence, flawed methods, and/or flawed chains of
causation. Another instance of justificatory incivility related to the epis-
temic dimension of public reason involves the selective use of non-flawed
scientific evidence for non-public-minded goals. Scientists often disagree
with each other even if there are no inherent flaws in their methods or
conclusions.113 In such cases, a policymaker might be guilty of justifi-
catory incivility if they deliberately select (e.g. for ideological or partisan
reasons) specific scientific methods and conclusions (even if not inherently
flawed) to support their preferred policies, while failing to acknowledge
alternative ones.
Conclusion
In this chapter we provided an account of civility that distinguishes
between its politeness and public-mindedness dimensions. With regard
to civility as politeness, we illustrated its structural and agential elements,
as well its functionality. When examining civility as public-mindedness,
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we focused instead on the distinction between its moral and justificatory
sub-dimensions. This allowed us to articulate different types of incivility,
setting the stage for our analysis of COVID-19 in the next two chap-
ters. More specifically, in Chapter 3 we will examine the many ways in
which COVID-19 poses unprecedented challenges to people’s ability to
be polite, and what this might imply for social coexistence and coopera-
tion, both in the short and long term. In Chapter 4 we will shift our focus
to civility as public-mindedness and analyse instances of moral and justifi-
catory incivility during the pandemic. Throughout both chapters we will
also consider various measures that have been or could be implemented
to counter greater incivility along these different dimensions.
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CHAPTER 3
Civility as Politeness During COVID-19
Introduction
This chapter examines new challenges to the politeness dimension of
civility presented by COVID-19. As we explained in Chapter 2, polite-
ness involves complying with norms of behaviour that aim to facilitate
peaceful exchange and positive social interaction. At the very onset of
the pandemic, compliance with politeness norms and other-regarding
behaviour served as an early bulwark against the spread of the virus.
As the director of the Division of Medical Ethics at New York Univer-
sity’s Grossman School of Medicine Arthur Caplan said, ‘[a]t least for
now, we don’t have treatment or vaccines. All we’ve got is behaviour.
And there is evidence that the behaviour works, if we’re diligent about
it’.1 How people behave during a crisis such as a pandemic has very
real consequences. In the absence of clear guidelines and policies, polite
other-regarding behaviour can save lives.
However, the crisis resulting from the pandemic also disrupted polite-
ness norms themselves. We focus on some of these disruptions in
this chapter. More specifically, we identify four problems posed by the
pandemic to people’s ability to behave politely. First, the current crisis
has made it difficult for people to identify norms of politeness and behave
appropriately in circumstances that were previously less contested and
problematic. Second, the signalling function of politeness has also been
undermined: communicating respect and consideration towards others
via polite speech or behaviour is more likely to go awry during the
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pandemic. Third, new problems regarding social cooperation may arise
as a result. When acts of politeness are unclear or misunderstood, they
may no longer help to mitigate conflict or facilitate cooperative social
exchange. Finally, citizens and politicians can exploit disruptions around
politeness norms to engage in behaviour that under normal circumstances
would be considered impolite.
Navigating New Politeness Norms
As we explained in the previous chapter, behaving politely implies
complying with social norms grounded in people’s social identities and
roles, which are often affected by contextual and environmental factors.
However, politeness also involves an agential dimension, namely the
ability to be aware of, critically assess, judge, and comply with those norms
based on the circumstances. In normal times, agents exercise this kind
of critical engagement against the background of relatively stable polite-
ness norms. However, COVID-19 has disrupted this stability and forced
agents to navigate a social environment characterized by greater uncer-
tainty, where it is more difficult to identify, evaluate, and comply with
politeness norms. In this sense, critical engagement with norms of polite-
ness has not only become increasingly difficult, but also more necessary
during the current pandemic: when the structural dimensions of polite-
ness are unstable or contested, agents are less likely to find and adopt
ready-made polite behaviours. Instead, they need to make a greater effort
to understand what behaving politely entails in different circumstances.
Yet, people are endowed with the capacity to adapt to these disrup-
tions and formulate solutions to problems raised by this kind of crisis.
In this subsection we evaluate whether and how individuals or groups
have responded to the disruption of politeness norms during the current
pandemic.
In what ways has COVID-19 rendered critical judgment related to
norms of politeness more problematic? It seems evident that people have
often faced a lack of clear information regarding the virus, the way it
spreads, and its short- and long-term effects—especially at the begin-
ning of the pandemic. However, the problem persists due to limited or
uncertain scientific evidence regarding how the virus spreads in everyday
environments such as gyms, restaurants, cafes, or on public transport.2
This points to an ongoing challenge since many of our polite interac-
tions with others happen in these kinds of spaces. For example, if it is
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unclear how the virus spreads within a restaurant, then it will be diffi-
cult for people to understand how to interact politely with their table
companions, the waiting staff, or other customers; what in normal circum-
stances used to be considered polite (e.g. handing over a menu, passing
the salt, or exchanging pleasantries with a neighbouring table) might no
longer be viewed as such. Furthermore, and relatedly, in the absence of
clear information people may end up making different judgments about
what constitutes politeness and how to express it in different contexts and
circumstances. This may risk creating different and separate ‘politeness
bubbles’, thus undermining the ‘social lubricant’ function of politeness, a
point to which we will return in more detail later in the chapter.
This ‘piecemeal’ approach to politeness, where people adopt different
norms of politeness (and to different degrees) in the absence of clear
information, constitutes one of the most significant challenges COVID-
19 poses to the politeness dimension of civility. Responding to this
situation requires interaction and communication between various agents
within society. For example, governments might help to coordinate and
disseminate findings from scientific research on the virus in order to
provide citizens with clearer guidelines, including guidance regarding
other-regarding behaviours that might constitute polite action in view of
the current pandemic. This might involve issuing press releases as well
as providing clear information about how to behave politely under the
current circumstances in popular public locations such as beaches and
parks. This might take the form of signs or ropes and fences to clearly
deter use (Image 3.1). People already provide these kinds of information
tools concerning etiquette for visiting mosques,3 Buddhist temples,4 or
churches.5
In the remainder of this section, we will consider three examples
regarding uncertain politeness norms: queuing, interactions in sites
related to the food industry such as restaurants and cafes, and greet-
ings. We will illustrate how COVID-19 has caused a disruption of
politeness norms in all three contexts, and how citizens, businesses, and
governments have reacted to this crisis in order to restore such norms.
Queuing During COVID-19
Queuing provides a clear example of a politeness norm that is simple
and universally understood as a polite act regardless of levels of compli-
ance. While we may observe subtle variation in queuing practices across
contexts, an Italian (for example) would understand how to stand in
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Image 3.1 Roped off outdoor gym equipment in Melbourne, Australia
a line in the United States and vice versa. Yet, at the start of the
pandemic, considerations related to the transmission of COVID-19
disrupted previous practices and added new layers of complexity to
queuing. New demands emerged about maintaining physical distance in
public places, but solutions came quickly. People acknowledged the need
to make small changes to their behaviour and almost immediately began
to help others understand new expectations. For example, in Seattle,
Washington vendors at a local farmer’s market provided additional guid-
ance with tape, chalk, and signs to help patrons adhere to new best
practices.6
Explicit measures such as floor markings can communicate emerging
politeness norms related to queuing—reducing uncertainty and making
compliance with new norms more likely. The solutions may be formal
or informal and the norms more or less codified. Some governments
stepped in to provide guidance and a more authoritative stance on phys-
ical distancing. For example, the state government in Tasmania, Australia
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encouraged businesses to act: ‘[t]o maintain physical distancing, place
appropriately spaced floor markings at queuing points, such as check-
outs and the entrance to the store. At larger stores, queuing stations
need to be clearly identified outside the store.’7 Supermarkets added
markings and moved especially long queues to outside spaces.8 Some
businesses adopted more technology-based solutions and implemented
digital queuing systems to further reduce risk and avoid potential impolite
(and unsafe) behaviour altogether9 (Image 3.2).
The public began to understand and adapt to new queuing norms
quickly in most cases. While in some contexts physical queuing is
customary (e.g. the UK), in others (e.g. Italy) ‘queuing’ in normal times
Image 3.2 A business providing guidance on queuing practices in Melbourne,
Australia
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may not involve an actual queue. Instead, the public may adopt alter-
native methods of ensuring fairness and order like taking a number or
simply recognizing others who are there first waiting their turn. In those
contexts, ‘queuing’ during COVID-19 may now entail physical queuing
compliant with new social distancing norms. Regardless of how it was
done before, queuing serves as a politeness norm to ensure fairness and
orderly cooperation, but now includes considerations related to health
and safety.
However, things may still go wrong even in the presence of new, clear
queuing norms. In extreme examples we have seen physical altercations
when people fail to observe social distancing in queues, as was the case at
a Walmart store in Colorado Springs in the United States.10 One US resi-
dent we spoke with recalled his initial impressions when visiting a Costco
warehouse store in the early weeks of the pandemic:
It was really weird because it was like two tribes. There were the people
who were very courteous, who understood [the rules] and had the same
fears that you did to stay away. And there were other crazy people that
were just going in there, you know, that kind of a thing. And, you know,
it was really tribal.11
Despite some of these unfortunate incidents, new politeness norms
related to queuing were introduced immediately after the onset of the
public health crisis. Overall, they were adopted quickly and universally in
part due to their simplicity; queuing involves politeness in a physical space
and entails relatively uncomplicated demands in practice.
Dining and Drinking with Others During COVID-19
More complicated environments and diverse forms of interaction can
introduce additional challenges regarding norms of politeness. For
example, interaction in sites related to the food industry such as restau-
rants, cafes, bars, and grocery stores can add additional layers of
complexity. We may need to interact with waiting staff, place an order,
conduct a transaction with a cashier, or use the toilet. These sites are
central to social life and therefore become places where we observe many
politeness norms. We also purposefully engage with other people in these
spaces; we might meet a friend for drinks after work or eat dinner at a
restaurant with family. The demands and practices related to politeness
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norms in these spaces can vary significantly across contexts and differ by
country as well.
Disruptions like COVID-19 can lead to greater uncertainty and intro-
duce new problems related to politeness in these more complicated
environments. People recognized many of these challenges to etiquette
and politeness norms early on during the pandemic. Experts weighed
in on how to alter the way we thought about previous social prac-
tices.12 Popular news outlets provided some basic advice on behaviours
when restaurants reopened after mandatory shutdowns.13 The public had
some guidance as to the new ‘dos and don’ts’ for restaurant patrons.14
However, different locales could adopt distinct approaches. Furthermore,
each business may have a different hierarchy of concerns based on its
own priorities and circumstances.
Customers face some distinct challenges in the way they engage with
businesses and can become disoriented in these uncertain environments.
As a customer in one place you may quickly learn some basic rules to
be polite to waiting staff, while in a different place where you order
your own food at the counter you might need to learn different norms
regarding where and how you might wait for your order to be taken
away. Restaurants have been especially hard hit and face a precarious busi-
ness landscape; recognizing and accommodating these circumstances has
become part of the process through which new politeness norms are being
formulated. In supporting local restaurants, customers might come to
terms with the fact that menus may not be complete; place orders earlier
in the day in consideration of preparation and supply-chain complications;
tip generously to support staff; and familiarize themselves with policies
related to curbside takeaway service so that employees do not have to
wait.15 Not showing up for a reservation has always been impolite, but
the consequences for businesses in the pandemic climate are especially
severe.16 Efforts to educate the public as to the dire financial effects could
help, but some businesses may need to adopt new deposit policies so as
not to rely on the politeness of their customers.
Businesses and their employees also face new challenges related to
etiquette and politeness norms, with a special emphasis on obligations to
ensure health and safety. Simple practices like greeting customers have
to be adjusted. For example, an employee at a Melbourne restaurant
described the disruption to the way they greet patrons: ‘our customers
are like an extension to our family. It’s not uncommon for us to greet
with a hug so this has been very difficult for us to acclimatize ourselves
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with’.17 Policies related to food preparation and service need to account
for new concerns and expectations too. The seating plan for customers
must now consider physical distancing requirements. Businesses should
recognize new risks for viral transmission related to touching surfaces
and take precautions when using specific technologies related to ordering
and payment. In the United States, where it may have been customary
to provide a gratuity to your waiter in cash even while paying with a
credit card to ensure they keep most of the money, it may now be more
polite to add the gratuity on the card to avoid touching the money, or
take some precautionary steps. For example, lifestyle and etiquette expert
Elaine Swann recently advised: ‘[i]f you do have to tip in cash, to put
[workers] at ease, put the cash in an envelope in advance…One of the
core values of etiquette is to make sure we’re doing everything we can to
put others at ease’.18
Customers have also had to more carefully consider how they might
interact with other patrons they do not know while inside restau-
rants. Polite behaviour when waiting to be seated and in passing other
customers largely relates to physical distancing. Restaurants can help
customers to be polite in this way. Normally, physical distancing in restau-
rants includes basic etiquette related to not touching others, respecting
privacy, and being unintrusive. We generally respect a ‘personal bubble’,
though the specifics can differ by country.19 These expectations have
become especially important during the COVID-19 crisis.
Restaurants, bars, and cafes have taken measures to help patrons
become aware of the need to maintain physical distancing and in many
cases provided some tools to help them do it. For example, a Paris
sidewalk cafe used giant teddy bears placed in seats to ensure adequate
spacing between customers at neighbouring tables.20 Restaurants all
over the world employed mannequins, dummies, and cardboard cut-
outs to communicate the need for and to help enforce social distancing
measures.21 Some locales maintained a sense of humour about how to
best adhere to new public health guidelines. For example, a cafe in
Germany asked patrons to wear hats with long pool flotation noodles
attached to the top to help with spacing.22 A US bar in Maryland placed
customers inside giant rolling ‘bumper tables’ to keep them two metres
apart while drinking on its outdoor patio, and a restaurant in Amsterdam
seated diners inside miniature greenhouses built for two.23
In addition to polite behaviour during interactions with other parties in
a restaurant, the public has also had to adjust to new etiquette concerning
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eating with co-diners. For example, the way we eat differs across cultures
and has changed throughout history.24 The COVID-19 pandemic has
introduced new challenges and considerations to the way we interact
with our family, friends and colleagues in environments related to food
service. As a result, customers might need to change their eating habits
in some contexts. For example, communal seating and sharing plat-
ters may become less common moving forward,25 and health risks have
affected long-standing cultural traditions tied to dining behaviours.26
These changes could have carry-on implications. For example, research
suggests that acts like sharing plates and meals facilitates cooperation
and reduces competitive behaviour among acquaintances and strangers
alike.27 Where sharing a meal was previously seen as polite, potentially
building trust and strengthening social bonds, this may now prove more
challenging.
Greetings During COVID-19
Politeness norms related to other common human interactions like greet-
ings are often situational and culturally dependent. For example, you
might hug a family member or friend when you meet for a coffee,
while a simple handshake would be more appropriate when meeting a
colleague from work. In different cultural or professional contexts, you
might demonstrate politeness with a formal bow, a rigid salute, or a casual
fist-bump. We learn the best practices to facilitate smooth exchange with
others through socialisation.28 With the onset of a pandemic, previously
understood expectations regarding appropriate greetings are less clear. A
polite handshake meant to initiate a pleasant social exchange might make
the other party uneasy or be perceived as unsafe at best or offensive at
worst. COVID-19 has turned some of the politeness norms related to
greetings on their head, where an other-regarding demonstration of care
may now entail abstention from previous polite behaviours. Given the
health risks associated with proximity and touch, the public could benefit
from a ‘hug and handshake hiatus’ and develop alternative ways to exhibit
politeness when greeting others.29
Specific cultures and social environments have been affected in distinct
ways. For example, politicians in France have urged the public to refrain
from la bise, a customary French greeting of air kisses on the cheeks.30
Those living in Muslim societies face similar disruptions as a result of
social distancing measures. A customary handshake followed by a hug
between friends and acquaintances of the same sex has largely fallen
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out of practice.31 Disruptions and changes to the way we greet others
has consequences for subsequent interactions and the trajectory of our
relationships. This issue extends to the business world as well. A bank
employee in Italy explained to us:
The handshake has always been considered a sign of trust in the other
person, more so in the banking sector. The customer is placing their life
savings in the bank’s care; this is an act of great trust. Not being able to
shake hands with customers [during the pandemic] has certainly led to a
situation of freezing relationships— everything is more impersonal.32
Likewise, when a commercial real estate agent in New York ended a lunch
meeting with someone he had known for ten years without a parting hug,
he remarked that it ‘felt like we didn’t close the loop’.33 The disruption
leaves something of a ‘norm gap’ when expressions of politeness transition
from one form to another. The communicative and signalling functions
of civility as politeness are in flux (a point to which we will return in the
next section) and we must develop alternative practices.
In more formal contexts, politicians will need to develop novel forms
of official protocol to guide diplomatic exchange between leaders.34 How
politicians interact with one another, as well as with their own citizens, has
become more complicated. For example, Prime Minister Boris Johnson
has had to learn how to balance conflicting politeness norms. Early in the
pandemic he joked about shaking hands with coronavirus patients: ‘I’m
shaking hands continuously, I was in a hospital the other night where I
think there were actually a few coronavirus patients and you’ll be pleased
to know I shook hands with everybody!’ He went on: ‘[a]nd I continue to
shake hands’, then he smiled and concluded, ‘[o]ur judgement is wash,
washing your hands is the crucial thing’,35 rather than abstaining from
handshakes. Johnson’s statement shows how previously ingrained polite-
ness norms around greetings might sometimes take priority for some
people over new concerns for health and safety. The medical commu-
nity recognizes the problematic nature of the handshake in healthcare
settings,36 but shaking hands can represent an especially important act
for politicians to relate to constituents.37 Johnson contracted the virus
shortly after.
Public consensus regarding the potential dangers and inappropriate-
ness of the handshake has led to a range of alternative greetings. Early
substitutes included smiles and air kisses from afar, but subsequent mask
requirements placed additional limits on visibility. Other gestures might
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include a small head incline, a hand to the heart, a namaste gesture, or
even a Star Trek-inspired Vulcan salute.38 More animated greetings could
include ‘jazz hands’, a footshake, an elbow bump, or a somewhat riskier
fist bump in the appropriate circumstances.39
Politeness Signals Going Awry
The second challenge posed by COVID-19 to civility as politeness
concerns the communicative and signalling function of polite speech and
behaviour. We saw in the previous chapter that ‘civility…is an essentially
communicative form of moral conduct’ since it helps convey respect and
considerateness for others.40 However, this is only the case if polite signals
are successful and receive uptake from those at the other end of the
polite interaction. If politeness signals misfire, those using them will fail
to communicate their respect and considerateness to their interlocutors.
Politeness signals can go awry even in normal times. For example,
people in different cultures may adopt different politeness norms
regarding how to initiate a conversation; some may prefer a more direct
approach whereas others may favour greater circumspection and ambi-
guity.41 Agents who are not aware of these differences and employ their
ready-made vocabulary of politeness might inadvertently send the wrong
signal to their interlocutors, coming across as rude, offensive, or disre-
spectful. This can have significant implications for the remainder of the
interaction, since empirical evidence shows that the early stages of a
conversation affect the extent to which the conversation will remain polite
and civil in the long term.42 Likewise, norms of politeness concerning
giving up one’s seat for older passengers on buses may be culture-
dependent; while this gesture may be perceived as polite in most Western
countries, it is considered rude in Japan, where older people view it as
an impolite reminder of their advanced age.43 If you are unaware of this
cultural difference, by giving up your seat to an older person you will
unintentionally send the wrong politeness signal.
Politeness signals may also go awry when politeness norms are in tran-
sition or when old norms are still in place but have become contested.
Take, for example, the act of a man holding a door for a woman. In
the past, this would have normally been perceived as an act of polite-
ness and chivalry, whereas in more recent times it might be interpreted
as an instance of sexism by some.44 This may have two potential conse-
quences. On the one hand, a man facing the choice of whether or not
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to hold a door for an approaching woman may make the ‘wrong’ choice
and, therefore, send her the ‘wrong’ signal. When a politeness norm is
in transition, it is plausible that some people still interpret it in the ‘old’
way (in this case, an act of politeness and chivalry) whereas others will
assign it a new meaning (in this instance, a sexist act). Therefore, if a man
decides to hold the door open but the approaching woman endorses the
latter interpretation, that act of intended politeness will go awry and not
have the desired effect.45 Alternatively, a man may decide not to hold the
door open for a woman by appealing to the value of gender equality but,
by doing so, may be considered impolite by the woman, if the latter still
endorses traditional views concerning door-holding.46 Of course, holding
the door for another person may also be devoid of a gender dimension
and simply be intended or received as a generic act of politeness.
All these problems have been exacerbated by COVID-19. Due to
the norm identification challenges illustrated in the previous section, the
pandemic has made it more difficult for people to find a ready-made
vocabulary of politeness to communicate their respect and consideration
for others, even in the absence of cultural barriers. Since many politeness
norms have become contested or are in transition, people may some-
times inadvertently come across as impolite, rude, and disrespectful: their
politeness may backfire. However, this unintentional impoliteness may
result not only from the use of the ‘wrong’ politeness signals but also
from the decision not to use any politeness signals, given the uncertainty
surrounding politeness norms and practices. For example, if we are no
longer sure whether to greet others with a handshake, an elbow, or in
some other way, we may decide not to greet them at all. But those we
interact with may interpret abstention itself as rude and impolite.
In the remainder of this section, we consider three examples of how
politeness signals can go awry within the context of the current pandemic.
We focus specifically on workplace communication (both online and
face-to-face), mask wearing, and interactions in everyday spaces such as
sidewalks, gyms, and outdoor exercising areas.
Workplace Communication During COVID-19
COVID-19 has created new points of confusion as to norms of commu-
nication in the workplace, especially regarding the best ways to express
politeness in email correspondence and proper etiquette during meetings.
The way we communicate politely via email may include elements related
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to aesthetics, length and content, as well as greetings and other social
niceties.47 A strict adherence to decorum in more formal correspondence
might signal an appropriate level of professionalism and regard for the
recipient. Employees who frequently use email also recognize that some
transgressions and impolite ‘flaming’ behaviours (e.g. all-caps that might
be perceived as aggressive) can have adverse effects, creating tensions,
antagonistic relationships, or overt conflict in the workplace.48 Those
should be avoided.
Making adjustments to our email correspondence during the pandemic
entails mostly only minor accommodations to still effectively signal polite-
ness. However, it is crucial that we demonstrate an awareness that we
are all living through challenging times. It is polite to acknowledge the
broader disruption to our social lives, as well as how we relate to others in
workplace roles.49 For example, leading off a correspondence with ‘I hope
that this email finds you well’ may sometimes feel inadequate. Likewise,
as we conclude our emails, many of the old sign-offs like ‘all the best’ or
‘regards’, may no longer suffice. These expressions seem to fall short in
signalling that you are a good colleague. Effectively signalling politeness
in correspondence during COVID-19 requires an even greater degree
of compassion and genuine concern for the other party.50 Employees
ultimately need to transform workplace communication into something
of a ‘recognition sandwich’, acknowledging the situation and the well-
being of others at the beginning and end of the correspondence.51 This
can prove more difficult in some contexts than others. For example, the
authors found it quite challenging to encourage colleagues to ‘have a
good weekend’ at the end of an email when the entirety of Melbourne,
Australia lived through strict lockdown measures that included a curfew
and only one hour outside the home for exercise or groceries, all within
five kilometres of their homes.
The content of email correspondence also has implications for the
signalling function of politeness. In the context of a global pandemic,
making simple everyday requests of others that may have previously
been quite normal can now seem unnecessary, insensitive, or impolite
given other concerns and responsibilities. For example, academics gently
nudging a colleague about a submission deadline for a book chapter
or peer-review comments on an article manuscript could come across
as impolite. However, scholars in these positions still need reviews and
chapter submissions as part of their jobs. In light of the new circum-
stances, people might employ new work-around practices of politeness;
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perhaps recognising the plight of others, pointing out the apparent absur-
dity of the request given the state of the world, or even using humour in
a strategically self-deprecating way to acknowledge what may be an inap-
propriate request. These practices conceal a business-as-usual outlook in
some way and constitute a new way to be polite, send the ‘right’ signal,
and reduce incidents of perceived inconsiderate behaviour. Our ready-
made norms of politeness may not be enough, and in this context we
need to add an extra step. This might include an additional performative
layer to ease what might be an objectively inappropriate request as the
other party could be bereaved, suffering from acute mental stress from
long-term social isolation, or be overly burdened with increased caring
responsibilities, in addition to their everyday work requirements.
Expectations regarding interpersonal interactions during work meet-
ings are also less clear during the pandemic. Public health measures have
forced employees in many industries to work from home. Many meet-
ings now take place remotely, using popular video conferencing tools
like Zoom. Employees face uncertainty and new challenges regarding
signalling politeness and respect in virtual environments. The norms
regarding best practices and behaviour in these spaces are still emerging.
Zoom has provided its own guidance regarding video meeting etiquette
with some simple suggestions like introducing other participants, keeping
a professional visual background, and looking into the camera when you
speak.52 Popular media commentary has helped to identify particular
social faux pas to avoid and best practices to ensure a more positive expe-
rience.53 There is an emerging consensus about what may be deemed
polite or impolite. Some key issues include muting your microphone
when not speaking, or your video when performing certain actions that
might be perceived as visually unpleasant by others (e.g. eating); mini-
mizing background noise; being mindful of camera position and stability;
avoiding multitasking like writing emails or completing other work tasks;
and remaining mindful of your appearance and dress.54 Users should also
consider potential technological issues like a weak Internet connection
and be prepared to engage without the video function in those cases.
However, turning off the video has now come to be seen as impolite by
some, as an indication that the user might not be fully engaged with the
conversation or meeting, and simultaneously focused on other tasks.
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Politeness and Mask Wearing During COVID-19
COVID-19 has high transmission rates and the virus can spread through
surface contact and via airborne particles. Mask wearing has therefore
become an important preventative measure to reduce its diffusion and
mitigate health risks now associated with so many activities in public life.
However, a mask can hinder our ability to communicate with others,
especially people with hearing difficulties and those who speak other
languages. Wearing or not wearing a mask is also a signal unto itself.
Beyond its functional role, a mask can communicate messages to other
people about yourself and how you see others. When masks are not
required by law, wearing one might send ambiguous signals. While some
could see it as an expression of other-regarding behaviour, others could
interpret it as a sign of distrust. For example, a dentist in Australia
reported having been subjected to verbal harassment when a customer
yelled at her for wearing a facemask in a supermarket at the onset of the
pandemic. The Australian public had not yet come to see wearing a mask
as a demonstration of other-regarding behaviour and the customer was
offended not being able to see the dentist’s face. In reality the dentist
wore the mask to keep others safe because of the high level of contact
with others in her profession.55
The type of mask can complicate signals even further, and the meaning
and intention behind mask wearing may not always be clear. A large
face shield, for example, might be seen as excessive and antisocial, while
a simple cloth covering, although less effective at preventing transmis-
sion, could be seen as a gesture of solidarity given the need to ration
medical grade masks.56 Furthermore, refusing to wear a mask can signal
dissent and communicate a specific political position, representing a disre-
gard for public safety and an empty act of defiance to some audiences.57
Conversely, in polarized political climates, wearing a mask could be seen
as a ‘smug liberal’ act by some.58 However, a mask-wearing culture can
change quickly and its meaning can transform just as fast.59
Wearing a mask may also obscure other ways of sending signals.
Smiling, frowning, and other facial expressions help to signal emotions
like happiness, surprise, anger, or disapproval, which are often crucial to
polite interactions.60 However, different parts of the face are responsible
for communicating emotions. Positive emotions generally emanate from
the bottom half of the face and widespread mask-wearing provisions keep
them hidden, while negative emotions are more visible through the top
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half of the face. A reduced capacity to visibly communicate emotions
or perceive others’ expressions inhibits the signalling function of polite
facial expressions.61 For example, one woman in Italy reflected on this
challenge:
We Italians used to greet relatives, friends, but also acquaintances with a
handshake of course, but also with hugs and kisses. I haven’t seen this
done since [the pandemic began]. Now we greet each other with a ‘hello’,
perhaps raising our voice because the mask limits a lot. It happened to me
personally running into an acquaintance, instead of a hello I greeted her
with a simple smile. Then I realized that since I was wearing both a mask
and sunglasses, she must have thought that I had not responded to her
greeting and I felt guilty.62
We might develop alternative ways to overcome these new signalling
limitations that masks create. For example, as one potential solution to
the communication difficulties that result from reduced facial visibility,
some manufacturers have started to create transparent ‘civility masks’
with a new ‘smile-through’ design.63 Alternatively, we may need to place
more emphasis on the importance of tone and use more body language,
given the potential impediments that wearing a mask poses for facial
expressions. Our words and gestures, along with the manner in which
they are delivered, can be important (im)politeness signals. For example,
sitting with arms and legs crossed may signal closure, while facing away
or looking in a different direction from someone with whom you are
engaged in conversation may communicate discomfort or disinterest.
Carefully choosing our words and gestures will become crucial during
the pandemic.64 A mask might also force people into uncertain situations
where there might be a tension between different politeness norms. In
these cases, people may need to make judgments about the signals they
want to send and assess whether the other party has received the intended
message. For example, when crossing paths with a friendly neighbour,
showing your face and trying to be kind and social, even from a distance,
may actually come across as inadvertently impolite during the pandemic.
Another solution that many people have adopted in response to
mandatory mask wearing involves the use of personalized homemade face
coverings, which were initially a pragmatic response to mask shortages
among medical workers. Personalized masks also have the potential to
communicate a range of messages65 and provide new opportunities to
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signal politeness to others. The form and design can allow its wearer
to express various messages. Pattern and image content might provide a
space to communicate politeness, as well as identity, personal affinities, or
a humorous message to others. Furthermore, some designs can be more
inclusive or message-neutral than others, such as Hawaiian aloha print
designs.66 People might also be able to use personalized masks to signal
a political identity that expresses solidarity with the LGBTIQ+ commu-
nity or the Black Lives Matter movement through specific colour patterns
or messaging.67 Alternatively, masks could include aggressive, offensive,
or highly politicized content,68 and some mask wearers might signal an
oppositional stance in the way they wear a mask incorrectly, or alter it to
visibly counteract its intended public health function.
Politeness in Everyday Spaces During COVID-19
COVID-19 has disrupted etiquette and politeness norms in contexts
where they were previously well-established. Simple gestures like holding
a door open for strangers or delaying a lift to allow for another passenger
are no longer straightforward acts of politeness that signal social coop-
eration and consideration. People have had to adjust previously polite
behaviours to accommodate new priorities that place health and safety
first. Holding the door for a stranger would unnecessarily place you
within the recommended physical distancing guidelines. However, you
might still signal the intention of being polite by communicating why
you refrained from holding the door. One etiquette and culture expert
explained: ‘Kindly tell them, “Normally I’d hold the door for you, but
I’d be within 6 feet”’.69 The public is still learning to navigate new health
risks and how to share spaces with others in the context of the pandemic.
Norms of politeness are not static. Even prior to COVID-19 we
lived in a world characterized by uncertainty regarding how to be polite
in different contexts and environments, and the public grapples with
contested norms or norms in transition on a regular basis. The practice
of holding doors, already mentioned at various points in this chapter, has
its own complicated history as an everyday ritual that may differ based
on factors such as age, gender, or social status, among others.70 Like-
wise, expectations around politeness in online discussion groups are still
evolving.71 Tone and directness of speech during in-person conversations
can be seen as impolite to varying degrees across time and context, but
individuals can make accommodations with relative ease.72 The global
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pandemic has disrupted (or further disrupted) previous politeness norms
in everyday spaces and the public will need to adapt and learn to be polite
together.73 This may require novel guidance in line with new knowl-
edge about risks related to viral transmission, but also general pragmatism
on the part of the public at large. Politeness norms may also evolve
in ways that depart from health and business guidelines. For example,
new lift guidelines at an Australian public university campus suggest that
two people are allowed inside at the same time based on social distancing
guidelines. Two passengers can fit in the space and still maintain a distance
of 1.5 metres. However, the authors found that the polite gesture in
practice quickly became for the second waiting passenger to allow the
first to use the lift solo and wait for the next one. In this kind of situ-
ation, the passenger might adopt new practices like pressing the ground
floor button as they exit the lift to send it back down immediately and to
reduce waiting time below.
Another example of uncertainty regarding norms of politeness in
everyday spaces involves our behaviour on the street. Social distancing
norms have taken on a greater importance during the course of the
pandemic. By the middle of 2020, maintaining a greater degree of
physical distance from others became the best practice in preventing
community transmission. Overt efforts to adhere to distancing guidelines
became the most important way to signal politeness. However, before
the COVID-19 crisis was declared a global pandemic on 11 March, many
people still made decisions on how to behave in relation to others on the
street in relation to other politeness norms. Prejudice towards people of
Chinese or East Asian descent became more pronounced in some places
owing to the origins of the virus. An academic from Israel described his
own experience regarding uncertainty on how to behave politely in the
street:
The other day I was walking my dog; it was very early in the morning
and the sidewalks were empty. Then suddenly I noticed that opposite me
on the sidewalk was a Chinese person walking towards me. I suddenly felt
that I was afraid to pass by him, and I thought this was terribly strange. I
kind of forced myself to continue walking towards him and not be afraid,
as it would appear very impolite and maybe humiliating to move to the
sidewalk on the other side of the street.74
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This shows the academic’s difficulty in choosing the correct action in
terms of his own safety, but also his awareness of the potential risk of
communicating distrust and fear by crossing to the other side of the road.
At that moment, crossing the street might have been perceived as an act
of prejudice, but perhaps not doing so could have been seen as a disre-
gard for the other person’s safety in light of the emerging threat presented
by the virus. As the pandemic progressed, the public began to perceive
efforts to create additional physical distance (including crossing the street,
if necessary) as the polite thing to do.
Many places around the world have experienced restrictive measures
aimed at curtailing the spread of COVID-19. For example, between
August and September 2020 residents in Melbourne, Australia became
subject to a Stage 4 lockdown that included a stay-at-home mandate
that only allowed for travel to buy groceries and one hour of exercise
within five kilometres of one’s homes, accompanied by an 8pm–5am
curfew. Many people began to take regular walks outdoors and were not
prepared to behave appropriately and exhibit politeness to others in these
spaces. A simple acknowledgement of other people in passing would no
longer suffice. Given the new demands around physical distancing, people
needed additional guidance on how to behave politely on walking paths
along the bay, in public parks, or when using outdoor exercise equipment
in proximity to others (Images 3.3 and 3.4).
The state government restricted access to some spaces at various times
during the lockdown, including skate parks and outdoor gym equipment.
Some residents chose to comply and others ignored these guidelines.
When the use of outdoor fitness spaces became permissible again in
Melbourne, users had to adapt to new politeness norms. Previously,
the dominant way to signal respect and cooperative behaviour involved
simple, considerate acts like time limitations on pieces of equipment
or acts of fairness like waiting turns. However, politeness now requires
greater consideration, with general gym etiquette emphasising norms
specific to hygiene and cleanliness, and providing enough space between
yourself and other users. You should also wear proper attire, use a towel,
wipe down equipment after use, and refrain from excessive socialising.75
If you decide to perform yoga or conduct a fitness class in a public space,
be mindful of how your behaviour might affect others’ ability to share
the space. Residents should also remain mindful of official policies and
comply with public safety measures (Image 3.5).
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Image 3.3 Guidance for walking path rules including distancing, stopping, and
behaviour in busy areas
In this section we have so far examined unintentional and involun-
tary acts of impoliteness. However, given its signalling function, people
can also be intentionally impolite. While they might sometimes do so in
order to express disagreement about specific norms (without challenging
the need for ‘a’ norm), or to demonstrate dissent from unjust government
policies,76 in many cases they might simply be acting out of self-interest
and showing a general disregard for others. We might counter the latter
type of intentional impoliteness in several ways, by introducing avenues
and pressures toward compliance while also constructing barriers to non-
compliance. This can be achieved through interventions around costs and
by introducing mechanisms for informal or formal sanction for violating
norms. Programming that helps foster awareness, legitimacy, and accep-
tance of particular norms can also help encourage compliance. When,
instead, impoliteness emerges from dissent, governments might need to
prioritize the creation of spaces and tools for channelling that dissent into
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Image 3.4 Circles on the grass to help people observe social distancing rules
engagement, debate, consultation, and deliberation, so as to reduce the
need for purposeful acts of impoliteness that may lead to greater social
tensions in society rather than cooperation.
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Image 3.5 A skater failing to comply with COVID-19 rules
Impoliteness and New Barriers
to Social Cooperation
As we highlighted in the previous chapter, one of the key functions
of civility as politeness is to act as a social ‘lubricant’77 by facilitating
social interaction and cooperation and reducing the potential for social
tensions.78 Uncertainty regarding politeness norms and their signalling
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function (as discussed in the previous sections), combined with general
anxiety resulting from COVID-19, can create a barrier to social coopera-
tion. It is important to recognize that impediments to social cooperation
can be either intentional or unintentional. On the one hand, a person
might decide to deliberately breach norms of politeness, or use the
‘wrong’ ones (given the circumstances) in order to signal their disre-
spect for others and thus generate social tensions. On the other hand, an
inadvertent impolite action might have a similar negative effect on social
relations.
For the first scenario, imagine a man who holds the door for female
colleagues at his workplace daily when he knows the action will be
perceived as sexist and disrespectful (e.g. because those colleagues and/or
his manager explained this to him before). Or in the political sphere,
consider when US President Donald Trump refused to shake hands with
German Chancellor Angela Merkel during a visit to the White House in
2017 despite requests from journalists and from Merkel herself. Trump’s
behaviour was interpreted by some as ‘a sign of the tensions between
the two leaders’,79 a tension which, one could argue, Trump deliber-
ately sought to create. The intentional refusal to shake hands can be
inferred from contextual cues. First, Trump is usually keen to shake hands
with other political leaders, as exemplified by his participation in a tradi-
tional ‘group handshake’ at an Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) summit in Manila in November 2017,80 or when he shook
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s hand for an impressive 19 seconds
in February 2017.81 Abstaining from a handshake with Merkel could
be seen as a clear departure from a norm of politeness Trump normally
complies with enthusiastically.82 Second, as one CNN journalist pointed
out at the time, ‘[t]he tense moment between the American and German
leaders [came] after Trump repeatedly bashed Merkel on the campaign
trail and accused her of “ruining Germany”, citing the nation’s poli-
cies allowing refugees into the nation’.83 In other words, the handshake
refusal could be understood not as an isolated incident but rather as part
of a broader tense relationship between the two leaders at the time.84
As an instance of unintentional impoliteness leading to social tension,
consider another incident involving Trump where he walked in front of
Queen Elizabeth II during his royal visit to the UK in July 2018.85 This
breach of protocol generated significant interest and immediate negative
reactions on social media, even among those who considered themselves
critics of the British monarchy. For example, one Twitter user said: ‘I’m
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not a monarchist by any stretch of the imagination but this is such an
insult to Britain. Absolutely clueless, classless, thoughtless, lacking in any
dignity and without a shred of respect’. Another wrote: ‘[t]his is an
important point. I see a lot of people bashing the monarchy, and okay.
Whatever. She’s a 92 year-old woman that he’s walking with. Simple
respect and decorum would cause him to walk at her pace regardless
of who she is’. A third one stated: ‘[m]e: I hate the Royals, they are
leeches on society. Also me: DONALD TRUMP DON’T DO THAT TO
THE QUEEN’.86 These reactions clearly show that breaches of protocol,
decorum, and politeness norms can create social tensions, in this case
between two countries and their citizens. Tensions also arose between
the UK and Italy when then Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi
shouted in the Queen’s presence during a G20 summit photo-shoot at
Buckingham Palace in April 2009.87
Social tensions resulting from breaches of politeness norms may also
arise outside of political contexts. They have the potential to under-
mine business relationships, especially in multicultural business contexts
where politeness norms grounded in different cultural and religious tradi-
tions exist. For example, when conducting business in the United Arab
Emirates (UAE), ‘one never extends their left hand and one does not
address another with their first name unless having been given permis-
sion do so’, and ‘[i]t is advisable to ask open ended questions that
will not require a yes or no answer. Furthermore, it is important to
“save face” with all communication conducted in a harmonious and
non-aggressive style’.88 Failing to comply with these and other related
politeness and etiquette norms is likely to cause tension and undermine
business relationships.
Road etiquette provides another area to illustrate the relationship
between politeness norms and the easing of social tensions. Of course,
every country has legal rules regulating traffic on the road. However,
these may not always be sufficient to guarantee peaceful and smooth inter-
actions among drivers. Road accidents can escalate from tensions on the
road, more often a result of a drivers’ temperament and lack of politeness
than infringements of traffic laws.89 Conversely, not cutting other drivers
off or giving them right-of-way are acts of politeness that can contribute
to easing social tensions on the road and thus reduce road rage and
the risk of accidents.90 Likewise, using a ‘friendly wave’ to thank other
drivers when they give way or pull over and let you pass (even when this
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is legally required) can go a long way towards creating a more peaceful
(and, therefore, safer) road experience for all drivers.91
Within the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, uncertainty
concerning norms of politeness has created additional moments for social
tension and new barriers to cooperation. As we have already pointed out,
new politeness norms emerged soon after the initial onset in some areas.
However, ongoing uncertainty in many contexts may lead people to act
impolitely in ways that risk undermining smooth social interactions and
cooperation. In some cases, impolite action may be driven by misguided
beliefs, as when people hoard goods from supermarkets, shouting at and
pushing one another in the unfounded fear of shortages. In other cases,
people may intentionally and consciously act impolitely for self-interested
reasons, because they do not want to spend the time required to learn
about or observe certain politeness norms (e.g. when they decide not to
clean shared gym or outdoor exercise equipment after working out). In
the following subsections, we engage with three examples that show how
impolite behaviour during COVID-19 can undermine social cooperation:
snitching, politeness in the workplace, and the impact of (im)politeness
on international cooperation.
Snitching During COVID-19
Snitching is the act of informing on another. There are, of course,
moral implications related to snitching, and there is a growing debate on
the related topic of whistleblowing in political theory and philosophy.92
Etiquette related to snitching is endowed with its own social norms and
expectations in how it is seen and practiced. As the famous saying ‘snitches
get stitches’ suggests, snitching is often understood as something that
‘you are not supposed to do’, and which may result in social stigma and
ostracism on the part of others, or even worse.93 All of this suggests
that in addition to being a morally significant behaviour (the permissi-
bility of which may be contested), snitching is also relevant to the issue
of politeness. More specifically, snitching is impolite since it contravenes
norms of social etiquette which demand that we abstain from snitching on
others. And, indeed, like most impolite acts, snitching can have negative
implications for social cooperation and increase social tension.
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Snitching has become a prominent issue during the COVID-19
pandemic. In the context of stay-at-home orders and laws around lock-
down measures, some people have been reporting fellow citizens, neigh-
bours, and businesses that violate the rules. However, many of those
reporting on others have become targets of public shaming and criticism,
as when in July 2020 someone in Melbourne posted a photo of and crit-
icized people in a park not wearing masks, and was strongly condemned
for doing so.94 Likewise, when a Melbourne pizzeria received an order
for eight pizzas, and its owner posted comments suggesting that perhaps
he had the duty to report this to the police (since a party of eight people
contravened social distancing rules at the time), some of the responses
he received included the following: ‘I would mind my own business
and not make assumptions’ or ‘[b]e grateful for the business and don’t
just assume’.95 While in both examples there were those who supported
snitching, the overall response suggests that the act of snitching is often
frowned upon and socially stigmatized.
One Melbourne resident we spoke to recalled hearing neighbours
throwing a party in violation of lockdown rules. Given the potential public
health and safety effects, one might understand snitching in this context.
However, she ultimately decided to adhere to the general ‘abstention
from snitching’ politeness norm, and explained:
I am hesitant to get police involved when I do not know the full circum-
stances and there is not an immediate danger: I wasn’t completely sure
where the party noise was coming from—there were at the time two sepa-
rate residences that had people over—and there may have been a reason for
people to meet, such as shared custody arrangements. Some of my friends
had also already mentioned to me that police wouldn’t attend for gather-
ings of less than 10 or 20 people, so by contrast the potential numbers at
the neighbours’ gatherings were lower and it would have been a waste of
my time to notify the police. In discussing the situation with my partner
I reflected on how I was feeling about missing significant moments in our
lives with family and friends, and how other friends of mine were experi-
encing the same thing. So we just closed the patio doors and tried to make
the best of things together.96
Violating an anti-snitching politeness norm can have negative implica-
tions for social cooperation. Some have argued for example that ‘hotlines
for reporting “non-compliance” [are]…evil tools that will damage the
very trust we’ll need to rebound from this crisis’.97 Likewise, political
3 CIVILITY AS POLITENESS DURING COVID-19 91
philosopher Daniel Weinstock has pointed out that ‘[i]nforming against
our neighbours is highly corrosive to social relations, in ways which may
continue to have echoes after this crisis is over’, and that it may often
be preferable to maintain a ‘certain amount of good faith among our
neighbours’.98 Clearly, then, snitching during the current pandemic risks
undermining social cooperation. Some have referred specifically to ‘an
etiquette to dealing with someone flouting rules that defy basic social
behaviour’.99 Rather than snitching, this etiquette requires that we step
up and challenge our fellow citizens and neighbours directly, when neces-
sary. As suggested by etiquette and protocol consultant Nancy Kosik,
when doing so,
you should be polite, assertive and ensure your body language is friendly.
Don’t yell from your car. Maintain an appropriate distance, and maintain
a positive tone…You should greet the group politely…and then say some-
thing like, ‘I don’t know if you’ve heard, but the government is urging
us to speak up if we see people putting themselves at risk. I’m asking you
to please wrap up and go home for obvious reasons, even if you’re feeling
fine’…Once you’ve said your piece…stay there. ‘Don’t just leave. See them
disassemble their group. Reinforce that you mean what you say’.100
Kosik’s recommendation signals the importance of politeness on two
levels. First, challenging others directly, rather than snitching on them, is
the polite thing to do. Second, the challenging itself should be done in a
way that is polite, lest it be ineffective, counterproductive, and escalatory.
On the latter point, famous etiquette expert Judith Martin, aka Miss
Manners, provides similar advice. When facing those who fail to wear
masks or comply with social distancing norms, she argues,
[y]ou don’t insult them because, among other things, it doesn’t
work…When you start screaming at people, ‘You’re trying to kill me’,
and, ‘Back off’, and that sort of thing, do they say, ‘Oh, excuse me’,
and back off? No, they get hostile…[therefore we should instead say]…
‘I think we should have more distance here’…You’re giving the person
the opportunity to do what you want that person to do without being
embarrassed…because if they get embarrassed, they’re going to get
mean’.101
Once again, we can see the clear connection between politeness and social
cooperation. Even if we avoid snitching and decide to directly challenge
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those who violate COVID-19 rules, we should do so politely, otherwise
we risk increasing social tension.
Workplace Politeness During COVID-19
The workplace provides another example concerning the potential nega-
tive effects of impoliteness on social cooperation during COVID-19,
especially around relationships between co-workers. COVID-19 has
clearly increased the level of anxiety and paranoia within the work-
place, with colleagues becoming suspicious of one another for a
variety of reasons and thus increasing social tension. For instance, a
company spokesperson of UK-based health and safety software providers
Protecting.co.uk stated:
I’ve heard many workplace horror stories since the coronavirus outbreak, of
rumours being spread and increasing tensions between colleagues…People
are stifling coughs to avoid bullying and harassment from colleagues, while
others are feeling like they’re being avoided unnecessarily because of office
hearsay.102
In a specific case, a worker who became the target of suspicion recalled:
I’ve been allergic to the air freshener in the office for the last five years,
but now everyone seems to be on high alert and has a huge problem with
me when I sneeze. I know we have to socially distance from each other,
but they are going out of their way to avoid being anywhere near me. I
find it really rude, and I’m actually quite upset.103
Likewise, especially at the early stages of pandemic, when domestic and
international travel was still allowed in many countries, there were cases
of employees returning from overseas trips becoming the target of suspi-
cion, accusations, and social stigma. Both authors returned to Australia
from overseas business travel in late February and early March 2020 and
experienced moments of minor apprehension and uncomfortable humour
related to potential exposure to the virus during travel. All these examples
show that COVID-19 can result in the disruption of norms of polite-
ness and courtesy in the workplace, thus undermining collegiality and
workplace cohesion.
The disruption of norms of politeness in the workplace concerns
not only relationships between co-workers, but also between workers
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and customers. This has been especially pronounced for businesses with
public-facing staff, such as supermarkets and other kinds of retail stores.
There have been many cases where tensions between staff and customers
escalated due to the latter’s rude behaviour, thus undermining the social
cooperation that is central to everyday commercial transactions within the
marketplace. For example, a bank employee in Italy described interactions
with customers during the first wave of COVID-19:
Several quarrels and disagreements with customers have arisen due to the
latter’s noncompliance with the rules…Many customers enter the branch
without a mask, others do not want to wait outside for more than a few
minutes and become hostile towards employees…There have been multiple
attacks on bank employees—stones have been thrown at some branch-
es…For us bankers it hasn’t exactly been a good time, we were at the
forefront in the days when there were thousands of deaths.104
Kind and polite behaviour on the part of both staff and customers,
e.g. via common courtesy expressions such as ‘please’ and ‘thank you’, can
indeed go a long way towards facilitating smooth and efficient interactions
and transactions. Disruptions to or noncompliance with these norms of
politeness can result in closure and may undermine the smooth working
of the marketplace. During the early stages of the pandemic in Australia,
for example, many supermarket workers became the target of rude and
abusive customers and refused to serve them. Furthermore, the presence
of impolite customers led others to leave the stores.105 Both responses
to this impolite behaviour were clearly deleterious to smooth and effi-
cient market transactions, by depriving some customers of staff assistance
and some stores of customers. In response to these incidents, Barbara
Nebart, Newcastle branch secretary of the Shop, Distributive and Allied
Employees’ Association (SDA), stated:
[P]lease respect our retail workers…They are not supplying the goods.
They are just trying to serve you to the best of their ability…If companies
have put limits on buying items, please respect those limits…I think people
just need to calm down. Everyone should try and be a little kinder to
each other…I must say, so far companies are trying to do the right thing.
Woolworths [supermarkets] have started twice hourly announcements to
please respect staff.106
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The fact that supermarkets had to proactively make announcements to ask
customers to be polite towards their staff not only signals the seriousness
of the problem, but also the importance of educating people to polite-
ness. Politeness, we explained in the previous chapter, involves an agential
dimension. We must make an effort to acquire information about norms
of politeness, context, and other factors on which our polite behaviour
depends. But often we cannot do this on our own, and we need others’
support. Politeness is often built together, in cooperation with others.
In this example Nebart and Woolworths tried to do just that: explaining
to customers the sources of the problem, in order to mitigate their anger
and frustration, and inviting them to be kinder towards supermarket staff.
Hopefully these kinds of interventions can help to recover politeness and
the resulting social cooperation.
Incidents involving rude behaviour have affected not only banks and
supermarkets but also other businesses. For example, in July 2020 one
woman in San Francisco allegedly decided to urinate on the floor of
a mobile phone store to show her opposition to its policies regarding
mandatory mask wearing.107 This incident shows yet another extreme
violation of norms of politeness regulating and facilitating interactions
between staff and customers. But it also suggests that COVID-19 might
have created greater uncertainty as to how to communicate objections
to new norms and social expectations—how best to express disagreement
and exercise noncompliance. If incivility (as impoliteness) can be used to
signal dissent,108 those who take action might not always be able to rely
on a ready-made vocabulary of speech and behaviour: sometimes, people
may need to be creative in order to be uncivil and communicate their
dissent.
Tensions between staff and customers in the airline industry have
also become especially strained during the pandemic. Travel, as we have
already stressed, has been severely disrupted by COVID-19. However,
some airlines have continued to operate, albeit often only via domestic
routes and with reduced frequency. During one incident in the US,
tensions erupted on a flight from Denver to Los Angeles when a couple
refused to wear masks despite repeated requests from flight attendants.
They invoked their ‘constitutional right’ and as a result the flight was
delayed until the couple was asked to disembark. The delay caused disrup-
tions for the other passengers onboard, some of whom feared they might
miss their connecting flights. One passenger remarked: ‘I can’t believe
that you were so rude. Why? Why couldn’t you just wear a mask?’.109
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This example shows how impolite behaviour can clearly undermine social
cooperation in such everyday situations as travelling and catching a flight.
Even when there are clear policies regulating people’s behaviour (in this
case, the airline had a no-exception mask policy), full compliance cannot
be achieved solely via formal means. To be more precise, full compli-
ance can be ensured via formal enforcement mechanisms like insisting
that the couple disembark from the aircraft. Likewise, another US carrier
started to issue ‘yellow cards’ to passengers who refuse to wear masks on
its flights, explaining that this might lead to bans from future flights.110
However, these more formal sanctions may not always be conducive to
(or sufficient for) greater social cooperation. If every traveller behaved
like the couple in the example, social cooperation would be undermined
or at least seriously disrupted. Polite behaviour is the lubricant of social
cooperation because it helps facilitate interactions without recourse to (or
alongside) more formal sanctions and regulations.
Politeness and International Cooperation During COVID-19
A final example in this section concerns politeness and international
cooperation. For instance, in May 2020 Australia called for an indepen-
dent international inquiry into the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic
in China. The request added additional stress to ongoing tensions
between the two countries, with terms such as ‘downright despicable’,
‘petty tricks’, ‘menacing’, and ‘irrational’111 being used by various diplo-
mats and MPs. In response to Australia’s move, China’s ambassador to
Australia Cheng Jingye said:
The Chinese public is frustrated, dismayed and disappointed with what you
are doing now…if the mood is going from bad to worse, people would
think why we should go to such a country while it’s not so friendly to
China…The tourists may have second thoughts. Maybe the parents of the
students would also think whether this place, which they find is not so
friendly, even hostile, is the best place to send their kids to. So it’s up to
the public, the people to decide. And also, maybe the ordinary people will
think why they should drink Australian wine or eat Australian beef?112
Some have tried to justify this kind of approach. For example, Ruan
Zongze, vice-president of the China Institute of International Studies,
stated:
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Calling for an investigation is just buck-passing behaviour…[this is
just]…self-defence against irresponsible accusations made by Western polit-
ical figures. China isn’t provoking anything…China should choose to be
tough on people who just try to throw mud at our country, because they
never hesitate to demonize and degrade China. How can you be polite to
impolite people?113
Therefore, China’s own impolite behaviour towards Western countries is
viewed here as a response to those countries’ earlier impolite acts, mani-
fested in demands for an international investigation in the origins of the
global pandemic. But this can only contribute to a spiral of impoliteness
that risks undermining international cooperation. The Australian Govern-
ment perceived the aforementioned statement by China’s ambassador as
a threat. And verbal threats are certainly a clear example of impolite-
ness,114 especially in a context like international relations and diplomacy:
relationships between states may become difficult when one or more of
them adopts this kind of language. Indeed, Australia’s foreign minister
responded to the Chinese statement in the following way: ‘[w]e reject
any suggestion that economic coercion is an appropriate response to a
call for such an assessment, when what we need is global cooperation’.115
One point to stress is that the spiral of impoliteness in this example
also involves references to international students, who have been partic-
ularly affected by COVID-19. Soon after the onset of the pandemic,
many countries around the world closed their borders to international
students by imposing various travel bans. For example, in March 2020
Canada issued new statements and policies intending to prohibit entry by
new international students and only allowing those who previously held
a visa.116 Likewise, Australia closed its borders to international students
in March 2020,117 having previously banned all travel from mainland
China at the beginning of February 2020,118 a measure considered
controversial by many at the time. More generally, international students,
especially those from China, have become targets of offensive and hostile
comments in a number of countries, leading many to feel unwelcome
as a result.119 Even when this has not escalated into incidents of racism
and hate speech (discussed in the next chapter), it has created a climate
that could impede international cooperation. This is exactly what emerges
from Cheng Jingye’s aforementioned statement that ‘[m]aybe the parents
of the students would also think whether this place, which they find is
not so friendly, even hostile, is the best place to send their kids to’.120
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This student-boycott threat could be seen as impolite and is in itself a
response to a broader impolite and hostile environment. An exchange of
this kind can have serious negative consequences for international coop-
eration since international students can play a significant role as cultural
mediators contributing to smooth international relations.121
In another example, consider US President Donald Trump and other
politicians’ use of the terms ‘Chinese virus’ and the ‘Wuhan virus’ to
refer to COVID-19. In addition to causing allegations of racism, the use
of these terms had the more immediate effect of preventing G7 coun-
tries from agreeing on a joint declaration at a meeting in March 2020.
It constituted something of a breach of diplomatic decorum. According
to a diplomat from a European country, ‘[w]hat the State Department
has suggested is a red line…You cannot agree with this branding of this
virus and trying to communicate this’.122 Clearly, in this case, the use of
inappropriate language by the US administration prevented or delayed
international cooperation to tackle COVID-19: if countries could not
even agree on how to refer to COVID-19, it is difficult to see how
they could agree on a common strategy for tackling it. Furthermore, the
branding itself may also already contain certain normative assumptions
regarding the policy response required to tackle it. For example, calling
COVID-19 the ‘Chinese virus’ may signal not only one’s views about
where the virus originated but also about who is mainly responsible for
its origins and spread (i.e. China) and, therefore, what should be done
about it (e.g. asking China for reparations).123
To minimize disruptions to international cooperation in cases like the
one concerning Australia and China, governments should recognize the
consequences that impolite statements and behaviour have on interna-
tional relations. Countries make decisions based not only on material
interests and norms, but also on their perceived treatment and status
recognition by other states.124 Impolite and disrespectful behaviour by
officials can harm cooperation and stoke tensions. Each country should
take steps to renew its commitment to diplomatic decorum and exercise
restraint in criticism and threats of economic retaliation. These actions,
and any dispute settlement, should take place through existing interna-
tional institutions that are designed to reduce conflict and strengthen
cooperation.125 Moreover, each state might look for alternative ways to
repair deteriorating relations and challenges to social cooperation. For
98 M. BONOTTI AND S. T. ZECH
example, Australia and China might work to improve regional agree-
ments and trade partnerships to mitigate the potential breakdown of social
cooperation caused by these impolite exchanges.126
Besides the broader geopolitical implications of impoliteness, there
are also more specific issues faced by politicians and diplomats at the
micro level, as they engage with each other in meetings and other diplo-
matic contexts. One of the main consequences of COVID-19 has been
the transition of many international and diplomatic interactions to the
online sphere. This has two main implications. First, social distancing
has removed many of the opportunities for physical interactions and
displays like a diplomatic handshake. These types of actions demonstrate
that one is a trustworthy cooperator, especially in situations of tension
or conflict. As Stephen Carter points out, ‘[s]haking hands traditionally
signaled a lack of aggression. The open palm holds no weapon, and, while
locked with someone else’s, cannot draw one’.127 Within the context of
international diplomacy, disruptions to this practice can have significant
implications. Carter continues,
Consider the iconic 1993 photograph of Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin
shaking hands at the White House to symbolize their agreement to the
Camp David Accords. Around the world, the image was cited as evidence
that the violent standoff in the Middle East would finally change. The
handshake mattered precisely because it was so hard to believe it had
happened. Socially distance the two leaders and the photograph becomes
incomprehensible, signaling nothing in particular.128
Due to public health considerations, politicians and diplomats have put
the handshake on hold, as they navigate new ways to signal trust and
cooperation with actions such as a friendly elbow bump.129 However,
as Carter points out, ‘[b]umping fists or elbows cannot carry the same
signal’.130 It is difficult to predict whether we will gradually witness a new
diplomatic etiquette emerge in the international sphere, where gestures
such as elbow bumps become normalized, or whether, as Carter seems to
suggest, there will be ‘a bifurcated future…in which traditional manners
continue fading from popular use but survive in such specialized arenas
as business and international relations’.131
Second, social distancing is forcing diplomatic relationships to move
online. As stated by Maricela Muñoz, Minister Counsellor at the Perma-
nent Mission of Costa Rica to the United Nations in Geneva,
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diplomats are facing multiple challenges, which encompass a broad range
of elements, including access to adequate technology, the re-shaping of
communication protocols, and the need to continue their work in virtual
negotiation settings. The impossibility to meet face to face, given the
confinement, social-distancing, and other sanitary measures, has demanded
an overnight transformation of the diplomatic business as we know it.132
Shortened meetings and time zone differences are posing special chal-
lenges to diplomatic relationships. These include, for example, the
difficulty of including technical experts and representatives from civil
society, as well as a growing need for diplomats to ‘think on their feet’.
Furthermore, it has often proved difficult to include delegates from devel-
oping countries due to technological and staffing issues. Some proposed
solutions include a greater focus on permanent delegations at multi-
lateral hubs like Geneva, New York, and Vienna; improving access to
technological platforms and working procedures; and expanding diplo-
mats’ skill sets, including their ability to interact with others in virtual
environments.133
Cover for Impolite Behaviour
The final problem we address in this chapter concerns the (mis)use of
COVID-19 in order to provide an excuse for impolite behaviour. Even
outside times of crisis, people often try to justify their (or others’) impolite
behaviour by deflecting responsibility to their personality,134 communica-
tion style,135 or ‘personal frustrations and system failures’.136 Like overt
breaches of politeness norms, these more covert forms of impoliteness can
also create tensions and undermine social cooperation, for example in the
workplace, where impoliteness can result in very real financial effects.137
Within the context of COVID-19, this problem has been exacerbated by
the disruption of (and uncertainty surrounding) politeness norms that we
have highlighted throughout this chapter. This has often contributed to
facilitating disinhibitions, therefore reducing barriers to what might have
previously been considered impolite behaviours.
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Personality and Impoliteness During COVID-19
Personality type can play a significant role in the way people experience
the pandemic. Extroverts have had an especially tough time in social isola-
tion under stricter lockdown orders.138 For example, one woman who
self-identifies as an extrovert described her experience in this way:
That’s what the doctor told me: ‘go out once a week…go out somewhere
and even have friends over but stay on the opposite side of the yard’ or
things like that for my mental health because I am a people person. And
it’s really getting me down. You know, it’s very difficult [to be an extrovert
during the pandemic].139
Conversely, COVID-19 has been described as ‘an introverts dream’ in
that it can provide introverts with an excuse for avoiding social situations
and for ‘flaking’ on other people, which is admittedly an instance of rude
behaviour.140 Even before the pandemic, appealing to one’s introverted
personality in order to justify rude behaviour was not unusual. In a 2016
article in The New York Times, for example, writer and editor KJ Dell’An-
tonia admitted: ‘I’ve started to develop [a suspicion] that my introversion
is an excuse for something else. I’m shy, yes. But am I also rude? In
a contest between my manners and my preferences, am I allowing my
preferences to win?’.141 While this rhetorical question suggests that intro-
version can indeed be used by some as an excuse for impolite or overtly
rude behaviour, we should also consider other factors involved. First,
some people genuinely have little control over their anti-social tendencies,
and expectations around social behaviour can be anxiety-inducing. But,
more importantly, the impoliteness for which introverts are often criti-
cized may actually have positive implications. More specifically, one of the
reasons why there is often a tension between an introverted personality
and compliance with norms of politeness is the fact that those norms, and
social institutions more generally, are grounded in (and tend to reward)
extroverted behaviour.142 In other words, the problem might be struc-
tural, not (only) agential: if the rules of the game are set up in line with
extroverts’ interests and preferences, then it will be inevitably more diffi-
cult for introverts to comply with them and be polite. Furthermore, this
structural bias can have significant negative repercussions for introverts’
lives and opportunities. For example, research findings have shown that
introverts generally earn less than extroverts143 and that they tend to be
neglected or stigmatized in educational contexts.144
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By bringing the tension between introversion and established polite-
ness norms to the forefront of public debate, COVID-19 may actually
provide an opportunity for critical reflection on existing social structures.
This might promote a better understanding of the relationship between
mental health and social institutions; create greater awareness of the
distinct challenges that introverts and extroverts are experiencing during
the pandemic145; and, more generally, encourage societies to embrace a
more diverse approach to politeness. The latter point is especially impor-
tant. In the same way multiculturalism theorists have demanded fairer
terms of integration for minorities,146 scholars of civility (and the public
more generally) may need to question the adoption of uniform norms of
civility as politeness that disregard the many ways in which individuals and
groups differ in terms of identity, personality, and social roles. This kind
of critical judgment and reflection, as we already know, is itself central
to what being polite means. Relatedly, and in line with the idea of ‘inci-
vility as dissent’,147 some impolite behaviour during COVID-19 can be
perceived as a challenge to unjust or unfair norms of politeness around
which social structures and institutions have been shaped.
Public Officials and Covert Impoliteness During COVID-19
In addition to ordinary citizens, the uncertainty concerning norms of
politeness during COVID-19 has also been exploited by political figures
as a cover for impolite behaviour. Here, though, it is important to distin-
guish between mere impoliteness and the kind of moral incivility that
we will examine in the next chapter. The latter includes such instances
of incivility as racist and sexist speech, which constitute a denial of their
targets’ free and equal civic status. Conversely, impoliteness only involves
an infringement on politeness norms, which are not tied to citizens’ free
and equal status per se.
Returning again to the issue of wearing a mask, Donald Trump used
impolite remarks more than once against the Democratic Party presiden-
tial candidate Joe Biden for wearing a mask in public. For example, in
September 2020 he mocked Biden for letting his mask hang off his ear
while delivering speeches, saying: ‘[d]id you ever see a man who likes a
mask as much as him?…He has it hanging down. Because it gives him
a feeling of security. If I were a psychiatrist, right, you know I’d say:
“This guy’s got some big issues. Hanging down. Hanging down”’.148
On another occasion, he ridiculed Biden by asking: ‘What the hell did
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he spend all that money on the plastic surgery if he’s going to cover
it up [with a mask]?’.149 One might argue that even in the absence of
COVID-19 Trump would have probably found other ways to mock his
rival. Yet, COVID-19 provided him and others with further opportunities
for mocking, which in this example are closely related to the politicization
of mask wearing in the US.
Here, we should take care to clarify the context of Trump’s remarks.
Despite his initial scepticism regarding the importance of wearing a
mask at the onset of the pandemic, Trump gradually accepted the over-
whelming evidence provided by the scientific community regarding the
importance of masks for containing the virus.150 However, Trump also
stressed that in his view the appropriateness of mask wearing depends on
context. For example, during a visit to Walter Reed Army Medical Center
(WRAMC) in July 2020, he declared: ‘I think when you’re in a hospital,
especially in that particular setting, where you’re talking to a lot of soldiers
and people that, in some cases, just got off the operating tables, I think
it’s a great thing to wear a mask…I’ve never been against masks, but I
do believe they have a time and a place’. On another occasion, he said:
‘I don’t know, somehow, sitting in the Oval Office behind that beautiful
Resolute Desk — the great Resolute Desk — I think wearing a face mask
as I greet presidents, prime ministers, dictators, kings, queens, I don’t
know. Somehow, I don’t see it for myself’.151
These statements are particularly interesting as they reveal two distinct
aspects of Trump’s approach to mask wearing. One is the appropriate-
ness of masks from a public health perspective: Trump agrees that people
should generally wear them in some crowded places, especially hospi-
tals. The other concerns norms of politeness and decorum: according
to Trump, there are places and situations, such as official meetings with
other heads of state, when wearing a mask is inappropriate, i.e. does
not conform with etiquette and protocol. In such cases, Trump seems
to argue, it is impolite to wear masks, even though this would be the
appropriate thing to do from a public health perspective. On another
occasion, Trump seemed to conflate the two dimensions, when he said the
following about Biden: ‘Joe Biden can wear a mask, but he was standing
outside with his wife, perfect conditions, perfect weather… And so I
thought it was very unusual that he had one on. But I thought that was
fine. I wasn’t criticizing at all. Why would I ever do a thing like that?’.152
Here Trump seems to hint at the inappropriateness of wearing a mask
from both a politeness and a public health perspective—this was both a
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low-risk public health situation and one in which decorum and etiquette
would have required Biden not to wear a mask. The main problem is
that, due to the ambiguity of statements like these, some might under-
stand Trump as implying that it is always safe not to wear a mask in
non-hospital contexts. As a participant in one of Trump’s political rallies
stated:
I don’t believe in the mask. That’s all…I don’t care. I just don’t believe
in it. Because I don’t understand what good it’s really going to do, unless
you’re in a high-risk area like a nursing home or a hospital. I think the
left is playing the mask thing to the hilt all the way to the election. In my
opinion, they’re trying to steal the election.153
The foregoing analysis illustrates the uncertainty and disagreement
regarding norms of politeness surrounding mask wearing during COVID-
19. On the one hand, there are norms of politeness and etiquette that
tell us we should be wearing a mask in public. These norms, like many
general etiquette norms (e.g. sneezing into a tissue or your elbow, using
a napkin rather than licking your fingers, flushing the toilet after using it)
are grounded in public health evidence, e.g. preventing the spreading of
germs and viruses.154 On the other hand, there are norms of politeness
and etiquette (e.g. concerning diplomacy and formal political occasions)
that are unrelated to public health but which, according to Trump, should
also be taken into account when deciding whether to wear a mask or not.
Trump exploited this context of uncertainty and disagreement, to which
he himself had contributed, in order to cover for his impolite behaviour
towards Biden and other mask-wearing US citizens.
The Australian politician Pauline Hanson provides another example. As
a member of the Australian Senate, and leader of the right-wing populist
One Nation party, Hanson has often been a vocal critic of immigration
and multiculturalism in Australia. It could be argued that COVID-19
has provided Hanson with cover and opportunity to speak in negative
terms about populations she often disparages in a way that is perhaps
more widely accepted given the circumstances. For example, when in early
July 2020 a sudden and strict stay-at-home order was imposed on 3,000
tenants in nine housing commission towers in Melbourne in order to
contain a COVID-19 outbreak, Hanson referred to the tenants as ‘[t]hese
people who cannot speak English, don’t know what the hell to do and
they are actually then, spreading it to other people’.155 Setting aside the
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allegations of racism that followed Hanson’s statement,156 we suggest
that COVID-19 provided cover for the impolite tone and delivery of her
statements.
A final example concerns public officials, more specifically police offi-
cers in Australia. Speaking in early September 2020 about planned
anti-lockdown protests by some Melbourne residents, Victoria Police’s
Assistant Commissioner Luke Cornelius referred to them in the following
way: ‘[t]he tin-foil hat-wearing brigade are alive and well out there in our
community…I mean it’s just crazy. It’s bat s*** crazy nonsense’.157 We
contend that this is impolite language that a high-ranking police officer
would not use in ordinary circumstances, when it would be perceived as
inappropriate by the vast majority of the public. However, the disrup-
tion of politeness norms resulting from COVID-19 has rendered this
kind of language more acceptable. But unlike the previous examples
concerning Trump and Hanson, we believe that Cornelius’s language can
be defended. Its purpose was not to mock or ridicule certain individ-
uals or categories of citizens per se (something which, especially in the
Hanson example, closely resembles hate speech, an aspect of moral inci-
vility to which we will return in the next chapter) but rather to disparage
their decision to mobilize against public health efforts. In this sense,
the use of impolite language by public figures to counter self-interested
behaviour and promote public-minded goals could be considered a ‘top-
down’ counterpart to the aforementioned ‘incivility as dissent’ paradigm.
In the same way in which citizens can use incivility as impoliteness to
signal and contest unjust laws and institutions from the bottom-up, public
officials can use impolite messages from the top-down in order to foster
just policy goals and norms and to hinder unjust ones, as long as these
messages target certain people because of their actions rather than because
of who they are (e.g. their ethnicity, religion, nationality, etc.).
Name-Calling and Insults in International
Politics During COVID-19
A final example of the use of COVID-19 to cover for impolite behaviour
concerns name-calling and insults in international politics. Consider again
Trump’s and other politicians’ decision to refer to COVID-19 as the
‘Wuhan virus’ or the ‘Chinese virus’. In addition to undermining inter-
national cooperation, as we saw in the previous section, the use of this
kind of terminology highlights Trump’s use of COVID-19 as a cover
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for impolite language that breaches international norms of etiquette and
protocol. Such norms certainly admonish name-calling and insults. Given
the ongoing tensions between the US and China, one might argue that
Trump used COVID-19 as a justification for using impolite language that
he would have already preferred to use prior to the pandemic, in order to
signal a stronger stance on China to his political base.
Here, however, we should be careful. Calling COVID-19 the ‘Wuhan
virus’ or the ‘Chinese virus’ might be much more than impolite language.
As many have pointed out, these statements may constitute instances of
racist speech. Even though Trump stated that ‘[i]t’s not racist at all. No,
not at all. It comes from China, that’s why. It comes from China. I want
to be accurate’,158 various commentators have suggested that Trump’s
statement may conceal a racist undertone. More specifically, according
to some, the statement has contributed to an increase in anti-Chinese
and anti-Asian racist incidents in the US, and can be traced back to a
longstanding history of anti-Chinese sentiment in the US. For example,
according to University of Minnesota professor Erika Lee,
[t]here is something very particular about the stereotype of China, Chinese
people and Chinese faces as being unsanitary, teeming with millions of
people living in crowded and dirty conditions, the weird habits that no
civilized people would deign to follow, and Chinatowns as places of disease
and contagion…Those stereotypes were used to justify quarantines and also
immigration enforcement.159
If, as it seems plausible, these comments are correct, this example
constitutes an instance of both impoliteness and moral incivility. Calling
COVID-19 the ‘Wuhan virus’ and the ‘Chinese virus’ was both a breach
of norms of international etiquette and protocol and an instance of anti-
Chinese racism. The latter is not simply impolite. As we pointed out
in Chapter 2, and will discuss more extensively in the next chapter,
racist speech is an instance of moral incivility, which involves failing to
treat others as free and equal. And, in relation to the problem exam-
ined in this section, it can be argued that COVID-19 provided Trump
and other politicians with an excuse and cover for both impoliteness and
racism. The former may have been driven by the pre-existing political
and economic tensions between the US and China; the latter by a more
general anti-immigrant and anti-multiculturalism rhetoric.
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Conclusion
This chapter examined new problems that COVID-19 poses for the
politeness dimension of civility. From its onset, the pandemic has
disrupted many of the norms that regulate people’s polite interactions
in their everyday lives, resulting in a series of unprecedented challenges.
First, COVID-19 has called into question previous norms of polite-
ness that were widely recognized, making it more difficult for people
to know how to behave politely in different circumstances. Second, this
uncertainty has often deprived people of unequivocal ready-made polite
signals to communicate their respect and consideration to others; speech
or behaviour that in the past may have been unambiguously perceived
as a polite signal might now go awry during the pandemic. Third, when
people no longer know for sure how to be polite, or their polite signals
misfire, this can also pose an obstacle to cooperative social interactions.
Finally, citizens and politicians might sometimes exploit the uncertainty
surrounding norms of politeness to engage in what would normally be
considered impolite behaviour.
Responding to these challenges is crucial if we want to safeguard polite-
ness and its key contributions to social coexistence. Both governments
and citizens, we have seen, can play important roles in this response. To
start, policymakers can remedy the lack of clarity surrounding norms of
politeness by disseminating information, including scientific findings, to
improve polite behaviour. This might include new signs and tools aimed
at fostering awareness of how to behave politely in everyday spaces, in
ways that are consistent with public health goals. While many of these
interventions must ultimately come from governments, businesses and
citizens should also do their part and make a proactive effort to acquire
(and help each other acquire) the knowledge necessary to be polite in
this new social landscape. They might also need to rely on creativity to
develop new politeness norms when required, as in the case of greet-
ings. These combined efforts can also help reduce the chance of politeness
signals going awry. Developing new guidelines for both offline and online
polite interactions, for instance, can help ensure that those signals do not
misfire. Finding alternatives to signalling tools that are no longer easily
available can help as well, including greater and more creative use of
verbal communication and body language to compensate for reduced face
visibility and expressions resulting from mandatory mask wearing.
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Furthermore, promoting politeness during the pandemic can also help
to minimize the social tensions that can result from breaches of politeness
norms. There is an important space for both governments and private
actors (e.g. retail businesses, airlines, etc.) to use informal and formal
tools to encourage polite behaviour and sanction noncompliance. Within
the international realm, adherence to norms of decorum and etiquette
(sometimes adjusted to take into account public health goals) should be
accompanied by the use of institutions to mitigate the challenges to coop-
eration posed by impolite behaviour. Finally, the pandemic might also
help governments and citizens to develop a more critical and inclusive
approach to politeness. They might even go so far as to recognize that
impoliteness too can sometimes be employed by policymakers to promote
public-minded policy goals, as when public officials rudely chastise those
who refuse to comply with mask-wearing requirements.
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This chapter examines the implications of COVID-19 for civility
as public-mindedness. This dimension of civility, as we explained in
Chapter 2, can be understood in two ways, both grounded in the view
that we should recognize and respect others as free and equal members
of our political community. The first understanding of civility as public-
mindedness entails using speech or behaviour that respects other people’s
fundamental rights, liberties, and equal civic standing. This view, which
we call moral civility, rules out physical violence, discrimination, and the
use of various forms of racist or hate speech. A second more expansive
understanding of civility as public-mindedness relates to the idea of public
justification. According to this view, which we call justificatory civility,
citizens must not only comply with the demands of moral civility; they
also need to offer public justifications for the political rules and policies
that they advocate. Such justifications should be based on public reasons,
i.e. reasons that all citizens could in principle accept at some level of
idealization despite their different worldviews and beliefs. Public reasons
include appeals to widely shared political values like freedom and equality
(a moral dimension) as well as to uncontroversial scientific methods and
conclusions (an epistemic dimension).
Both moral and justificatory civility offer normative guidelines as to
how we ought to interact with others in societies characterized by diver-
sity and disagreement. And both of them provide us with a useful
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analytical lens for examining some of the social and political implica-
tions of COVID-19. In this chapter, we use this lens in order to evaluate
the way in which different types of actors and institutions, at both the
local/national and international level, have responded to the pandemic,
and the extent to which they have complied with demands of moral and
justificatory civility. More specifically, we identify four problems related
to civility as public-mindedness that have arisen during COVID-19. First,
we show how different forms of discrimination and hatred that have
emerged during the pandemic (e.g. government-driven, in the work-
place, and within society more broadly) threaten moral civility and the
free and equal status of citizens, especially members of vulnerable groups.
Second, we argue that COVID-19 has created opportunities for political
actors to advance sectarian agendas that fail to comply with the demands
of justificatory civility. They may do so either by appealing to partial
interests and controversial beliefs, or by overly prioritizing certain polit-
ical values in relation to others. Third, we contend that many of the
policies implemented by liberal democratic governments in response to
the pandemic have imposed unreasonable ‘strains of commitment’ upon
certain social groups whose members may already suffer from various
forms of marginalization and vulnerability (e.g. racial minorities, women,
LGBTIQ+ people, and older people). The excessive burden borne by
these groups, we argue, ought to be taken into account in the process of
public justification, and governments should also implement measures to
mitigate the uneven effects of their policies. Finally, we consider the role
of science in the public justification of policy responses to COVID-19.
We argue that the limited understanding of the virus within the scientific
community, the dearth of research on the social and cultural dimensions
of COVID-19, and the politicization of science for personal or partisan
gain, pose serious obstacles to justificatory civility during the pandemic.
Covid-19 and Moral Civility
As we explained in Chapter 2, the first dimension of civility as public-
mindedness is moral civility. This differs from both civility as politeness
(which we examined in Chapter 3) and justificatory civility (which we
will consider in the subsequent sections of this chapter). Moral civility
rests on a commitment to liberal democratic norms and institutions.
It requires refraining from perpetrating physical violence against others1;
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from using racist or other types of expression that portray members of
certain groups as physically, intellectually, or morally inferior2; or from
discriminating against others.3 When citizens or governments engage in
speech or behaviour that fails to comply with these demands, and do not
treat people as free and equal, we are in the presence of moral incivility.
We should also recall, as explained in Chapter 2, that while moral civility
might sometimes overlap with civility as politeness, the two are and should
be treated as distinct dimensions of civility; polite manners can some-
times be adopted to cover for morally uncivil speech or behaviour and,
conversely, impolite conduct can be employed to advance morally civil
goals.
In this section, we examine the implications of COVID-19 for moral
civility using three examples that show how some governments and
citizens in liberal democracies have responded to COVID-19 in ways
that could be considered morally uncivil. First, we consider instances of
government-driven discrimination in relation to the allocation of scarce
resources concerning healthcare or financial support; we argue that some
political leaders have exploited the pandemic in order to advance or
reinforce pre-existing political agendas that discriminate against specific
members of their political community. Second, we focus on discrimina-
tory practices in the workplace during COVID-19 and explain how these
differ from instances of impoliteness examined in the previous chapter.
Finally, we analyse the rise in incidents involving racism and hate speech
directed at members of various minority groups since the onset of the
pandemic. All three examples show how the pandemic has provided fertile
ground for moral incivility, raising the need for prompt institutional and
social responses.
Government-Driven Discrimination During COVID-19
Political leaders can use crises like the COVID-19 pandemic to advance
political agendas that foster higher levels of racism and discrimina-
tion against some groups in society or that degrade liberal democratic
institutions. Governments might prioritize some people over others
when they make decisions about how to allocate scarce health resources
or economic assistance. Some politicians and public figures have also
used the pandemic strategically as was the case with Italy’s former inte-
rior minister Matteo Salvini who has been especially vocal about border
security. The pandemic provided cover for him to criticise his political
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opponents and further advance an uncivil and discriminatory anti-migrant
agenda, specifically targeting those who have arrived from Africa.4 These
kinds of messages and policies can have dire consequences for tradition-
ally marginalized groups that are even more vulnerable in the context of
COVID-19.5
Politicians might also use the public health crisis as cover for an
ongoing assault against liberal democratic institutions and freedoms.
The pandemic can exacerbate threats of authoritarian overreach and an
opportunistic consolidation of power by populist politicians. Leaders may
further silence opposition groups and take unilateral action against some
segments of society in the name of public health, safety, and general
national welfare. For example, Hungary’s Viktor Orbán has placed strict
limitations on free speech, giving himself complete discretion to enforce
new laws allowing up to five years in prison for interfering with quaran-
tine efforts or publishing material he deems ‘fake news’.6 These measures
can effectively silence political opposition groups and healthcare workers
who might criticize public health policies. Orbán has described the virus
as a menace and a threat linked to unwelcome migrants.7 He has made
this link between the virus and migrants explicit, explaining: ‘[w]e are
fighting a two-front war. One front is called migration, and the other
one belongs to the coronavirus. There is a logical connection between
the two, as both spread with movement.’8 It appears that Orbán will use
his emergency powers to advance nativist policies that target groups he
sees as threats including foreign corporate interests, cosmopolitan elites,
international students, and migrants.9
A broad range of regimes around the globe are finding opportuni-
ties for discrimination and overt repression under COVID-19. Expanded
surveillance, widespread censorship, limitations on freedom of movement,
and excessive punishments have provided dozens of governments with the
capacity to place further restrictions on liberal democratic norms and to
discriminate against some of their citizens.10 Potential threats to political
and social freedoms and other human rights are especially pronounced,
with widespread suppression of basic civil liberties.11 Prominent inter-
national organisations like the United Nations have been proactive in
identifying many of the dangers COVID-19 poses to liberal democratic
norms and institutions, and have developed recommendations govern-
ments can follow to help avoid racism and discrimination during the
pandemic.12
Selective lockdowns in many countries illustrate some of the chal-
lenges that governments face in balancing concerns for public health
4 CIVILITY AS PUBLIC-MINDEDNESS DURING COVID-19 125
with ensuring the rights and welfare of the broader population. For
example, protestors in Madrid accused the regional government of
class discrimination, ordering selective lockdowns in predominantly low-
income neighbourhoods. The government insisted that the measures
were implemented in the areas with the highest levels of infections.
However, one official suggested that the higher rates of infection were
partially due to ‘the way of life of immigrants’, complicating arguments
that decisions were based solely on pragmatism.13 Residential towers in
Melbourne, Australia also experienced a targeted lockdown to stem an
outbreak among residents. A ‘heavy-handed’ hard lockdown of 3,000
public housing tenants drew criticism from those who saw the measures
as discriminatory and believed they placed an especially heavy burden
on residents from already marginalized groups.14 A former UN special
rapporteur went so far as to say that the way the government handled the
response was not only ‘shocking and deeply discriminatory’ but perhaps
even an ‘assault on human dignity’.15
The pandemic has created numerous challenges to the principles of
moral civility. In some of the worst cases, overt hate and religious discrim-
ination can create further tensions in already polarized societies. For
example, in a particularly horrific incident, Islamophobia and a hospi-
tal’s refusal to treat two Muslim women in India led to the death of
their newborns.16 Political and social leaders need to take immediate
steps to address overt discriminatory practices and better meet the needs
of marginalized groups. The public must remain mindful of the dispro-
portionate effects that the pandemic has on some communities and help
to protect the most vulnerable while attempting to counter discrimina-
tion and threats to liberal democratic norms. Domestic governments and
international organisations alike have a role to play in understanding and
countering these threats—enhancing justice, oversight, and the rule of
law.17
Policies that might protect and enhance elements of moral civility
should not only address actions that directly encroach on liberal demo-
cratic values; they should also include steps to promote better governance
more broadly. The virus can disproportionately affect the most cultur-
ally and linguistically diverse segments of many large cities, sometimes as
a result of intentional discrimination. However, discrimination may also
be indirect or unintentional, resulting from language barriers or limited
government engagement with some minority communities. Governments
and public health officials can benefit from multi-pronged strategies that
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include effective translation, consistent messaging across communities,
and purposeful engagement with a target audience to better dissemi-
nate messages. For example, English-language messaging could target
younger family members in multilingual communities with the aim of a
subsequent ‘re-narration process’ among other family members in their
native tongue.18 In addition to involving multicultural communities in
the development of effective strategies, it is important to tailor messages
to their values, deliver information via messengers who are trusted among
their members (e.g. religious leaders), use accessible communication
channels (e.g. social media), and create multicultural bodies that can
advise national governments on health matters.19
Consultation is essential to understand the distinct needs and chal-
lenges different communities face, and in providing the information
necessary to ensure the uptake of effective public health policies. Efforts
to account for and amplify marginalized voices can help to curtail some
of the disproportionate effects of the pandemic on communities that
can be seen as (un)intentional discrimination. Consultation can also
help improve decision-making across identity markers such as age. For
example, at various times during the pandemic we saw spikes in cases of
viral transmission among young people, including massive outbreaks at
US universities.20 There is an urgent need for consultation and co-design
with young people to develop effective ways to limit the spread of the
virus, to come up with tailored strategies to reduce stresses on mental
health, and to enlist them in a campaign to combat misinformation on
social media.21
Workplace Discrimination During COVID-19
In normal times, moral incivility in the workplace can constitute a
‘veiled manifestation of sexism and racism’ that may disadvantage some
employees.22 This form of workplace incivility differs from the impolite-
ness dimension discussed in the previous chapter. It does not concern
politeness norms in communication that serve as a social lubricant, but
rather various forms of bias, prejudice, and discrimination experienced by
some people in the workplace.
COVID-19 can lead to greater moral incivility in the workplace in the
form of discriminatory behaviour and outcomes. For example, the origins
of the virus have led to discriminatory conduct targeting employees with
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Asian backgrounds. One worker in Monterey, California described their
experience:
I was the only Asian American at a conference with work colleagues and I
had an allergy flare up that day. One woman, seeing me sneeze, told me
I couldn’t be there, that I needed to leave, and ordered me not to touch
any of the coffee and cookies put out by the convention. She singled
me out when other people in the conference were sneezing, sniffling and
coughing.23
The pandemic may also place strain on hard-fought improvements
related to gender equality. In many cases, changes to workplace condi-
tions and practices can disproportionately affect some groups over others.
The gender dimension highlights inequalities related to job security,
access to economic support programming, additional safety risks in
certain sectors with higher levels of women workers (e.g. nursing, aged
care, social work), and adjustments to accommodate additional childcare
responsibilities.24
Companies across sectors have had to contend with mounting pres-
sures to adapt to the ‘new normal’. Large companies have had to make
health and safety decisions in this new environment and some have imple-
mented contentious policies that may come across as discriminatory. For
example, one mining company faced allegations of ageism and racism after
workers were told to stay at home if they were of a certain age or of
indigenous descent. While the company justified its actions as a way to
reduce risk to populations seen as more vulnerable to transmission and
to the negative health effects of COVID-19, not everyone found this
explanation persuasive.25 In the US context, the American Bar Associa-
tion expects a ‘flood’ of age discrimination lawsuits moving forward.26
The pandemic has generated additional decision-making scenarios where
firms will have to be especially careful to avoid discriminatory behaviour
as it relates to decisions about workplace COVID-19 testing, selections
for leave-of-absence requests, and rehiring practices.27 In some cases,
employers will have to make additional accommodations for vulnerable
employees who still see risks in returning to work when the pandemic
subsides.28
Steps must be taken to manage and mitigate the effects of the
pandemic on immediate discriminatory practices, as well as their impli-
cations for broader inequalities. Employers must resist what may even be
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well-intentioned decisions, if these risk being discriminatory against some
employees.29
Discrimination and Hate in the Public Sphere During COVID-19
The pandemic has also exacerbated morally uncivil acts of discrimination
and hatred in the public sphere more broadly. Due to the geographic
origins of the virus, we have seen a rise in overt anti-Chinese discrim-
ination and racist incidents in many parts of the world. An initiative
called Stop AAPI (Asian American and Pacific Islander) Hate has collected
incident data in the US to show the scale of the problem, whom it
affects, and where these types of incidents take place.30 Descriptive statis-
tics in a recent US report show that verbal harassment in businesses
and on the street are the most common and disproportionately target
women. Qualitative data from the report provides illustrative examples.
One complainant in New York City recalled: ‘I’m a healthcare worker. I
saw a mask-less man sit across from me on the subway. I moved to the
other side of the train car and he followed. He spat and coughed on the
subway while yelling racial slurs. No one stood up for me’. Another victim
in Georgia described a hate-inspired assault: ‘I was in line at the pharmacy
when a woman approached me and sprayed Lysol all over me. She was
yelling out, “[y]ou’re the infection. Go home. We don’t want you here!”
I was in shock and cried as I left the building. No one came to my help’.31
Some of the language used by political actors to describe COVID-19 in
the media, such as ‘kung flu’ and ‘China virus’, can embolden those who
might perpetrate more overt acts of discrimination and racist behaviour
in the public sphere.32
These incidents of hate and discrimination often reflect pre-existing
social divides tied to ethnicity, religion, and other characteristics. When we
spoke with the Founder and National Convener for the Asian Australian
Alliance, Erin Wen Ai Chew, she pointed out that ‘COVID-19 is not the
cause of the anti-Asian rhetoric, it’s just a symptom of a bigger prob-
lem’.33 However, the pandemic has both amplified and normalized these
kinds of incidents. Leaders from different parties across the political spec-
trum have contributed to this antagonistic climate. Media messaging and
the broader geopolitical tensions have further aggravated public attitudes
towards people of Chinese origins and other Asian backgrounds. As Erin
Wen Ai Chew observes, this social and political climate ‘has normalized
the idea that it’s okay to walk around, and if you see an Asian person
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walking in the street, it’s okay to call them “the Chinese virus”, so it’s
okay to tell them not to eat dogs or bats or any kind of exotic animals. So
that idea has been a lot more normalized, particularly during COVID’.34
The pandemic can also provide new opportunities for individuals
and groups to advance causes motivated by religious and racial hatred.
For example, some have taken advantage of greater social ‘strain’ to
advance Islamophobic messaging. Key ‘trigger’ events like the current
COVID-19 crisis can lead to spikes in both offline and online hatred
aimed at Muslims.35 The same can be said regarding other religious
groups. Researchers at Tel Aviv University, for example, have found that
the pandemic ‘unleashed a unique worldwide wave of antisemitism’.36
Conspiracy theories and misinformation feed into biases and can lead
to misdirected attribution of blame targeting religious minorities. For
example, a study at Oxford University found that nearly 20% of respon-
dents in a survey of the English population agree to some degree with
the statements that ‘Jews have created the virus to collapse the economy
for financial gain’ or that ‘Muslims are spreading the virus as an attack on
Western values’.37
The broader far-right has been especially active in exploiting COVID-
19 to help advance a range of goals. In the Australian context—where
the far-right largely pursues a diverse and shifting anti-Islam, cultural and
racial superiority agenda38—far-right groups have integrated nationalist
and anti-egalitarian messaging into their public commentary about the
global pandemic.39 Anti-Chinese racism features in a prominent way, as
does anti-globalist rhetoric targeting bodies like the World Health Orga-
nization (WHO). Public narratives that emerge as a result of the global
pandemic around self-sufficiency and isolation may now resonate with
more Australians, among whom views that globalization is bad for the
country have nearly doubled from 15% in 2017 to 29% in 2020.40
Countries around the world that face similar shifts in public attitudes
must remain vigilant in confronting and counteracting morally uncivil
speech and behavior tied to nationalist and anti-globalization attitudes
and policies. The COVID-19 virus has disrupted social and political life
in such a way that agendas advancing xenophobia, racism, and religious
intolerance could find a more receptive audience. Leaders might glean
insights from strategies to combat hate speech and behaviour outside of
the global health crisis. For example, a plan of action will require offi-
cials and partner organisations to monitor and analyse data; identify and
address root causes; engage with a range of civil society actors to build
coalitions across sectors; and incorporate media and new technologies in
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creating tools for programme delivery.41 States need to collect data to
analyse and understand the problem. These efforts can raise awareness
about acts of discrimination and hate, while providing a stronger evidence
base for informed policy recommendations.42 Solutions may range from
informal initiatives to more formal measures aimed at using the rule
of law (e.g. improved anti-racism legislation) to better protect victims
and more effectively prosecute perpetrators.43 Governments should also
recognize some of the constraints on institutional responses. While a
government can pass laws, formulate regulations, and establish procedures
to counteract discrimination and hate in broader society, they may not be
prepared to respond to micro-level incidents. For example, the Australian
Human Rights Commission adopts a conciliatory or mediation process to
resolve these kinds of incidents. It is unlikely that a perpetrator and victim
would agree to engage via this type of process during normal times, and
even less likely in a situation like a pandemic because of limitations of
movement and face-to-face interaction.44
Sectarianism and Issue Prioritization
The remaining sections of this chapter are devoted to the analysis of the
second dimension of civility as public-mindedness: justificatory civility. As
we pointed out in Chapter 2, while virtually all liberal political theorists
are committed to moral civility, justificatory civility is more closely related
to the political liberalism strand of contemporary liberal theory. Rawls and
other political liberals argue that citizens of liberal democracies character-
ized by reasonable pluralism and disagreement have a ‘duty of civility’ to
explain to each other how the political rules ‘they advocate and vote for
can be supported by the political values of public reason’.45 Those polit-
ical values include basic rights and liberties that are widely endorsed in
liberal societies as well as epistemic rules of inquiry and scientific evidence.
Being civil in the justificatory sense therefore means appealing to these
broadly shared values when justifying policies and laws. This is especially
important in the case of politicians, who have a more direct impact on
decision-making than ordinary citizens. Conversely, appealing to contro-
versial reasons such as those grounded in religious worldviews, or to
flawed scientific evidence, constitutes an instance of justificatory incivility.
In this section we focus specifically on one way in which some political
actors have violated justificatory civility during COVID-19: the advance-
ment of sectarian aims and political agendas. Sectarianism is antithetical
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to public-mindedness and public reason.46 It involves the promotion of
the interests, values, and goals of specific individuals and groups within
society, rather than the advancement of the common good. To stress the
point again, not all liberals express concern about the advancement of
political agendas grounded in controversial beliefs and sectarian interests.
Some critics of political liberalism, for example, contest the imposition of
public reason constraints on political debate and decision-making, arguing
that it is antidemocratic.47 Others defend political perfectionism, arguing
that states should promote valuable conceptions of the good life; for
them, public reason imposes undue burdens on this goal.48 For these
critics, the fact that a political party might advance a sectarian political
agenda only reflecting the interests of a specific social group, or that a
politician might employ religious arguments to justify the policies they
advocate, do not constitute a problem for liberal democracy. However,
since we embrace public reason liberalism, we believe that sectarianism is
problematic for liberal democratic states. In the remainder of this section,
we show how COVID-19 has imposed new strains on public-minded
behaviour, providing more scope for individuals and groups to pursue
sectarian interests.
Sectarian Political Agendas: Horizontal and Vertical
The COVID-19 crisis has provided new opportunities for some actors
to pursue overtly sectarian agendas. Despite facing a common public
health challenge, actors with divergent interests and goals have, at times,
attempted to steer policies in ways that prioritize their own particular
agendas over those that might advance more public-minded goals. It
may be useful to distinguish between two kinds of sectarianism that have
emerged during the pandemic.
The first, which we call horizontal sectarianism, concerns political
actors that have advanced policy proposals grounded in the interests of
their party or constituents. Party politics has featured prominently in
policy formulation and implementation in a lot of cases. Many politicians
have used the current health crisis to advance personal and party interests,
along with those of their constituents, rather than the common good of
the broader political community. For example, the US Senate struggled
to pass an emergency stimulus package as Democrats and Republicans
disagreed about certain provisions—e.g. measures concerning corporate
stock buybacks and executive pay, as well as unemployment insurance
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and worker protections. Furthermore, electoral considerations continued
to influence pandemic policies leading up to the November 2020 US
Presidential elections.49 Sectarian agendas and lack of consensus across
partisan lines have created significant obstacles to the development and
implementation of effective and publicly justified policy responses to the
pandemic.50 Another example of horizontal sectarianism is provided by
the decision to add Trump’s name to stimulus checks sent to millions of
US citizens to help them respond to the economic effects of the pandemic
(Image 4.1).51
While the economic stimulus per se can certainly be considered
a reasonable and publicly justified response to COVID-19, aimed at
promoting economic growth and protecting jobs, its politicization by
Trump seems to be difficult to justify based on the standards of public
reason and appears to be mainly driven by his personal and partisan
political interests.
Image 4.1 US economic stimulus check that included the name of President
Donald J. Trump
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Another instance of horizontal sectarianism concerns appeals to
controversial religious arguments in order to justify opposition to mask-
wearing regulations. As one recent study points out, opposition to
wearing a mask and other cautious behaviours in the US is often corre-
lated with a conservative Christian background.52 Consider, for example,
the following statement made by Ohio state representative Nino Vitale in
May 2020:
This is the greatest nation on earth founded on Judeo-Christian Princi-
ples. One of those principles is that we are all created in the image and
likeness of God. That image is seen the most by our face. I will not wear
a mask…That’s the image of God right there, and I want to see it in my
brothers and sisters.53
Vitale’s statement clearly contains an appeal to a controversial religious
argument that could not be accepted by atheists and arguably by most
religious believers who do not embrace his particular take on Judeo-
Christian values. In this sense, it is clearly an instance of justificatory
incivility based on a sectarian and controversial religious doctrine.
Alongside horizontal sectarianism, we have also witnessed what we
call vertical sectarianism during the current pandemic. Rather than the
use of controversial arguments or the advancement of the interests of a
specific party or sector of society, vertical sectarianism involves the specific
decision-making level within a system of multi-level governance. For
example, when Italy asked other EU member states for help with medical
assistance and supplies at the onset of the pandemic, those countries
did not provide the requested support. This ‘shameful lack of solidar-
ity’54 signalled a clear concern for their own national interest which
hindered the pursuit of a publicly-minded goal at the EU level.55 It is
difficult to see how this kind of response could be publicly justified if
one considers the EU as being the relevant constituency of public reason
in this instance. The same argument may often apply to other cases56
when the national interest is prioritized over that of the international
community at times when coordinated action and solidarity would seem
to constitute the publicly-minded attitudes necessary to tackle a crisis like
the current pandemic. We understand, of course, that whether public
reason and public justification should apply beyond the traditional nation-
state remains an ongoing dispute.57 However, we also think that at least
within the context of a political and economic union like the EU, notions
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of justificatory civility, sectarian arguments, and public-mindedness are
increasingly relevant.
But it is perhaps within the nation-state, which constitutes the tradi-
tional site of public reason, that the vertical dimension of sectarianism
becomes most visible. What this dimension involves is the advancement
of policy goals grounded in the interests of specific regional or state sub-
units in relation to the national or federal level. In the US, for example,
the allocation of economic aid resources to different states seems to have
been driven by partisan concerns, sometimes favouring Republican states
less affected by the pandemic than Democratic states facing immediate
difficulties.58 This example also demonstrates how the horizontal and
vertical dimensions of sectarianism are sometimes intertwined. In this
case, contention within the vertical level of governance was driven by
horizontal partisan interests.
In another example, some US states formed alliances such as the West
Coast Pact and the East Coast consortium in April 2020 to counter
President Trump’s minimized COVID-19 threat assessment and his insis-
tence on the need to re-open for business, thus re-igniting the perennial
debate in the US about states’ rights.59 Regardless of the substance of the
dispute, this signals a policy approach grounded in the interest of specific
states or groups of states rather than the general interest of the broader
national political community, which is what justificatory civility and public
reason would demand.
In other cases, however, the interests of specific states or sub-units have
been presented as related to (rather than in tension with) the national
interest. For example, when the Australian Government’s Acting Chief
Medical Officer, Professor Paul Kelly, expressed his concerns about a new
COVID-19 outbreak in the state of Victoria in July 2020, he stated:
This latest outbreak is not a Victorian problem. It is a national problem. It
is everyone’s problem. Support is being provided by the Commonwealth
and other states and territories – several hundred clinical and other staff
are helping with testing, contact tracing and public engagement. I am very
heartened – and, I might say, not the least surprised – by this national
response to get on top of the virus.60
In sum, in this section we have shown that when political actors appeal
to controversial values or partial (e.g. personal, partisan, or local) interests
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to justify or oppose laws and policies related to COVID-19, this under-
mines public justification and constitutes a violation of justificatory civility.
It should be stressed that the justifications for sectarian-minded policies
are not always stated explicitly. But it is often possible to infer from the
policy itself, and/or from the broader behaviour of the relevant political
actor, whether the policy could be justified by appealing to public reasons.
In many instances, the implementation of a policy that clearly advances
the interests of a specific political party or leader can hardly be considered
consistent with justificatory civility.
Confronting sectarianism, both during COVID-19 and more broadly,
can take on two forms. The first involves designing and strengthening
institutional mechanisms that can prevent encroachment on justifica-
tory civility. For example, judicial institutions like the US Supreme
Court, which for Rawls constitutes the ‘exemplar of public reason’,61
can stand as a bulwark against laws that may advance sectarian religious
values.62 Likewise, institutional responses to counteract disagreements
across different levels of governance will require competing partisan actors
to acknowledge the scope of their rights and duties at each level. When
there are uncertainties or disagreements at different levels of governance,
there should be clear channels of communication between the parties
involved in a dispute and appropriate mechanisms for its resolution.
The second kind of response to sectarianism involves promoting
compliance with the moral duty of justificatory civility among politicians
and citizens. That duty, recall, demands that citizens justify to each other
the political rules that they defend by appealing to the shared polit-
ical values of public reason. Schools and other educational institutions
could play a key role in educating children to the virtue of justificatory
civility, e.g. by familiarizing them with key constitutional principles that
reflect shared political values in their society. Such principles constitute the
shared vocabulary of public reason that citizens ought to employ when
participating in the process of public justification in the political realm.
Another solution might be to introduce or enhance channels for citi-
zens’ participation in decision-making, such as consultation mechanisms
or deliberative forums.63 These can encourage policymakers and citizens
alike to acquire reason-based and other-regarding perspectives on political
matters, informed by the value of reciprocity, in the spirit of justificatory
civility.
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Issue Prioritization 1: Public Health vs. Economic Growth
In the previous subsection, we considered instances of sectarianism that
emerge when political actors appeal to controversial values or partial
interests in defence of or in opposition to public policies related to
COVID-19. However, an additional problem that we would like to
consider in this section concerns the relationship between different polit-
ical values in the context of public justification. That is, policies may
sometimes be unreasonable not because they are grounded in sectarian
values but because they balance different non-sectarian political values in
unreasonable ways. Indeed there are often tensions between widely shared
political values in liberal democratic societies. While this does not neces-
sarily preclude public justification, it does require that those advocating or
opposing certain laws and policies offer reasons that ‘represent a plausible
balance of political values. An argument, even if based on a political and
free-standing value, fails to be a reasonable public justification if it does
not plausibly address other political values that may be at stake’.64
One type of balancing concerns different understandings of how the
same shared category of political value should be best realized. Take, for
example the ‘values of the common good’65 that are central to political
liberalism and public reason. Within the context of COVID-19, there has
been an ongoing debate regarding the potential trade-off between public
health and economic growth, arguably two policy goals that advance the
common good. The tension between public health and economic growth
has led people to conceptualize the harms resulting from COVID-19 in
different ways, with some prioritizing the harm to health and others the
long-term harm to the economy and livelihoods. From the very beginning
of the pandemic, some countries clearly embraced a public health-oriented
approach and acknowledged the almost certain costs to the economy. For
example, on 18 March 2020 Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau
stated:
If you work in a restaurant, drive a cab, organize events, or freelance to pay
your bills, working from home is not so simple. Just like if you work in the
oil and gas sector or the tourism and seafood industries, you’re looking at
the uncertainty in the global economy and probably wondering not only
how long this is going to last, but how long your savings are going to last.
No matter who you are or what you do, this is a time when you should be
focused on your health and that of your neighbours. Not whether you’re
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going to lose your job. Not whether you’re going to run out of money
for things like groceries and medication.66
Likewise, before introducing extreme lockdown measures to counter
Australia’s second wave of COVID-19 infections, the Premier of the state
of Victoria Daniel Andrews explained to the public:
As Premier, I’ve spent every day fighting for workers and fighting for jobs.
I understand deeply: a job means financial security – but it also means
stability, purpose and the foundation to build your future. Truthfully, I
never thought I’d find myself in a position where I’d have to ask people
not to go to work. But if we’re serious about driving this thing down
– and we absolutely must be – we need to take unprecedented steps in
limiting the movement of people, and therefore limiting the movement of
this virus.67
It is important to stress that Trudeau and Andrews, like other leaders who
clearly recognized the importance of prioritizing public health goals, did
not disregard the urgent economic circumstances they faced. In addition
to acknowledging the inevitable job losses and economic repercussions
that would accompany strict lockdown measures necessary to save lives,
these leaders also took measures to help businesses and workers who were
affected by government responses to the pandemic.68
Conversely, other political leaders stressed the importance of priori-
tizing the economy over public health outcomes early on. For example,
Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro downplayed the severity of the
pandemic as ‘just a little flu’ and insisted that ‘the economy must come
first’.69 In late March 2020, Bolsonaro stated: ‘[l]ife must go on, employ-
ments [sic] should be kept, people’s income should be preserved, so all
Brazilians should go back to normal’.70 Likewise, in the same month,
Texas Lt. Gov. Dan Patrick stated:
My message is that let’s get back to work. Let’s get back to living. Let’s
be smart about it… And those of us who are 70 plus, we’ll take care of
ourselves. But don’t sacrifice the country… I just think there are lots of
grandparents out there in this country like me—I have six grandchildren—
that’s what we all care about… And I want to live smart and see through
this, but I don’t want the whole country to be sacrificed. And that’s what
I see… No one reached out to me and said, as a senior citizen, are you
willing to take a chance on your survival in exchange for keeping the
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America that all America loves for your children and grandchildren? And if
that’s the exchange, I’m all in.71
Even in Italy, one of the first countries where the government imposed an
almost total lockdown at the beginning of the pandemic, the tendency to
prioritize the economy among some sectors of the population contributed
to delaying the shutting down of key businesses and factories, arguably
helping the spread of the virus in those early stages. This was partic-
ularly the case in the Bergamo province, one of the richest and most
productive of Italy, and one characterized by a strong work ethic. On 29
February 2020, the Confindustria Bergamo, a body representing 1,200
businesses employing 80,000 people, published a reassuring message in
English aimed at the region’s foreign export partners, and started a
Twitter campaign via the hashtag ‘#Bergamoisrunning’. The key message
by the president of Confindustria Bergamo, Stefano Scaglia, was ‘work
goes on, we remain open’.72
The examples discussed so far therefore reveal an apparent trade-off
between public health and economic growth goals, as two different ways
of promoting the common good. However, a closer look at the empirical
reality suggests that in fact there might be synergy between protecting
public health and protecting the economy.73 An analysis of GDP data
and death rates across cases, for example, concluded:
Contrary to the idea of a trade-off, we see that countries which suffered
the most severe economic downturns – like Peru, Spain and the UK –
are generally among the countries with the highest COVID-19 death rate.
And the reverse is also true: countries where the economic impact has been
modest – like Taiwan, South Korea, and Lithuania – have also managed to
keep the death rate low.74
More empirical evidence might be needed in this area, and it is likely
that policymakers will continue to face difficult trade-offs, especially as
measures like lockdown and stay-at-home orders impose increasing strains
upon businesses. However, the more general point is that policymakers
should engage in this kind of reflection in order to ensure that the policies
they implement meet the standards of justificatory civility by addressing all
the relevant political values at stake, and different interpretations of them.
And, of course, things are not static. For example, when introducing new
measures to counter a second wave of infections in October 2020, Italian
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Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte stated: ‘[w]e must act, deploying all the
measures necessary to avert a new generalized lockdown. The country
cannot afford a new setback which would severely jeopardize the whole
economy’.75
It is likely that political leaders will continue to make adjustments
to policies based on changing circumstances, while having to balance
public health and economic concerns. From the perspective of justifica-
tory civility, it is important that they recognize the trade-offs inherent in
prioritizing either goal.
Issue Prioritization 2: Public Health vs. Individual
Rights and Freedoms
Alongside distinct notions of what the common good should entail,
COVID-19 has also often highlighted the need to balance the common
good of public health with individual rights and freedoms. Here one
might point out that this trade-off is only apparent, given that priority
that Rawls famously assigns to basic rights and liberties over the promo-
tion of the common good. According to him, ‘the principles of justice
are to be ranked in lexical order and therefore the basic liberties can be
restricted only for the sake of liberty [rather than to advance the common
good]’.76 However, this objection overlooks another important aspect of
Rawls’s theory. In his view, citizens can only enjoy their basic rights and
liberties if they also have access to a social minimum set of goods that
protect them from such conditions as hunger or disease.77 This implies
that under political liberalism the promotion of the common good of
public health is not in tension with individual rights and liberties but, at
least in principle, instrumental to it. That said, it is implausible to argue
that any (temporary) infringements on individual rights and freedoms are
permissible if they help protect those rights and freedoms in the long
term. If that were the case, one might be able to justify any types of
authoritarian policies in the name of public health. Instead, justificatory
civility demands that policymakers offer a reasonable balance of political
values by carefully weighing the promotion of public health to help citi-
zens enjoy their basic rights and liberties in the long term against the
restrictions of those very rights and liberties that public health policies
often involve in the short term.
Consider again, for example, the opposition to mask wearing displayed
by certain religious believers. Some people may justify their opposition by
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appealing to controversial arguments tied to a specific religious tradition,
as in the aforementioned example concerning Ohio state representative
Nino Vitale. However, in other cases, resistance to mask-wearing regu-
lations has been justified by appealing to the right to religious freedom,
as exemplified by plaintiff claims in the recent Florida legal case Tillis v.
Manatee County.78 The right to the free exercise of religion is protected
by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and it certainly is one
of the shared political values central to political liberalism and theories
of public reason. Appealing to this right is distinct from appealing to
arguments rooted in a specific religious faith.
That said, appeals to religious freedom cannot be used to contest
any piece of legislation that even mildly infringes upon that right. US
courts normally apply a ‘rational basis test’ or a ‘strict scrutiny test’ to
assess the constitutionality of a specific law, especially when the latter
involves an alleged infringement on citizens’ basic rights. The former
test demands that in order to be constitutional ‘[a] statute or ordinance
must have a legitimate state interest, and there must be a rational connec-
tion between the statute’s/ordinance’s means and goals’.79 The latter is
more demanding and requires that ‘[t]o pass strict scrutiny, the legislature
must have passed the law to further a “compelling governmental interest”,
and must have narrowly tailored the law to achieve that interest’.80 Both
tests are likely to result in the Courts deeming mask mandates consti-
tutional since ‘[such] mandates do advance a compelling state interest
– the protection of public health – and do so in a way that minimizes the
restriction on the constitutional right involved, whether of speech or reli-
gion’.81 Within the context of COVID-19, these tests can therefore help
the courts to strike a reasonable balance between different shared political
values that are central to the public culture of a liberal democracy like the
US. More generally, these tests can provide policymakers with normative
guidelines for prioritizing one particular political value (e.g. public health)
while addressing others (e.g. religious freedom) that may be temporarily
curtailed as a result. This can contribute to formulating and implementing
policies that abide by the standards of justificatory civility.
Other individual freedoms have also been invoked in opposition
to government measures such as lockdown and stay-at-home orders,
including freedom of movement and freedom of speech. Several months
into the global pandemic we witnessed a significant number of protests
around the world, with some highlighting the ‘alleged erosion of rights
“that’s been ramped up in unprecedented ways during this Covid-19
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crisis”’.82 In some cases, protests took a much more extreme and violent
form.83 Culpability for these extreme cases may lie with political leaders,
as when Trump posted messages on Twitter calling on citizens to ‘LIB-
ERATE’ states like Minnesota, Michigan, and Virginia.84 Protests against
lockdown and stay-at-home orders have also often been led by the so-
called ‘sovereign citizens’ movement, rooted in the US but now with a
global presence. Movement members have specifically contested the way
in which government orders during the pandemic have infringed upon
their rights. Some of them have even expressed their anger by assaulting
or baiting police.85
These protests are relevant to civility in two ways. On the one hand,
they can act as an important reminder for governments to seriously
consider individual rights (e.g. to free movement and speech) when
implementing measures to promote public health, thus justifying those
policies based on a reasonable balance of political values. On the other
hand, the protesters’ demand for greater justificatory civility is often
accompanied by both incivility as impoliteness and moral incivility. The
former manifests itself when protesters use rude language or behaviour
to communicate their views and express their anger. For example, during
anti-lockdown protests at the Michigan state capital, protestors chanted
‘Lock her up!’ at Governor Gretchen Whitmerand and purposefully
caused traffic disruptions with the symbolic ‘Operation gridlock’ because
she was ‘driving them out of business’.86 The latter can be witnessed
when they harm other members of the public or assault police offi-
cers. Whether and when these forms of ‘incivility as dissent’87 aimed at
promoting justificatory civility are permissible is an issue that we do not
have the space to fully address here. However, some factors that might
need to be considered include the type of incivility adopted by protesters
(e.g. impoliteness seems much less serious than moral incivility); the
opportunities that protesters might have to convey their message in alter-
native civil ways; and, finally, the extent to which governments are failing
to address individual rights and liberties when justifying their policies.
Another case highlighting the need to balance different political values
concerns the tension between the common good of public health and
economic freedoms, where in one example bar owners participated in the
so-called ‘Bar Lives Matter’ protests.88 Here it seems that the trade-off
might be easier to resolve. First, economic freedoms (e.g. bar owners’
freedom to keep their establishments open), while certainly important in
a liberal democracy, are arguably less important than fundamental rights
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and liberties like freedom of speech or freedom of religion from the
perspective of political liberalism.89 And second, within the context of
COVID-19, the potential harm to public health caused by drinking in
bars is much more significant than that resulting from other risky activ-
ities. For example, during a US Senate committee hearing in late June
2020, Anthony Fauci, director of the US National Institute of Allergy and
Infectious Diseases, stated: ‘[b]ars: really not good. Really not good…-
Congregation at a bar, inside, is bad news. We really got to stop that
right now’.90 For both reasons, governments would seem to be justi-
fied in prioritizing public health and fundamental political rights over the
economic freedoms advocated in campaigns like ‘Bar Lives Matter’.
In some cases, the government has entrusted businesses with the imple-
mentation of new health and safety regulations, leaving them to balance
those rules against employees’ rights, such as the right to privacy. For
example, the President of a large personal care manufacturing firm in
Southern California described his experiences with the pandemic and
responding to employee safety concerns at the office and production
facilities:
It spreads like the flu, and I have no idea what people are doing on the
weekend. I had one employee come to see me and she was very upset. One
of her colleagues that she shares a workspace with had posted a photo on
Instagram where they were at a large barbeque. Now they’re in the office,
but I can’t do anything about what they do on their own time. I want all
employees to feel comfortable, but the rules don’t always allow for it.91
This example demonstrates how the tension between different political
values is not always one policymakers face directly, leaving citizens and
businesses with the difficult challenge of addressing these matters on their
own with unclear regulations and insufficient guidance.
In sum, to avoid the instances of justificatory incivility discussed in this
chapter, governments need to come up with ways to achieve policies that
can promote immediate public health outcomes that help stop the spread
of the virus and reduce deaths, while at the same time minimizing the
temporary infringement of fundamental political rights. This is also for
the benefit of businesses or other actors whom governments entrust with
the implementation of public health policies, and who may need clearer
guidance to balance different political values. How transgressions of basic
rights and liberties are justified to the public is crucial, and governments
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should clearly articulate the criteria for when and how certain polit-
ical values may be prioritized over others. Some ethical frameworks can
help to guide and justify those decisions.92 At the very least, policymakers
should acknowledge when certain political values are being undermined
or curtailed by their interventions. For example, when liberal democratic
governments implement policies that infringe on certain rights and liber-
ties, e.g. via coercive measures, they should stress that these measures are
temporary and allow for exemptions (e.g. from uniform travel bans93 or
mandatory mask wearing94) for particular citizens or circumstances when
possible.
Policy Compliance and Strains of Commitment
As we pointed out in Chapter 2, justificatory civility concerns not only
the reasons invoked in defence of political rules and policies but also their
potential effects. Public reason liberalism is not consequentialist; it does
not base the legitimacy of political rules on their effects but rather on the
justifications and reasons for them.95 However, the likely or foreseeable
outcomes of a policy are still relevant to public justification. More specif-
ically, a policy that would impose excessive ‘strains of commitment’96 on
specific citizens is not one that is publicly justifiable; those who are likely
to be overly burdened by the policy could not be reasonably expected to
accept the policy and its justification. As Jonathan Quong points out,
Although laws should be impartial in terms of their justification and not
necessarily in their consequences, it’s important to be clear about what
justificatory impartiality requires. Non-discriminatory intent is a necessary
but not sufficient condition of justificatory impartiality. There are many
laws that might meet the condition of being non-discriminatory in their
intent, yet would clearly be unjustifiable on account of the unreasonable
burdens they impose on certain persons. Justificatory neutrality requires
not just that we avoid discriminatory intent, but also that we imagine what
impact a given policy will have on all affected parties. We fail to reason
impartially if we don’t consider how the burdens and benefits of a policy
will be distributed. In addition to the condition of non-discriminatory
intent, impartial justification requires something along the lines of Rawls’s
‘strains of commitment’ condition. I fail to reason impartially if I support
a policy whose burdens and benefits are distributed in such a way that I
wouldn’t agree to place myself in the position of those who are worst-off
under the policy.97
144 M. BONOTTI AND S. T. ZECH
In this section we examine the ‘strains of commitment’ problem in
connection with COVID-19. We pay particular attention to the fact that
every society presents certain structural inequalities, which may result in
some groups being overly burdened by policies that would in principle
appear to be public-minded. Many of the policies implemented by liberal
democratic governments in response to COVID-19 present this kind of
problem. At first glance, they seem to be public-minded, insofar as they
aim to protect lives, advance the common good of public health (which,
we have seen, helps protect individual rights and liberties in the long
term), and restore economic well-being. However, it is undeniable that
in some cases those policies, no matter how well-intentioned in principle,
have had uneven effects on different categories of citizens and imposed
excessive burdens on some but not others. In this section, we focus partic-
ularly on the unequal burdens those policies have imposed on individuals
characterized by differences in race, gender, and age.
One of the main implications of our analysis—beyond those imme-
diately related to COVID-19—is that justificatory civility demands that
policymakers be aware of the social and political realities that charac-
terize their society, and of how the policies that they intend to implement
will interact with those conditions and produce certain effects. No policy
can have neutral effects. Whenever governments legislate on, say, tax-
related matters, it is inevitable that their policies will have negative
effects on some citizens more than others. Likewise, it is undeniable that
lockdown and stay-at-home orders implemented by many governments
during COVID-19 have negatively affected certain individuals and busi-
nesses more than others. These effects cannot be entirely dissociated from
the public justifiability of such policies, if they impose excessive burdens
on certain persons and groups. Therefore, the likely or foreseeable conse-
quences and social impact of such policies should be built into their public
justification. This is also important because in some cases those poli-
cies may even exacerbate structural inequalities that render them overly
burdensome for certain groups.
COVID-19 and Race
The pandemic has highlighted some of the deep structural inequalities in
many societies related to race. COVID-19 has affected certain groups
more than others because of differences in access to health services,
housing type, levels of economic precarity, and employment types.98
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In this section we focus specifically on the effects and implications of
structural racial inequality for policy responses to the pandemic.
Some segments of the population have faced distinct economic effects
resulting from COVID-19 policies. While many people have had to
contend with greater financial uncertainty, current unemployment rates
and the eventual ‘economic fallout’ will continue to affect racial and
ethnic minority communities in more pronounced ways.99 Financial
safety-net programs in countries like the US will prove especially crucial
to reduce disproportionate strains related to race. Measures taken in the
name of public health have led to a severe economic downturn and
affected black workers especially hard with higher unemployment rates
overall. Many sectors with high proportions of black workers have been
deemed ‘essential’, making those able to continue in their jobs more
vulnerable to infection.100 Policies that do not consider the dispropor-
tionate effects of the pandemic on minority and disadvantaged groups
risk placing additional unreasonable burdens on those groups. In the
US context, efforts to alleviate these burdens might involve identifying
and targeting industries with greater numbers of employees from precar-
ious workforces (e.g. nonprofit and public-sector employment which
have higher proportions of minority employees) and adjusting policies
to provide focused support and minimize burdens.101
Indigenous communities are especially vulnerable to some COVID-
19 policies and face a particularly grave situation worldwide.102 In many
countries across South America, for example, policies aimed at mitigating
the economic effects of the pandemic among the broader population
may not adequately provide relief for those in low-skilled and unstable
employment.103 Policies in Brazil, Colombia, and Peru have left some
indigenous communities neglected and in dire straits. For example, even
when economic support targeting some vulnerable communities arrives,
poor distribution practices like cash payments at remote regional banks
have led to long lines and increased risks for viral transmission in the
Peruvian Amazon.104 Governments should address these shortcomings
in their policies if they want to prevent the strains of commitment that
risk undermining their public justification.
There are also clear political effects related to COVID-19 and race. In
the US context, public health measures presented additional challenges
to voter turnout in the November 2020 presidential election and are
likely to contribute to ongoing trends in racial disenfranchisement. Issues
related to polling place access for in-person voting, excessive wait times
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that can deter participation for different reasons, and biases in the rates
of rejection of mail-in ballots might all contribute to the ongoing and
disproportionate marginalisation of voters based on race and ethnicity.105
English language skills, familiarity with voting procedures, flexible work
schedules, and access to reliable transportation also make voting easier,
allowing some citizens to more easily exercise their political rights. A
Human Rights Watch report documenting the experience of Abd’ullah, a
voter in Philadelphia, during the June 2020 primaries proves illustrative
of new obstacles to voting during the pandemic, especially in minority
communities. He arrived at his regular polling station to find it closed.
There was no indication as to an alternative site and technical difficulties
with the elections website forced him to drive around looking for another
option. He eventually found a school where he waited in line for over an
hour to cast a provisional ballot. He recalled: ‘[s]omeone else would have
been discouraged. I myself was very, very discouraged, to the point of
almost giving up. But I had my own car, so I was flexible. If I had been
taking public transportation, it would not have been possible. I would
have given up.’106 He suggests that some members of minority groups
are often also economically disadvantaged and therefore may not always
be able to find ways around the restrictions imposed during the pandemic
in order to exercise their fundamental rights and liberties. Policymakers
should be aware of the unreasonable burdens that those measures impose
on these citizens if they want to implement publicly justifiable policies.
COVID-19 has also created additional obstacles for some citizens to
exercise their right to protest. Public health measures like strict lock-
downs, stay-at-home orders, and restrictions on public gatherings can
place limitations on citizens’ ability to fully exercise that right. The
measures have been especially challenging for blacks in the US when orga-
nizing protests in response to several incidents of lethal police violence.
Some posed questions as to a trade-off between protesting racism and
risks to public health. The difficulty in maintaining physical distancing in
large crowds or in complying with mandatory mask rules, shouting and
chanting, and some of the more aggressive police responses like pepper
spray that elicit gasping and coughing, can all put protest participants
at greater risk of contracting the virus.107 However, abstaining from
protests around such an important issue would constitute a significant
strain for all those committed to mobilizing for accountability in the face
of racial injustice, but even more so for members of marginalized groups
who are most affected. Over 1,200 health professionals signed an open
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letter arguing that the protests against racism were actually crucial for
public health outcomes. The letter stated that ‘[w]hite supremacy is a
lethal public health issue that predates and contributes to COVID-19’
and concluded that ‘[p]rotests against systemic racism, which fosters the
disproportionate burden of COVID-19 on Black communities and also
perpetuates police violence, must be supported.’108
The pandemic has laid bare many structural inequalities tied to race.
The protests related to police violence against black Americans became a
space to link specific racist actions to systematic discrimination in other
sectors like healthcare. Infection and death rates were significantly higher
among blacks at the beginning of the pandemic, especially among those
from lower socioeconomic backgrounds.109 Based on these structural
factors, some have come to see being black in the US as its own form
of health risk.110 One black protester in Washington, DC described the
situation of people he knew who lost their lives to COVID-19: ‘[t]hey
were living in impoverished areas. Couldn’t get proper treatment. Lived
in crowded conditions, so social distancing was hard to do. And they
were still forced to go to work and be put in harm’s way’.111 Ulti-
mately, research suggests that widespread Black Lives Matter protests may
not have contributed to virus transmission rates overall.112 Any policies
regarding protests against racial discrimination and police violence should
certainly consider the potential public health risks and consequences.
However, policymakers should also recognize the effects limitations on
protests will have on racial minorities’ ability to redress systemic inequal-
ities.
COVID-19 and Gendered Effects
The impact of COVID-19 on society also highlights a clear gender
dimension, with different gender groups facing distinct challenges. In
Chapter 1 we briefly mentioned that men are more likely to die from
the virus than women for reasons that are still unclear. But beyond
rates of mortality, men have also been especially vulnerable to mental
distress during the pandemic. This is particularly the case for fathers with
young children and those who are unemployed.113 However, women
have been affected to even a greater degree by the pandemic. Aside
from the higher maternal mortality rates in developing countries also
mentioned in Chapter 1, COVID-19 has in many ways also compounded
existing gender-based economic inequalities. But perhaps one of the most
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significant effects of the pandemic on women has been the sharp rise in
domestic and family violence.114 Lockdown and stay-at-home orders have
forced people to live in confined spaces for significant lengths of time,
causing or exacerbating tensions related to health and financial issues. In a
statement highlighting the emergence of a ‘shadow pandemic’, Phumzile
Mlambo-Ngcuka, Executive Director of UN Women, pointed out that
[c]onfinement is fostering the tension and strain created by security, health,
and money worries. And it is increasing isolation for women with violent
partners, separating them from the people and resources that can best help
them. It’s a perfect storm for controlling, violent behaviour behind closed
doors. And in parallel, as health systems are stretching to breaking point,
domestic violence shelters are also reaching capacity, a service deficit made
worse when centres are repurposed for additional COVID-response.115
The gendered impact of COVID-19 also concerns issues related to
caring responsibilities. An Australian Government report, for example,
shows that while men are also facing greater caring and domestic respon-
sibilities, women have been especially affected by these demands. More
specifically,
[w]omen are likely to increase time spent on caring responsibilities. They
comprise the majority of the healthcare workforce, and are more likely
to care for sick family members at home and take on education-related
responsibilities while children are home from school…The increase in
caring responsibilities can heighten feelings of stress and limit women’s
economic opportunities.116
Furthermore, a study of female academics working at Australian univer-
sities shows that many women have struggled to manage remote work
and caring, and have not received much support by their institutions.117
One female academic at an Australian university described the difficulties
in achieving this balance:
Experiencing the rolling lockdowns with an infant brings unique chal-
lenges. I have had to negotiate caring and work arrangements in my own
home, which had up until that point been a space largely undisturbed by
my job… Since March I have not had sustained thinking time. Despite this,
I have attempted to maintain some kind of normal research and writing
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level, with incredible difficulty, just so my research trajectory is not unduly
shattered by the dual dimensions of caring and COVID-19.118
More generally, lack of institutional support for women has resulted
in reduced numbers of remunerated working hours and higher levels
of stress, as women continue to undertake most of the unpaid ‘care
economy’ work tasks such as cooking and childcare.119
Finally, COVID-19 has also had a significant impact on the LGBTIQ+
community. In the Australian context, for example, it has compounded
pre-existing disparities among members of this community related to
health, rates of depression and suicide, experiences with discrimination
when accessing healthcare and support services, and when engaging with
law enforcement.120 Mitigating the negative effects of the pandemic
will require abiding by a number of key guiding principles. These
include complying with human rights legislation, taking into account the
distinctive needs and circumstances of LGBTIQ+ people, ensuring that
economic stimulus interventions offer support for LGBTIQ+ people and
organizations, and providing institutional mechanisms for ensuring that
LGBTIQ+ people are given democratic voice and included in consultation
processes.121
The same considerations should apply across all marginalized or espe-
cially vulnerable groups. Policymakers should take into account the
social and political realities that characterize their society, and how their
proposed policies in response to COVID-19 will interact with those
conditions and produce certain effects. When the empirical evidence
suggests that a policy imposes (or is likely to impose) disproportionate
burdens on certain individuals and groups, in order to comply with the
demands of justificatory civility policymakers may face a choice between
renouncing the policy, modifying it, or implementing additional measures
aimed at mitigating its uneven effects. Ultimately, the key point is the
following: justificatory civility demands not only abstract reasoning but
also attention to the concrete circumstances in which (and for which)
political rules are designed and implemented.
Older People During COVID-19
A third social category which has been particularly burdened by policy
responses to COVID-19 are older people. We already pointed out in
Chapter 1 that older people are at greater risk of contracting and dying
150 M. BONOTTI AND S. T. ZECH
from COVID-19 than children and younger adults. Aged care facili-
ties have become sites for significant outbreaks with high fatality rates
as well.122 However, older people’s greater vulnerability also becomes
apparent when we consider the implications of some of the policy
responses to the pandemic. For example, data show that rates of unem-
ployment have been higher than in previous recessions for workers who
are 65 and older.123 Furthermore, many older people have also experi-
enced disruptions to their retirement plans and may not be afforded the
same opportunities to resume travel when the pandemic subsides. One
recent retiree in the US described his disappointment with the timing of
the pandemic:
These were the years that we have set aside between, you know, 66 and
maybe early 70s, where we were going to do all of the things that we had
put off because we were raising a family and we were at the end of the
most productive years in our careers. We didn’t take extended vacations,
we didn’t do a lot of things because our jobs were demanding; our careers
were demanding. We said that we were going to retire at an earlier age
than some people…[W]e had a couple good years where we [traveled in]
Europe, Australia, and a lot of the US, and all of a sudden, all of that’s
gone. And at the same time we’re progressing in our age, and these are
years that we’ll never get back. It’s not like you can travel [in the same
way] when you’re 77.124
A more significant problem, however, is posed by the social isolation
resulting from such measures as stay-at-home orders and social distancing
rules. These measures have often prevented older people from engaging in
social interactions that are central to their well-being, such as those with
their relatives and family and those occurring at stores, among community
groups, in places of worship, or during other day-to-day activities.125 For
example, we spoke with one woman in Italy who described the measures
she took during the first wave of the pandemic: ‘[t]o try to safeguard
the health of my elderly mother, who lives one floor above mine, for
two months I only met with her for a few minutes [each day], wearing
a mask’.126 This kind of isolation can cause or exacerbate ‘depression,
feelings of despair and, in older adults with dementia, further cognitive
decline’.127
Older people living in long-term care (LTC) facilities have been partic-
ularly affected, due to significant limitations imposed upon the number,
timing, and modalities of visits by friends and relatives. Visitors are often
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required to be tested before attending LTC facilities, and the visits are
often short and conducted outdoors. All those involved must physically
distance and wear masks and other personal protective equipment. This
inevitably has an impact on the quality of the meetings. In the Canadian
context, health researchers and practitioners observe that
[t]he impracticalities of such visits are obvious: spouses of residents are
often older adults themselves and face mobility challenges getting tested,
residents have hearing and vision loss making communicating during a
physically distanced visit outdoors challenging, and covering visitor faces
with masks is not helpful or comforting for residents with memory loss.
Some residents have been socially isolated for over 3 months due to
COVID-19 outbreaks, spending all day and every meal trapped alone in
their rooms; held hostage by ill-conceived policies… Such policies are out
of touch with the needs of residents and are causing emotional distress.128
This suggests that some of the key policies implemented by governments
in response to COVID-19 have imposed excessive burdens on older
people. This risks undermining their public justifiability and demands that
policymakers be aware of these policies’ uneven social impact, especially
given the vulnerable position many older people already find themselves
in. There are, however, potential ways of reducing the impact of such
policies on older people. In the context of LTC facilities, for example,
this might involve
[refocusing] care on the resident and reintroduce person-centred care into
countermeasures… This means welcoming and advocating for innovation,
user-friendly digital technologies that promote connections to loved ones,
and leveraging [nurses’] close relationships with residents to advocate for
more person-centred policies.129
Online resources have also been used more broadly beyond the context of
LTC facilities. For example, in addition to Facebook, Twitter, and What-
sApp social networking tools, older people in the UK also have access
to the Nextdoor App, which enables communication and social inter-
actions between neighbours. Online platforms have also been used to
enable older people to attend religious services, play board games online,
and attend virtual music concerts. Since many older people do not have
high levels of IT literacy, some have proposed additional forms of support
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such as letters, cards and parcels, telephone conversations, and cognitive
behaviour therapy.130
Justificatory civility does not demand that governments always
renounce policy responses to COVID-19 just because these might have
a disproportionate effect on older people. After all, these policies are
necessary to reduce the virus’s spread and save lives. However, policy-
makers must at the very least acknowledge those uneven consequences
and, where necessary, make a genuine effort to either modify their policies
or implement and promote measures to mitigate their uneven effects. This
could be done either through direct efforts like providing older people
with the financial and technological means to access online resources
in their homes, or perhaps indirectly by organizing public information
campaigns encouraging citizens to adopt some of the aforementioned
supporting behaviours in their daily interactions with older people.
Science, Health and Justificatory Civility
The final problem we address in this chapter concerns the relationship
between science and justificatory civility. As we pointed out in Chapter 2,
and as Rawls himself highlights, scientific methods and findings should
play a key role in public justification. However, this is only on the condi-
tion that these methods and findings are not controversial. Politicians
who appeal to conspiracy theories131 to justify certain laws or policies, for
example, are in clear breach of the duty of civility. But those who rely on
flawed or incomplete scientific evidence, or who deliberately select certain
pieces of (sound) scientific evidence but disregard others for political
convenience, are also being uncivil from a justificatory point of view.
The link between scientific expertise and public justification is partic-
ularly relevant to COVID-19. No other policy challenge in recent times
has perhaps elicited greater debate on the role of science in public policy
than the current pandemic, rendering the need for a fusion of science
and policy especially urgent.132 Measures to contain the virus’s spread
such as social distancing rules, mask-wearing regulations, and lockdown
or stay-at-home orders, rely heavily on scientific expertise and evidence.
In the absence of such evidence, it is not clear how governments could
legitimately impose upon their citizens such burdensome rules, especially
given the significant toll of these policies on rights and liberties.
One of the greatest challenges posed to the science/policy nexus
during COVID-19 is the politicization of scientific evidence. As stated by
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Fauci, a simple motto should guide scientists who advise policymakers,
especially in times of crisis: ‘[y]ou stay completely apolitical and non-
ideological, and you stick to what it is that you do. I’m a scientist and
I’m a physician. And that’s it’.133 In other words, scientists must rely on
facts and data, even when these contradict the political goals of decision-
makers. This is especially important when evidence-based policies can help
save human lives. But this is, of course, not an easy credo to follow. Fauci
recalls how he was once advised that ‘[w]hen you go into the White
House, you should be prepared that that is the last time you will ever
go in. Because if you go in saying, I’m going to tell somebody something
they want to hear, then you’ve shot yourself in the foot’.134 It comes as
no surprise that there were tensions between Fauci and Trump during
the pandemic, with the former US President often suggesting potential
treatments for COVID-19, only to see them quickly corrected or refuted
by Fauci.
In the remainder of this section, we will examine the challenges posed
by COVID-19 to the connection between science and policy by focusing
on three specific issues: the first concerns the scientific community’s
ongoing limited understanding of the virus and its long-term health
effects; the second relates to the lack of scientific research on the way
in which COVID-19, and the policies implemented in response to it,
interact with various social and cultural contexts; and the third involves
the problems posed by the politicization of science and by the lack of
clear communication channels between scientists and policymakers.
Understanding COVID-19, How It Spreads, and Its Long-Term Effects
The first issue that we examine in this section concerns the scien-
tific understanding of COVID-19. Justificatory civility demands that
when policymakers appeal to scientific evidence to justify legislation, the
evidence and the methods employed to produce it should be uncontro-
versial. Whether these criteria have been met in the scientific study of
COVID-19 remains unclear. The scientific community has invested signif-
icant time and energy in the study of COVID-19 since the beginning of
the pandemic. However, there has been ongoing disagreement among
scientists regarding key aspects of the virus, including the effectiveness of
wearing a mask in preventing its spread; the degree to which people who
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have had the virus become immune to it; and the question of how cases
should be estimated and reported.135
The study of COVID-19 in everyday environments has left us with
additional unanswered questions. Most of the scientific research on
COVID-19 has focused on studying the virus in laboratory settings, away
from the everyday environments in which the virus exists and spreads.
This is problematic since a full understanding of how the virus can be
transmitted requires having a grasp of how it interacts, for example,
with everyday objects such as furniture, lifts, and door handles.136 For
instance, a recent study pointed out that the 2-metre social distancing
rule implemented by many governments to reduce COVID-19 trans-
mission might be based on incomplete evidence. More specifically, the
study claims, ‘[s]afe transmission mitigation measures depend on multiple
factors related to both the individual and the environment, including viral
load, duration of exposure, number of individuals, indoor versus outdoor
settings, level of ventilation and whether face coverings are worn’.137 This
has important policy implications. As the study concluded,
safe social distancing limits differ widely between settings, with outdoor
environments likely associated with lower risk of transmission at a given
distance. Staggered social distancing rules alongside other public health
interventions may be required to recognise the importance of the environ-
mental context in determining transmission risk.138
Scientists have also stressed the need for more research on COVID-
19 in relation to air,139 water,140 and specific types of surfaces.141
While a growing number of studies have begun to address these gaps,
e.g. by analysing in more detail how COVID-19 spreads in restau-
rants,142 airplanes,143 and humid vs. dry environments,144 more research
is required in these areas.
Research regarding COVID-19 transmission on airlines provides an
interesting case for discussion. The US Department of Defense part-
nered with United Airlines and university researchers to examine risks of
COVID-19 transmission on airplanes under a range of control conditions
while stationary and in-flight. The study generated some encouraging
conclusions for those who would like to see a return to more frequent
air travel, finding that a person would have to sit next to a conta-
gious passenger for over 54 hours to become infected through aerosol
transmission.145 Continuous use of a surgical mask, combined with
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seat layout and powerful air filtration systems, eliminate much of the
risk for transmission in these controlled environments. However, there
are still limitations to the study and many of its assumptions. As one
researcher at Johns Hopkins University noted about the study, ‘you take
the element of human behavior out’.146 The study assumes that passen-
gers do not remove their mask, eat a meal, use the lavatory, or interact
with other passengers or flight crew. Indeed anecdotal evidence of known
instances of onboard transmission seem to involve acts like using the lava-
tory.147 Other research scientists find the prospect of experimental studies
hopeful, but also question some of the data used in a broader campaign
to portray air travel as relatively free from health risks.148
Finally, there seems to still be significant uncertainty regarding the
long-term health effects of COVID-19 and their exact causes, for example
in relation to the heart149 or the brain.150 Likewise, a recent study
published in The Lancet151 lists a number of long-term complaints raised
by former COVID-19 patients, including extreme fatigue, muscle weak-
ness, inability to concentrate, memory lapses, and difficulty sleeping. The
authors highlight the need for more research in this area, pointing out
their inability to provide patients with clear answers to a number of ques-
tions related to the long-term effects of the virus: ‘does acute COVID-19
cause diabetes? Or other metabolic disorders? Will patients develop inter-
stitial lung disease? We are still in the first months of the pandemic and
we do not know what to tell our patients when they are asking about the
course and prognosis of their ongoing complaints’.152
The controversy and uncertainty surrounding many scientific studies
of COVID-19 does not imply that the evidence provided by these studies
should be automatically disregarded, or that their findings are always
unsuitable for public justification. Scientific evidence can be controver-
sial and still be used for public justification. Expecting all scientists to
agree on every scientific finding and every method employed in scientific
inquiry would mean setting the bar too high, given that scientists regu-
larly disagree with one another and that this disagreement is a healthy
aspect of scientific research. In this sense, abiding by more general stan-
dards of research that are broadly agreed upon within the scientific
community, e.g. Thomas Kuhn’s five desiderata of theory choice, might
in principle be sufficient to produce scientific findings that can be used in
public justification.153
However, public justification should not be seen in simple black-
and-white terms. There can be degrees of public justification, and the
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more controversial and uncertain scientific findings are, the more diffi-
cult it will be for policymakers to justify public health policies based on
them, especially when those policies curtail individual rights and liber-
ties. Conversely, relying on less contested scientific findings can make it
easier for governments to justify public health interventions. For example,
if scientific research were to consistently show that COVID-19 can
have significant long-term consequences for many of those who have
contracted it, including those from groups with lower mortality rates (e.g.
young people and children), this could raise the stakes and have signif-
icant implications for policy responses to COVID-19. The prospect of
a generation with severe long-term health problems, and the resulting
strain on public health infrastructure, would strengthen the public justifi-
ability of demanding policy responses to COVID-19, including those that
significantly curtail people’s rights and liberties.
In some cases, however, the scientific study of COVID-19 might
be not merely controversial or uncertain but inherently flawed. For
example, some researchers concluded that ‘several diagnostic and prog-
nostic models for covid-19…are all at high risk of bias, mainly because of
non-representative selection of control patients, exclusion of patients who
had not experienced the event of interest by the end of the study, and
model overfitting’.154 Other studies were found to be based on flawed
datasets.155 In such cases, we are not observing healthy scientific disagree-
ment but rather what could be described as ‘gross epistemic error’.156
The scientific findings resulting from this kind of flawed research cannot
reasonably be invoked to justify public policy; to do so would be uncivil
in the justificatory sense.
Understanding COVID-19 in Different Social and Cultural Contexts
A second example we consider here concerns the importance of under-
standing COVID-19 within different social and cultural contexts. The
scientific understanding of the virus is, of course, important for the public
justification of government responses to the pandemic. And we high-
lighted in the previous section some of the current shortcomings that
characterize the scientific study of COVID-19. However, beyond the
kind of evidence and data that the natural sciences can provide, it is also
important for policymakers to draw on evidence concerning the social
and cultural dimensions of the pandemic. These include both the social
and cultural environment within which the virus exists and spreads, and
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the potential social and cultural effects of the policies implemented to
contain the virus—it would be unreasonable to apply the same policies
indiscriminately across different cultures, countries, and contexts. Absent
this broader understanding, such policies might be both ineffective and
inconsistent with the demands of justificatory civility.
In the previous section we highlighted the urgent need for addi-
tional scientific research on COVID-19 in everyday environments in
order to understand how the virus spreads in different spaces and
via different surfaces and materials. Studies conducted in the lab, in
isolation from everyday contexts, cannot always provide this kind of
evidence. But beyond a better understanding of the physical dimen-
sions of everyday environments, it is also important to study their social
and cultural dimensions, for example how people interact in different
everyday contexts and spaces. In restaurants and cafes, for example,
knowledge about what materials chairs and tables are made of, or how
ventilation works within these environments, is not sufficient to under-
stand how COVID-19 spreads. It is also necessary to understand the
kinds of interactions people engage in, such as whether they tend to eat
together or alone, whether they share plates or not, whether they sit or
stand to drink coffee, as well as how frequently they visit these venues
and for how long. These questions, however, cannot be answered in the
abstract. It is necessary, instead, to acquire knowledge and understanding
of different food and coffee cultures. Knowing, for example, that people
in a certain country tend to eat at restaurants in large groups over long
periods of time, whereas in another they tend to have quick meals on
their own, may have implications for how policies to counter COVID-19
are designed, since those different social and cultural habits are likely to
affect the spread of the virus in different ways.157
Acquiring this knowledge requires interdisciplinary research beyond
the natural scientific study of the virus. More specifically, it demands that
policymakers draw on the expertise of social scientists (e.g. sociologists,
anthropologists, psychologists, and political scientists) who study the virus
in relation to people’s behaviours and beliefs. Drawing on this expertise
is important in order to understand not only how the virus spreads in
different everyday contexts but also how to respond best.158 For example,
knowing about the religious make-up of a country is important since
religious believers in many countries have sometimes opposed or failed
to fully comply with lockdown policies targeting places of worship.159
Likewise, knowing whether the political culture of a specific country
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emphasizes norms of individual freedom or solidarity will be relevant
to understanding how its leaders can best justify policy responses to
COVID-19, and the extent to which they can curtail individual rights and
freedoms in ways that that majority of citizens will find publicly justifiable.
For example, a recent statement by Prime Minister Boris Johnson
contends that one of the reasons why measures to contain the virus have
not been very successful in the UK is its citizens’ love for individual
freedom. During a parliamentary speech, Johnson stated:
Actually, there is an important difference between our country and many
other countries around the world… That is that our country is a freedom
loving country. If you look at the history of this country over the last
300 years, virtually every advance – from free speech to democracy – has
come from this country. And it is very difficult to ask the British population
uniformly to obey guidelines in the way that is necessary.160
In contrast, German Chancellor Angela Merkel has often emphasized the
importance of solidarity within German society, a point that she stressed
in a speech to the nation at the onset of the pandemic in March 2020:
Since German reunification, no, since the Second World War, there has not
been a challenge for our country in which action in a spirit of solidarity on
our part was so important. Everything I tell you about this comes from
the Federal Government’s ongoing consultations with the experts from the
Robert Koch Institute and other scientists and virologists. These are not
just abstract numbers in statistics, but this is about a father or grandfather,
a mother or grandmother, a partner – this is about people. And we are a
community in which each life and each person counts.161
Recognizing these kinds of cultural differences can be very important
for policymakers’ ability to provide better public justifications for their
policies, i.e. justifications that better align with those values. After all,
it is a key assumption of political liberalism that public reasons must be
grounded in ideas that are implicit in the public political culture of a
society.162 Those ideas, or how they are prioritized against each other,
may not be the same across different societies, including across liberal
democracies. And if policymakers cannot provide a public justification
that aligns with shared ideas and values in their society’s public political
culture, they may need to formulate new policies that are more consistent
with those ideas and values.
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Beyond issues concerning religious and political worldviews, other
social and cultural factors influence how we understand and counter
COVID-19. For example, shaming could provide a powerful psycholog-
ical mechanism to limit challenges to social order during the pandemic.
At the onset of the public health crisis, for instance, many Australians
started to hoard and fight over toilet rolls. Prime Minister Scott Morrison
referred to that behaviour and, more generally, to non-compliance
with anti-COVID-19 policies, as ‘un-Australian’.163 Mask-wearing norms
further illustrates the importance of additional cultural factors. Whether
people are more or less likely to wear masks to contain the spread of
COVID-19 depends very much on local cultural norms. For example,
in some parts of Asia everyone wears a mask by default – it is seen as
safer and more considerate. In mainland China, Hong Kong, Japan, South
Korea, Thailand and Taiwan, the broad assumption is that anyone could
be a carrier of the virus, even healthy people. So in the spirit of solidarity,
you need to protect others from yourself… For many of these countries,
mask-wearing was a cultural norm even before the coronavirus outbreak.
They’ve even become fashion statements – at one point Hello Kitty face
masks were all the rage in the street markets of Hong Kong.164
Likewise, cultures where friendly kissing and hugging are common might
be more conducive to the spread of the virus.165 Furthermore, a society’s
ability to respond to a threat like the current pandemic also depends on
previous experiences of natural disasters. As one study shows,
[e]cological and human-made threats increase the need for strong norms
and punishment of deviant behavior in the service of social coordination
for survival—whether it is to reduce chaos in nations that have high popu-
lation density, deal with resource scarcity, coordinate in the face of natural
disasters, defend against territorial threats, or contain the spread of disease.
Nations facing these particular challenges are predicted to develop strong
norms and have low tolerance of deviant behavior to enhance order and
social coordination to effectively deal with such threats [tight cultures].
Nations with few ecological and human-made threats, by contrast, have a
much lower need for order and social coordination, affording weaker social
norms and much more latitude [loose cultures].166
Knowing whether a society’s culture is ‘tight’ or ‘loose’ can be very
important for understanding its people’s response to COVID-19, the
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extent to which social norms can regulate behaviour, and the level of
compliance with policy responses to the pandemic.
In sum, knowledge and understanding of the social world in which
COVID-19 exists and spreads is fundamental for justificatory civility. To
reassert our central point in this section, such knowledge is important for
two reasons. First, it can help policymakers to better understand the virus
and improve the efficacy of the policies implemented to contain it. This
can enhance the epistemic dimension of the public justification for those
policies. Second, a better understanding of a society’s political culture can
also help policymakers to better align the moral dimension of their public
justification for those policies to the ideas, values, and norms that are
widespread and prevalent within that society.
Disconnect and Subversion in the Science-Policy
Interface During COVID-19
So far in this section we have examined the problems posed to public justi-
fication by limits or flaws in our scientific understanding of COVID-19.
These might be due to shortcomings in the natural or social scien-
tific study of the virus, or a combination of both. Here we examine a
different set of problems, which also constitute obstacles to justificatory
civility. The first is related to the lack of clear communication between
policymakers and the scientific community (even when sound scientific
evidence is available); the second concerns problems associated with the
politicization, subversion, and manipulation of science.
The first problem is sometimes characterized as a failure of the so-
called ‘science-policy interface’. More specifically,
The science-policy interface is a short-hand description of the system by
which the best scientific information and advice is provided by the most
knowledgeable institutions and experts, acted upon by key decision-makers
in government, and provided to the public. Many of the failures are due to
incompetence in government, but there have also been failures by scientific
institutions and advisors who recognized the emerging threat but were
unable to marshall support for timely effective action.167
We speculate that in addition to incompetence among policymakers
and failures within the scientific community, other factors might also
hinder the smooth transmission of scientific findings from the latter to
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the former. More specifically, the way in which scientists communicate
their findings to policymakers can play an important role in how they
are received. Take, once again, the example of Fauci discussed earlier. It
is plausible that Fauci’s pragmatic approach, characterized by an apolit-
ical, non-ideological and goal-oriented stance, has contributed to his
ability to influence US Presidents and other key political leaders over
several decades.168 Furthermore, the uptake of scientific findings by poli-
cymakers (and citizens in general) may sometimes also be affected by the
level of politeness with which they are communicated.169 That is, polite
exchanges can help uptake, a testimony to the role of politeness as a ‘social
lubricant’ that we examined in the previous chapter. During a pandemic,
when tensions are often high among citizens and policymakers, exercising
restraint and abiding by politeness norms when communicating scientific
evidence can therefore facilitate the uptake of that evidence by those in
charge of policy-making, thus resulting in policies more in line with public
justification. This also reveals an interesting synergy between civility as
politeness and justificatory civility.
In addition to the failure of the science-policy interface, the inability
of scientific evidence to contribute to the public justification of poli-
cies during COVID-19 may also result from the politicization, subver-
sion, and manipulation of science carried out by policymakers. These
phenomena may manifest themselves in various ways.
Politicians might make false scientific claims, as when Trump stated
that ‘[t]aking hydroxychloroquine to treat COVID-19 is safe and effec-
tive’,170 a claim he continued to make even after the scientific commu-
nity challenged his assertion.171 Trump’s claim was based on a French
study172 that was later found to be scientifically flawed.173 This example
also reveals another problem: sometimes politicians may think that their
beliefs about what is scientifically viable and effective to tackle the
health crisis are on a par with evidence-based policies. When Fauci,
following Trump’s claim, was asked whether the drug hydroxychloro-
quine is effective at preventing coronavirus, he responded, ‘[t]he answer is
no’. President Trump then returned to the microphone to offer a rebuttal:
‘[i]t may work, it may not work. I feel good about it. That’s all it is, it’s
just a feeling, you know, right, smart guy’. He added, ‘[y]ou know the
expression, “[w]hat the hell do you have to lose?”’ and reasoned, ‘I’ve
been right a lot, let’s see what happens’.174 This statement shows that
in recommending the use of hydroxychloroquine to treat COVID-19,
Trump relied on a flawed method, i.e. appealing to his feelings rather than
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to findings based on valid scientific methodology. Since public reason and
justificatory civility involve appeals to knowledge based on sound science
in support of legislation, drawing on feelings about flawed studies can
exacerbate justificatory incivility.
In other cases, politicians may adopt a selective approach to scientific
evidence, citing data that are sound but incomplete. For example, when in
July 2020 Trump cited low rates of contagion and mortality among chil-
dren to justify his support for re-opening schools, he neglected important
evidence about community transmission, especially to older people who
are much more vulnerable to the virus.175
In other instances, we have witnessed politicians misinterpreting or
misapplying sound scientific evidence. For example, when hearing that
COVID-19 dies faster when exposed to sunlight and heat, and that bleach
or isopropyl alcohol can kill it within minutes, Trump suggested that
perhaps the virus could be treated by irradiating patients’ bodies with UV
light or injecting disinfectant into their bodies. His suggestions, however,
were quickly dismissed by scientists. While his claims were in principle
based on sound scientific evidence, Trump committed a gross epistemic
error by inferring that the effectiveness of sunlight and disinfectants at
killing COVID-19 outside the human body imply that these ‘treatments’
would also be effective inside the human body, and by neglecting the
serious harm they could cause to the body in the process.176
In addition to the flawed or selective use of scientific evidence, another
obstacle to the contribution of science to justificatory civility arises from
its politicization. Sometimes politicians make overt attempts to undermine
science when its findings prove politically inconvenient. For example,
under pressure from various business sectors, Trump refused to imple-
ment the Centers for Disease Control and Preventions 17-page draft
recommendation for reopening the US, expressing his preference for
pre-COVID-19 opening rules rather than abiding by the more cautious
recommendations of the CDCP.177
Beyond the actions of specific leaders, the politicization of science
can affect society more broadly. Partisan divides may influence and
distort how individuals perceive and respond to scientific evidence about
COVID-19. In the US context, for example, the way in which people
approach scientific evidence regarding COVID-19 has become deeply
polarized along partisan lines, with clear differences in beliefs about basic
facts related to the pandemic. Some commentators suggest that many
4 CIVILITY AS PUBLIC-MINDEDNESS DURING COVID-19 163
people are living in ‘alternative realities’.178 There is also evidence, for
example, that US Republican supporters tend to be more skeptical about
scientific evidence related to COVID-19 than their Democrat counter-
parts.179 The politicization of science can have far-reaching implications.
For example, collective bodies that usually abstain from adopting posi-
tions of support for individual candidates may see the affront to science
as a motivation to adopt political positions. For instance, for the first time
in its 175-year history, the popular science magazine Scientific Amer-
ican openly endorsed a presidential candidate in 2020, justifying this
decision by arguing ‘that Donald Trump has badly damaged the U.S.
and its people—because he rejects evidence and science’.180 This kind
of response can further exacerbate the distance between some politicians
and the scientific community, thus undermining the uptake of scientific
evidence by the former.
Finally, the contribution of science to justificatory civility can be under-
mined by the presence and spread of conspiracy theories, such as the
view that ‘[t]he COVID-19 pandemic is part of a strategy conceived by
global elites — such as Bill Gates — to roll out vaccinations with tracking
chips that would later be activated by 5G, the technology used by cellular
networks’.181
How can these problems be addressed? In addition to educating people
about awareness and assessment of scientific evidence, we may also resort
to the use of ethics frameworks.182 We have already seen before that
these frameworks can help policymakers navigate the difficult ethical
dilemmas they face, especially when they need to balance different polit-
ical values, rights, and liberties. However, they can also provide guidelines
for conducting183 and communicating184 scientific research during the
pandemic.
Conclusion
This chapter examined new challenges that COVID-19 poses to both the
moral and the justificatory dimensions of civility as public-mindedness.
Different types of actors and institutions, at both the local/national and
international level, have responded to the pandemic in ways that some-
times failed to comply with the demands of moral and justificatory civility.
First, various forms of discrimination and hatred have targeted members
of vulnerable groups, thus undermining their status as free and equal citi-
zens in ways that are morally uncivil. Second, a number of political actors
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have exploited COVID-19 to put forward sectarian political agendas, or
overly prioritized certain political values in relation to others, in ways that
defy the requirements of justificatory civility. Third, some governments
have implemented policies that imposed unreasonable ‘strains of commit-
ment’ upon certain categories of citizens, especially groups that already
experience structural marginalization and disadvantage. This, we argued,
risks undermining the public justifiability of these policies. Finally, threats
to justificatory civility have also emerged from the limited scientific under-
standing of COVID-19 and of its social and cultural dimensions, as well
as from the politicization of science for personal or partisan gain by some
actors.
There is an urgent need to respond to these challenges if we want to
prevent an escalation of moral and justificatory incivility. We suggested
a number of ways in which governments and citizens can undertake
this endeavour. When it comes to moral civility, governments can take
steps towards more inclusive policies that can reduce discrimination and
improve conditions for marginalized segments of the population. This
might involve multi-pronged strategies that include consistent messaging
as well as translation, consultation, and co-design of policies. Further-
more, policymakers can help counteract increases in racism and hate
speech by identifying their causes, monitoring and collecting data,
engaging with civil society actors, employing media and new technolo-
gies for programme delivery, and improving legal mechanisms like hate
speech laws.
Responding to the challenges posed by COVID-19 to justificatory
civility also requires multiple forms of interventions. First, sectarianism
can be averted via institutional bulwarks against incivility such as judicial
mechanisms that can help to prevent religious beliefs from encroaching on
political rules. At the same time, governments should promote justifica-
tory civility by advocating the values of cooperation, other-regardingness,
and reciprocity via educational institutions, as well as through the use of
consultative and deliberative bodies. Furthermore, the adoption of ethics
frameworks could help governments and citizens to articulate more clearly
the criteria for establishing when and how certain political values should
be prioritized over others in the public justification of policies. Addition-
ally, in order to reduce the strains of commitment that some policies
might impose upon certain groups, policymakers ought to acquire greater
awareness of the social and political realities that characterize their society,
especially structural inequalities that place additional burdens on certain
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groups; develop more tailored policies that prioritize marginalized groups;
engage in greater dialogue with these communities; and devise interven-
tions to mitigate the burdensome effects of policies on some groups when
these cannot be avoided.
Finally, governments need to ensure that they do not implement poli-
cies that are grounded in flawed or incomplete scientific evidence. This
will require promoting and funding more scientific research on COVID-
19 (including both medical research and research concerning the social
and cultural dimensions of the virus) and ensuring that there are trans-
parent and effective channels of communication between governments
and the scientific community. Policymakers themselves will also need to
acquire greater scientific literacy in order to avoid using scientific evidence
in ways that are unsound and unfair, and which therefore threaten
justificatory civility.
Notes
1. Christopher F. Zurn, ‘Political Civility: Another Idealistic Illusion’,
Public Affairs Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 4 (2013): 341–368. https://
www.jstor.org/stable/43575586.
2. Jeremy Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2012).
3. Andrew Peterson, Civility and Democratic Education (Singapore:
Springer, 2019), 29.
4. Lorez Tondo, ‘Salvini Attacks Italy PM Over Coronavirus and Links to
Rescue Ship’, The Guardian, 25 February 2020. https://www.thegua
rdian.com/world/2020/feb/24/salvini-attacks-italy-pm-over-corona
virus-and-links-to-rescue-ship.
5. Delan Devakumar et al., ‘Racism and Discrimination in COVID-19
Responses’, The Lancet, Vol. 395, No. 10231 (2020): 1194. https://
doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)30792-3.
6. Cas Mudde, ‘Don’t Let Free Speech Be a Casualty of Coro-
navirus. We Need It More Than Ever’, The Guardian, 7
April 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/apr/
06/coronavirus-free-speech-hungary-fake-news.
7. Ishaan Tharoor, ‘Coronavirus Kills Its First Democracy’, The Washington
Post, 31 March 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/
03/31/coronavirus-kills-its-first-democracy/.
8. Dalibor Rohac, ‘Hungary’s Prime Minister Is Using the Virus to
Make an Authoritarian Power Grab’, The Washington Post, 26 March
166 M. BONOTTI AND S. T. ZECH
2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/03/25/hun
garys-prime-minister-is-using-virus-make-an-authoritarian-power-grab/.
9. Rohac, ‘Hungary’s Prime Minister Is Using the Virus to Make an
Authoritarian Power Grab’.
10. David Gilbert, ‘These 30 Regimes Are Using Coronavirus to Repress
Their Citizens’, Vice, 10 April 2020. https://www.vice.com/en_us/art
icle/dygbxk/these-30-regimes-are-using-coronavirus-to-repress-their-cit
izens.
11. Adam Wagner, ‘In a New Age of Emergency Laws, Human
Rights Are More Important Than Ever’, New Statesman, 31 March
2020. https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2020/03/emerge
ncy-laws-human-rights-pandemic-coronavirus.
12. United Nations Human Rights—Office of the High Commissioner,
‘Racial Discrimination in the Context of the COVID-19 Crisis’,
22 June 2020. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Racism/
COVID-19_and_Racial_Discrimination.pdf.
13. Anonymous, ‘Selective Lockdowns in Madrid Discriminate Against
Poor, Protesters Say’, Daily Sabah, 20 September 2020. https://www.
dailysabah.com/world/europe/selective-lockdowns-in-madrid-discrimin
ate-against-poor-protesters-say.
14. Marie McInerney, ‘Australia on COVID-19 Alert as Melbourne Locks
Down Again’, Croakey, 8 July 2020. https://www.croakey.org/austra
lia-on-covid-19-alert-as-melbourne-locks-down-again/.
15. Virginia Langeberg, ‘Melbourne’s Public Housing Lockdown Was an
“Assault on Human Dignity”, Says the UN’s Former Housing Expert’,
SBS News, 4 September 2020. https://www.sbs.com.au/news/melbou
rne-s-public-housing-lockdown-was-an-assault-on-human-dignity-says-
the-un-s-former-housing-expert.
16. Joe Wallen, ‘Indian Hospitals Refuse to Admit Muslims as Coro-
navirus Causes Islamophobia Surge’, The Telegraph, 19 April
2020. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/04/19/indian-hospit
als-refuse-admit-muslims-coronavirus-causes-islamophobia.
17. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Guidance Note:
Ensuring Access to Justice in the Context of COVID-19’,
May 2020. https://www.unodc.org/documents/Advocacy-Section/Ens
uring_Access_to_Justice_in_the_Context_of_COVID-191.pdf.
18. Josh Taylor, ‘How a Trust Breakdown Left Melbourne’s Minority
Communities Hardest Hit by Covid Second Wave’, The Guardian,
30 August 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/
aug/30/how-a-breakdown-of-trust-left-melbournes-ethnic-commun
ities-hardest-hit-by-covid-second-wave.
19. Abby Wild et al., ‘We Asked Multicultural Communities How Best to
Communicate COVID-19 Advice. Here’s What They Told Us’, The
4 CIVILITY AS PUBLIC-MINDEDNESS DURING COVID-19 167
Conversation, 17 July 2020. https://theconversation.com/we-asked-
multicultural-communities-how-best-to-communicate-covid-19-advice-
heres-what-they-told-us-142719.
20. The New York Times, ‘Tracking Covid at U.S. Colleges and Universities’,
The New York Times, 8 October 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/intera
ctive/2020/us/covid-college-cases-tracker.html.
21. Melissa Kang et al., ‘Young People Are Anxious About Coronavirus.
Political Leaders Need to Talk with Them, Not at Them’, The Conver-
sation, 3 April 2020. https://theconversation.com/young-people-are-
anxious-about-coronavirus-political-leaders-need-to-talk-with-them-not-
at-them-135302.
22. Lilia M. Cortina, ‘Unseen Injustice: Incivility as Modern Discrimination
in Organizations’, The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 33, No. 1
(2008): 55–75. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2008.27745097.
23. Asian Pacific Policy and Planning Council, ‘Stop AAPI Hate National
Report: 3.19.20–8.5.20’, 27 August 2020, 14. http://www.asianpaci
ficpolicyandplanningcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/STOP_AAPI_
Hate_National_Report_3.19-8.5.2020.pdf.
24. Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission,
‘Improving Workplace Equality During COVID-19’, n.d. https://
www.humanrights.vic.gov.au/legal-and-policy/covid-19-and-human-rig
hts/improving-workplace-equality-during-covid-19/.
25. David Marin-Guzman, ‘BHP Accused of Ageism, Racism Over COVID-
19 Policy’, Financial Review, 21 September 2020. https://www.afr.
com/work-and-careers/workplace/bhp-accused-of-ageism-racism-over-
covid-19-policy-20200921-p55xmr.
26. Harrys Meyer, ‘A Flood of Age Discrimination Lawsuits Is Expected
from Covid-19 and the Economic Downturn’, ABA Journal, 1
September 2020. https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/flood-of-
age-discrimination-suits-expected-with-pandemic-economic-downturn.
27. Rick Reyes, ‘Surviving the Post-Apocalypse: Discrimination, Harass-
ment and Retaliation Litigation Risks in the Employment Context




28. Laurence Darmiento, ‘Businesses Are Reopening. If You’re Older
or Sick, What Happens to Your Job?’ Los Angeles Times, 22
May 2020. https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2020-05-22/cor
onavirus-reopening-preexisting-conditions-seniors-older-workers.
29. Equality and Human Rights Commission, ‘Coronavirus (COVID-19)
Guidance for Employers’, n.d. https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/
en/advice-and-guidance/coronavirus-covid-19-guidance-employers.
168 M. BONOTTI AND S. T. ZECH
30. Asian Pacific Policy and Planning Council, ‘Stop AAPI Hate National
Report’.
31. Asian Pacific Policy and Planning Council, ‘Stop AAPI Hate National
Report’, 10–11.
32. Zhaoyin Feng, ‘Being a Chinese Student in the US: “Neither the US
nor China Wants Us”, BBC News, 3 August 2020. https://www.bbc.
com/news/world-us-canada-53573289.
33. Erin Wen Ai Chew (Founder and National Convener for the Asian
Australian Alliance), video interview, 21 October 2020.
34. Erin Wen Ai Chew (Founder and National Convener for the Asian
Australian Alliance), video interview, 21 October 2020.
35. Imran Awan and Roxana Khan-Williams, ‘Research Brifing Report:
Coronavirus, Fear and How Islamophobia Spreads on Social Media’,
Anti-Muslim Hatred Working Group, 2020. https://antimuslimhatre
dworkinggrouphome.files.wordpress.com/2020/04/research-briefing-
report-7-1.pdf.
36. Stuart Winer, ‘COVID-19 Fueling Worldwide Wave of Anti-semitism,
Researchers Find’, The Times of Israel, 23 June 2020. https://www.tim
esofisrael.com/covid-19-fueling-worldwide-wave-of-anti-semitism-resear
chers-find/.
37. Anonymous, ‘Conspiracy Beliefs Reduces the Following of Govern-
ment Coronavirus Guidance’, University of Oxford News, 22 May
2020. https://www.ox.ac.uk/news/2020-05-22-conspiracy-beliefs-red
uces-following-government-coronavirus-guidance-0.
38. Mario Peucker, Debra Smith, and Muhammad Iqbal, ‘Not a Monolithic
Movement: The Diverse and Shifting Messaging of Australia’s Far-
Right’. In The Far-Right in Contemporary Australia, ed. Mario Peucker
and Debra Smith (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 73–100.
39. Mario Peucker, ‘Seizing the Opportunity: How the Australian Far-right
Milieu Uses the Pandemic to Push Its Nationalist and Anti-globalist




40. Natasha Kassam, ‘COVID Poll: Lowy Institute Polling on Australian
Attitudes to the Coronavirus Pandemic’, Lowy Institute, 14 May 2020.
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/covidpoll-lowy-institute-
polling-australian-attitudes-coronavirus-pandemic#sec42561.
41. António Guterres et al., ‘United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action
on Hate Speech’, United Nations Office on Genocide Protection and the
Responsibility to Protect, May 2019: 1–5. https://www.un.org/en/gen
ocideprevention/documents/UN%20Strategy%20and%20Plan%20of%
20Action%20on%20Hate%20Speech%2018%20June%20SYNOPSIS.pdf.
4 CIVILITY AS PUBLIC-MINDEDNESS DURING COVID-19 169
42. Asian Australian Alliance and Osmond Chiu, ‘COVID-19 Coronavirus
Racism Incident Report’, Australian Asian Alliance, 24 April 2020.
http://diversityarts.org.au/app/uploads/COVID19-racism-incident-
report-Preliminary-Official.pdf.
43. Matthew Doran, ‘Coronavirus-fuelled Racism Prompts Debate on
Whether Australia’s Laws Are Strong Enough to Protect Victims’,
ABC News, 7 May 2020. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-05-07/
coronavirus-fuelled-racism-prompts-debate-on-australia-law/12220816?
nw=0; Anonymous, ‘Andrews Government Must Fix Laws to Stamp Out
Racist Attacks’, Human Rights Law Centre, 12 June 2020. https://
www.hrlc.org.au/news/2020/6/11/andrews-government-must-fix-
laws-to-stamp-out-racist-attacks.
44. Erin Wen Ai Chew (Founder and National Convener for the Asian
Australian Alliance), video interview, 21 October 2020.
45. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (expanded edition) (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2005), 217.
46. Gerald Gaus, ‘Sectarianism Without Perfection? Quong’s Political Liber-
alism’, Philosophy and Public Issues, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2012): 8. http://fqp.
luiss.it/files/2012/12/PPI-1-2012-02gaus.pdf.
47. Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the
Global Era (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 108; Jürgen
Habermas, ‘Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks
on John Rawls’s Political Liberalism’, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 92,
No. 3 (1995): 128. https://doi.org/10.2307/2940842.
48. Steven Wall, Liberalism, Perfectionism, and Restraint (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998); Joseph Chan, ‘Legitimacy,
Unanimity, and Perfectionism’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 29,
No. 1 (2000): 5–42. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2000.000
05.x.
49. Daniel W. Drezner, ‘Everyone Is in Denial About November’, The
Washington Post, 20 April 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/out
look/2020/04/20/everyone-is-denial-about-november/.
50. Mark Pickup, Dominik Stecula, and Clifton van der Linden, ‘Novel
Coronavirus, Old Partisanship: COVID-19 Attitudes and Behaviours in
the United States and Canada’, Canadian Journal of Political Science,
published online on 12 May 2020. https://doi.org/10.1017/S00084
23920000463.
51. Jim Acosta and Caroline Kelly, ‘Trump’s Name Will Be Added to Stim-




170 M. BONOTTI AND S. T. ZECH
52. Samuel L. Perry, Andrew L. Whitehead, and Joshua B. Grubbs, ‘Culture
Wars and COVID-19 Conduct: Christian Nationalism, Religiosity, and
Americans’ Behavior During the Coronavirus Pandemic’, Journal for the
Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 59, No. 3 (2020): 405–416. https://
doi.org/10.1111/jssr.12677; Leslie Dorrough Smith, ‘Why Masks Are
a Religious Issue’, The Conversation, 4 September 2020. https://thecon
versation.com/why-masks-are-a-religious-issue-144391.
53. Elisha Fieldstadt, ‘Ohio Lawmaker Refuses to Wear Mask Because He
Says It Dishonors God’, NBC News, 7 May 2020. https://www.nbc
news.com/news/us-news/ohio-lawmaker-refuses-wear-mask-because-
he-says-it-dishonors-n1201106.
54. Elisabeth Braw, ‘The EU Is Abandoning Italy in Its Hour of Need’,
Foreign Policy, 14 March 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/
14/coronavirus-eu-abandoning-italy-china-aid/.
55. Larry Elliott, ‘The Coronavirus Crisis Has Brought the EU’s Failings
into Sharp Relief’, The Guardian, 29 March 2020. https://www.thegua
rdian.com/business/2020/mar/29/the-coronavirus-crisis-has-brought-
the-eus-failings-into-sharp-relief.
56. Tax Justice Network, ‘Revealed: Netherlands, Blocking EU’s Covid19
Recovery Plan, Has Cost EU Countries $10bn In Lost Corporate
Tax a Year’, Tax Justice Network, 8 April 2020. https://www.taxjus
tice.net/2020/04/08/revealed-netherlands-blocking-eus-covid19-rec
overy-plan-has-cost-eu-countries-10bn-in-lost-corporate-tax-a-year/;
Jeanne Whalen et al., ‘White House Scrambles to Scoop Up Medical
Supplies Worldwide, Angering Canada, Germany’, The Washington Post,
5 April 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/04/
03/white-house-scrambles-scoop-up-medical-supplies-angering-canada-
germany/.
57. Jonathan Quong, ‘Public Reason’. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philos-
ophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (2018). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
spr2018/entries/public-reason.
58. Aaron Glantz, Bailout Money Bypasses Hard-hit New York, California
For North Dakota, Nebraska, Reveal, 23 April 2020. https://www.
revealnews.org/article/bailout-money-bypasses-hard-hit-new-york-califo
rnia-for-north-dakota-nebraska/.
59. Maeve Reston, ‘Governors on East and West Coasts Form Pacts to
Decide When to Reopen Economies’, CNN , 13 April 2020. https://
edition.cnn.com/2020/04/13/politics/states-band-together-reopen
ing-plans/index.html; Keith Eldridge, ‘Washington, Oregon, California
Join Pact for COVID-19 Collaboration’, KOMO News, 14 April 2020.
https://komonews.com/news/coronavirus/washington-oregon-califo
rnia-join-pact-for-covid-19-collaboration; Colm Quinn, ‘U.S. Governors
Defy Trump by Forming Regional Alliances’, Foreign Policy, 14 April
4 CIVILITY AS PUBLIC-MINDEDNESS DURING COVID-19 171
2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/14/us-governors-states-rig
hts-defy-trump-by-forming-regional-alliances/.
60. Paul Kelly, ‘Victoria Not Alone in Latest COVID-19 Response’,
Australian Government—Department of Health, 4 July 2020. https://
www.health.gov.au/news/victoria-not-alone-in-latest-covid-19-response.
61. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 231.
62. E.g. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
63. E.g. see André, Bächtiger et al. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of
Deliberative Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
64. Jonathan Quong, Liberalism Without Perfection (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2011), 207.
65. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 224.
66. Justin Trudeau, ‘Prime Minister’s Remarks Announcing the COVID-
19 Economic Response Plan’, Prime Minister of Canada, 18 March
2020. https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/speeches/2020/03/18/prime-min
isters-remarks-announcing-covid-19-economic-response-plan.
67. Daniel Andrews, ‘Statement From The Premier’, Premier of Victoria, 3
August 2020. https://www.premier.vic.gov.au/statement-from-premier-
03-aug.
68. E.g. Government of Canada, ‘Canada’s COVID-19 Economic Response
Plan’, Government of Canada, n.d. https://www.canada.ca/en/dep
artment-finance/economic-response-plan.html; Victoria Government,
‘Financial Support for Businesses and Workers’, Victoria Govern-
ment, n.d. https://www.coronavirus.vic.gov.au/financial-support-for-
businesses-and-workers.
69. Daniela Ponce, ‘The Impact of Coronavirus in Brazil: Politics and the
Pandemic’. Nature Reviews Nephrology, Vol. 16 (2020): 483. https://
doi.org/10.1038/s41581-020-0327-0.
70. Bruno Dupeyron and Catarina Segatto, ‘Just Like Trump, Brazil’s
Bolsonaro Puts the Economy Ahead of His People During Coron-
avirus’, The Conversation, 21 April 2020. https://theconversation.com/
just-like-trump-brazils-bolsonaro-puts-the-economy-ahead-of-his-peo
ple-during-coronavirus-136351.
71. Tim Hains, ‘Texas Lt. Gov. Dan Patrick: A Lot of Grandparents Would
Be Willing To Die To Stop A Second Great Depression’, Real Clear
Politics, 24 March 2020. https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/
2020/03/24/texas_lt_gov_dan_patrick_a_lot_of_grandparents_would_
be_willing_to_die_to_stop_a_second_great_depression.html.
72. Anna Bonalume, ‘Devastated by Coronavirus, Did Bergamo’s Work
Ethic Count Against It?’ The Guardian, 6 April 2020. https://www.
theguardian.com/world/commentisfree/2020/apr/06/coronavirus-ber
gamo-work-ethic-lockdown.
172 M. BONOTTI AND S. T. ZECH
73. Martin McKee and David Stuckler, ‘If the World Fails to Protect the
Economy, Covid-19 Will Damage Health Not Just Now But Also in the
Future’, Nature Medicine, Vol. 26 (2020): 640–642. https://doi.org/
10.1038/s41591-020-0863-y.
74. Joe Hasell, ‘Which Countries Have Protected Both Health and the
Economy in the Pandemic?’, Our World in Data, 1 September 2020.
https://ourworldindata.org/covid-health-economy.
75. Rebecca Ann Hughes, ‘Italy’s New “Soft” Coronavirus Measures Prior-
itize the Economy’, Forbes, 19 October 2020. https://www.forbes.
com/sites/rebeccahughes/2020/10/19/italys-new-soft-coronavirus-
measures-prioritize-the-economy/.
76. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1999), 266; see also Rawls, Political Liberalism, 223.
77. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 228; see also Alexander Kaufman, Rawls’s
Egalitarianism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 223–224.
78. Joel D. Tillis v. Manatee County, Fla. Circuit Court Case No. 2020-
CA-002849AX, 3 August 2020. https://www.chamberlitigation.com/
sites/default/files/Joel%20D%20Tillis%20v%20Manatee%20County%
20%281%29_0.pdf.
79. Legal Information Institute, ‘Rational Basis Test’, n.d. https://www.law.
cornell.edu/wex/rational_basis_test.
80. Legal Information Institute, ‘Strict Scrutiny’, n.d. https://www.law.cor
nell.edu/wex/strict_scrutiny.
81. John E. Finn, ‘Freedom of Religion Doesn’t Mean Freedom from Mask’,
The Conversation, 11 August 2020. https://theconversation.com/fre
edom-of-religion-doesnt-mean-freedom-from-mask-mandates-144190.
82. Jason Wilson, ‘The Rightwing Groups Behind Wave of Protests Against
Covid-19 Restrictions’, The Guardian, 17 April 2020. https://www.the
guardian.com/world/2020/apr/17/far-right-coronavirus-protests-res
trictions. See also Allan Smith, ‘“Lock Her Up!’: Anti-whitmer Coro-
navirus Lockdown Protestors Swarm Michigan Capitol’, NBC News,
16 April 2020. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/lock-
her-anti-whitmer-coronavirus-lockdown-protestors-swarm-michigan-cap
itol-n1184426; Jason Wilson, ‘The Rightwing Groups Behind Wave
of Protests Against Covid-19 Restrictions’, The Guardian, 17 April
2020. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/17/far-right-
coronavirus-protests-restrictions; Anonymous, ‘Germany Coronavirus:
Hundreds Arrested in German “Anti-Corona” Protests’, BBC News, 30
August 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-53959552.
83. Katie Shepherd and Moriah Balingit, ‘A Noose, an Ax and Trump-
inspired Insults: Anti-lockdown Protesters Ratchet Up Violent Rhetoric’,
The Washington Post, 15 May 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/
nation/2020/05/15/noose-fight-coronavirus-protest/.
4 CIVILITY AS PUBLIC-MINDEDNESS DURING COVID-19 173
84. Quint Forgey, ‘Trump Breaks With His Own Guidelines to Back
Conservative Anti-quarantine Protesters’, Politico, 17 April 2020.
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/17/trump-states-stay-at-
home-orders-192386; Jay Inslee, ‘Inslee Statement on Trump Encour-
aging Illegal and Dangerous Acts’, Washington Governor, 17 April 2020.
https://www.governor.wa.gov/news-media/inslee-statement-trump-enc
ouraging-illegal-and-dangerous-acts.
85. Anonymous, ‘Coronavirus: Melbourne Police “Assaulted and Baited”
Over Lockdown Rules’, BBC News, 4 August 2020. https://www.bbc.
com/news/world-australia-53645759.
86. Guardian Staff and Agencies, ‘Protesters Chant “Lock Her Up” After
Michigan Governor’s Stay-at-home Order’, The Guardian, 16 April
2020. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/15/michigan-
coronavirus-protest-stay-home-order-gretchen-whitmer.
87. Derek Edyvane, ‘Incivility as Dissent’, Political Studies, Vol. 68, No. 1:
93–109. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321719831983.
88. Daniel Villareal, ‘“Bar Lives Matter” Protesters Descend on Texas
Capitol to Oppose Closures’, Newsweek, 30 June 2020. https://www.
newsweek.com/bar-lives-matter-protesters-descend-texas-capitol-opp
ose-closures-1514538; Teo Armus, ‘“We’re Not the problem”: Texas
Bar Owners Sue Over Governor’s Shutdown Order’, 30 June 2020.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/06/30/texas-bars-
shutdown-abbott/.
89. E.g. see Samuel Freeman, Rawls (Abingdon and New York: Routledge,
2007), 56ff.
90. Hilary Brueck, ‘Dr. Fauci Says Drinking Inside Bars Is One of the
Most Dangerous Things You Can Do Right Now’, Business Insider
Australia, 1 July 2020. https://www.businessinsider.com.au/fauci-slams-
people-at-bars-not-wearing-masks-avoiding-crowds-2020-6.
91. President of a personal care manufacturing firm, phone interview, 27
October 2020.
92. E.g. see UNESCO, ‘UNESCO provides Ethical Frameworks to COVID-
19 Responses’, 15 April 2020. https://en.unesco.org/news/unesco-pro
vides-ethical-frameworks-covid-19-responses.
93. Anonymous, ‘Coronavirus: Australian Family Hit with Huge Quarantine
Bill to Visit Dying Father’, BBC News, 10 September 2020. https://
www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-54107251.
94. Doron Dorfman, ‘Mask Exemptions During the COVID-19 Pandemic—
A New Frontier for Clinicians’, JAMA Network, 10 July 2020. https://
jamanetwork.com/channels/health-forum/fullarticle/2768376.
95. Jonathan Quong, ‘The Scope of Public Reason, Political Studies, Vol.
52, No. 2 (2004): 233–250. https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-9248.
2004.00477.x.
174 M. BONOTTI AND S. T. ZECH
96. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 153.
97. Jonathan Quong, ‘Cultural Exemptions, Expensive Tastes, and Equal
Opportunities’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2006):
59–60. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5930.2006.00320.x.
98. Haroon Siddique, BAME Campaigners Urge Uk Government to
Tackle Race Inequalities After High Covid Toll’, The Guardian, 27
May 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/27/call-
for-coronavirus-uk-race-equality-strategy.
99. Connor Maxwell and Danyelle Solomon, ‘The Economic Fallout of
the Coronavirus for People of Color’, Centre for American Progress,
14 April 2020. https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/news/
2020/04/14/483125/economic-fallout-coronavirus-people-color/.
100. Elise Gould and Valerie Wilson, ‘Black Workers Face Two of the Most
Lethal Preexisting Conditions for Coronavirus—Racism and Economic
Inequality’, Economic Policy Institute, 1 June 2020. https://www.epi.
org/publication/black-workers-covid/.
101. Bradley L. Hardy and Trevon D. Logan, ‘Racial Economic Inequality
Amid the COVID-19 Crisis’, Brookings - The Hamilton Project (Essay
2020-17), August 2020. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/upl
oads/2020/08/EA_HardyLogan_LO_8.12.pdf.
102. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs—Indige-
nous People, ‘COVID-19 and Indigenous Peoples’, n.d. https://www.
un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/covid-19.html.
103. Martín de Dios, ‘The Situation of Latin America’s Indigenous Popu-
lation and the Impact of COVID-19’, UNDP Latin America and the
Caribbean, 14 May 2020. https://www.latinamerica.undp.org/con
tent/rblac/en/home/blog/2020/impacto-y-situacion-de-la-poblacion-
indigena-latinoamericana-ant.html.
104. Forbes Staff, ‘Los Indígenas de la Amazonía se Enfrentan al COVID-19
Desprotegidos y Vulnerables’, 11 May 2020. https://forbescentroame
rica.com/2020/05/11/los-indigenas-de-la-amazonia-se-enfrentan-al-
covid-19-desprotegidos-y-vulnerables/.
105. Isabel Linzer, ‘COVID-19 Is Poised to Deepen Racial Disenfranchise-
ment in November’, Freedom House, 22 June 2020. https://freedomho
use.org/article/covid-19-poised-deepen-racial-disenfranchisement-nov
ember.
106. Anonymous, ‘What Democracy Looks Like: Protecting Voting Rights
in the US during the Covid-19 Pandemic’, Human Rights Watch,
22 September 2020. https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/09/22/
what-democracy-looks/protecting-voting-rights-us-during-covid-19-pan
demic.
107. Bill Chappell, ‘Protesting Racism Versus Risking COVID-19: “I
Wouldn’t Weigh These Crises Separately”’, NPR, 1 June 2020.




108. Mallory Simon, ‘Over 1,000 Health Professionals Sign a Letter Saying,
Don’t Shut Down Protests Using Coronavirus Concerns as an Excuse’,
CNN , 5 June 2020. https://edition.cnn.com/2020/06/05/health/
health-care-open-letter-protests-coronavirus-trnd/index.html.
109. Julia Craven, ‘Coronavirus Cases Are Increasing in the Nation’s
Capital. That Doesn’t Bode Well for Its Black Population’, Slate,
9 April 2020. https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/04/corona
virus-disparate-impact-black-people-washington-dc.html.
110. Shannon Palus, ‘Public Health Experts Say the Pandemic Is Exactly
Why Protests Must Continue’, Slate, 2 June 2020. https://slate.com/
technology/2020/06/protests-coronavirus-pandemic-public-health-rac
ism.html.
111. Akilah Johnson, ‘On the Minds of Black Lives Matter Protesters: A
Racist Health System’, ProPublica, 5 June 2020. https://www.propub
lica.org/article/on-the-minds-of-black-lives-matters-protestors-a-racist-
health-system.
112. Dhaval M. Dave et al., ‘Black Lives Matter Protests, Social Distancing,
and COVID-19’, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER
Working Paper No. 27408), August 2020. https://www.nber.org/pap
ers/w27408.pdf. Note: The research does not speak to individual protest
locations. Instead, it suggests that the protests led to greater adherence
to social distancing behaviour by non-participants who stayed at home.
113. Australian Government Workplace Gender Equality Agency, ‘Gendered
impact of COVID-19’, 11 May 2020. https://www.wgea.gov.au/top
ics/gendered-impact-of-covid-19.
114. Caroline Bradbury-Jones and Louise Isham, ‘The Pandemic Paradox:
The Consequences of Covid-19 on Domestic Violence’, Journal of
Clinical Nursing, Vol. 29, No. 13–14 (2020): 2047–2049. https://
doi.org/10.1111/jocn.15296; Alex R. Piquero et al., ‘Staying Home,
Staying Safe? A Short-Term Analysis of COVID-19 on Dallas Domestic
Violence’, American Journal of Criminal Justice, Vol. 45 (2020):
601–635. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12103-020-09531-7.
115. Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, ‘Violence Against Women and Girls: The
Shadow Pandemic’, UN Women, 6 April 2020. https://www.unw
omen.org/en/news/stories/2020/4/statement-ed-phumzile-violence-
against-women-during-pandemic; Kate Fitz-Gibbon, Naomi Pfitzner,
and Jacqui True, ‘More Women Seeking Late-night Help Through
Online Chat As Covid Lockdown Triggers Past Trauma’, Monash Lens,
18 August 2020. https://lens.monash.edu/@politics-society/2020/
176 M. BONOTTI AND S. T. ZECH
08/18/1381066/more-help-required-the-crisis-in-family-violence-dur
ing-the-coronavirus-pandemic.
116. Australian Government Workplace Gender Equality Agency, ‘Gendered
impact of COVID-19’.
117. Meredith Nash and Brendan Churchill, ‘Caring During COVID-19:
A Gendered Analysis of Australian University Responses to Managing
Remote Working and Caring Responsibilities’, Gender, Work & Orga-
nization, Vol. 27, No. 5 (2020): 833–846. https://doi.org/10.1111/
gwao.12484.
118. A female academic at an Australian university, interview questions via
personal correspondence, 13 October 2020.
119. Kate Power, ‘The Covid-19 Pandemic Has Increased the Care Burden
of Women and Families’, Sustainability: Science, Practice and Policy, Vol.
16, No. 1 (2020): 67–73. https://doi.org/10.1080/15487733.2020.
1776561; see also Clare Wenham, Julia Smith, and Rosemary Morgan,
‘COVID-19: The Gendered Impacts of the Outbreak’, The Lancet, Vol.
395, No. 10227 (2020): 846–848. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-
6736(20)30526-2.
120. Equality Australia, ‘LGBTIQ+ Communities and COVID-19: A Report
on the Impacts of COVID-19 on Australian LGBTIQ+ Communities
and Building a Strong Response’, 16 April 2020. https://equalityaust
ralia.org.au/covid-report/.
121. Equality Australia, ‘LGBTIQ+ Communities and COVID-19; see also
Marina Carman, Adam Bourne, and Jackson Fairchild’, ‘COVID-19:
Impacts for LGBTIQ Communities and Implications for Services’,





122. Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality and Safety, ‘Aged Care and
COVID-19: A Special Report’, 30 September 2020. https://agedcare.
royalcommission.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-10/aged-care-and-
covid-19-a-special-report.pdf.
123. Truc Thi Mai Bui, Patrick Button, and Elyce G. Picciotti, ‘Early Evidence
on the Impact of COVID-19 and the Recession on Older Workers’,
National Bureau of Economic Research, June 2020. https://www-nber-
org.ezproxy.lib.monash.edu.au/papers/w27448.
124. A retiree in California, video interview, 17 October 2020.
125. Joanne Brooke and Debra Jackson, ‘Older People and Covid-19: Isola-
tion, Risk and Ageism’, Journal of Clinical Nursing, Vol. 29, No. 13–14
(2020): 2044–2046. https://doi.org/10.1111/jocn.15274.
4 CIVILITY AS PUBLIC-MINDEDNESS DURING COVID-19 177
126. A woman in Italy, interview questions via personal correspondence, 22
October 2020 (Translated from Italian into English by the authors).
127. Charlene H. Chu, Simon Donato-Woodger, and Christopher J. Dainton,
‘Competing Crises: COVID-19 Countermeasures and Social Isolation
Among Older Adults in Long-term Care’, Journal of Advanced Nursing,
Vol. 76, No. 10 (2020): 2456–2459. https://doi.org/10.1111/jan.
14467.
128. Chu, Donato-Woodger and Dainton, ‘Competing Crises’.
129. Chu, Donato-Woodger and Dainton, ‘Competing Crises’; see also
Brooke and Jackson, ‘Older People and Covid-19’; Richard Armitage
and Laura B. Nellums, ‘COVID-19 and the Consequences of Isolating
the Elderly’, The Lancet, Vol. 5, No. 5 (2020): e256. https://doi.org/
10.1016/S2468-2667(20)30061-X.
130. Brooke and Jackson, ‘Older People and Covid-19’.
131. For recent discussions of conspiracy theories, see Russell Muirhead and
Nancy L. Rosenblum, A Lot of People Are Saying: The New Conspiracism
and the Assault on Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2019); Matej Cíbik and Pavol Hardoš, ‘Conspiracy Theories and Reason-
able Pluralism’, European Journal of Political Theory, published online on
1 April 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1474885119899232.
132. American Association for the Advancement of Science, ‘Shaping Science
Policy’, n.d. https://www.aaas.org/focus-areas/shaping-science-policy.
133. Michael Specter, ‘How Anthony Fauci Became America’s Doctor’, The
New Yorker, 10 April 2020. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/
2020/04/20/how-anthony-fauci-became-americas-doctor.
134. Spencer, ‘How Anthony Fauci Became America’s Doctor’.
135. Manal Mohammed, ‘Three Major Scientific Controversies About Coro-
navirus’, The Conversation, 7 August 2020. https://theconversation.
com/three-major-scientific-controversies-about-coronavirus-144021.
136. Matteo Bonotti et al., ‘COVID-19 in Everyday Spaces: Social and
Political Considerations’, ABC Religion & Ethics, 17 June 2020.
https://www.abc.net.au/religion/covid19-in-everyday-spaces-and-soc
ial-division/12365294.
137. Zeshan Qureshi et al., ‘What Is The Evidence to Support the 2-metre
Social Distancing Rule to Reduce COVID-19 Transmission?’, CEBM ,
22 June 2020. https://www.cebm.net/covid-19/what-is-the-evidence-
to-support-the-2-metre-social-distancing-rule-to-reduce-covid-19-tra
nsmission/.
138. Qureshi et al., ‘What Is The Evidence to Support the 2-metre Social
Distancing Rule to Reduce COVID-19 Transmission?’.
178 M. BONOTTI AND S. T. ZECH
139. Lydia Bourouiba, ‘Turbulent Gas Clouds and Respiratory Pathogen
Emissions: Potential Implications for Reducing Transmission of COVID-
19’, JAMA, Vol. 323, No. 18: 1837–1838. https://doi.org/10.1001/
jama.2020.4756.
140. Annalaura Carducci et al., ‘Making Waves: Coronavirus Detection, Pres-
ence and Persistence in the Water Environment: State of the Art and
Knowledge Needs for Public Health’, Water Research, Vol. 179 (2020):
115907. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.watres.2020.115907.
141. Neeltje van Doremalen et al., ‘Aerosol and Surface Stability of SARS-
CoV-2as Compared with SARS-CoV-1’, The New England Journal of
Medicine, Vol. 382, No. 16 (2020): 1564–1567. https://doi.org/10.
1056/NEJMc2004973.
142. Emily Clark, ‘Restaurants Have Been Identified as Coronavirus
Hotspots, So Is It Safe to Dine Out?’, ABC News, 24 August
2020. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-08-23/restaurants-cafes-cor
onavirus-hotspots-is-it-safe-to-dine-out/12570600; Jianyun Lu et al.,
‘COVID-19 Outbreak Associated with Air Conditioning in Restaurant,
Guangzhou, China, 2020’, Emerging Infectious Diseases, Vol. 26, No. 7
(2020): 1628–1631. https://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid2607.200764.
143. Nguyen Cong Khanh et al., ‘Transmission of SARS-CoV 2 During
Long-Haul Flight’, Emerging Infectious Diseases, Vol. 26, No.
11 (2020): 2617–2624. https://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid2611.203299;
Rui Pombal, Ian Hosegood, and David Powell, ‘Risk of COVID-
19 During Air Travel’, JAMA, published online on 1 October 2020.
https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2020.19108.
144. Kate Doyle, ‘Coronavirus Weather Study Suggests Dry Air Could Aid
the Spread of COVID-19’, ABC News, 25 August 2020. https://www.
abc.net.au/news/2020-08-25/weather-covid-19-coronavirus-and-hum
idity-study/12587402.
145. Ian Duncan, ‘Defense Department Study Finds Low Risk of Coronavirus
Infection Through Air on a Packed Airline Flight’, The Washington




146. Duncan, ‘Defense Department Study Finds Low Risk of Coronavirus
Infection Through Air on a Packed Airline Flight’.
147. Maggie Fox, ‘Modern Aircraft Ventilation Systems Aren’t Spreading
Viruses, DoD Study Suggests’, CNN , 16 October 2020. https://edi
tion.cnn.com/travel/article/airplanes-ventilation-study-covid-19/index.
html.
4 CIVILITY AS PUBLIC-MINDEDNESS DURING COVID-19 179
148. Laurence Frost, ‘“Bad Math”: Airlines’ Covid Safety Analysis Challenged
by Expert’, Reuters, 19 October 2020. https://www.reuters.com/art
icle/us-health-coronavirus-airlines-risks/bad-math-airlines-covid-safety-
analysis-challenged-by-expert-idUSKBN27411C.
149. Saurabh Rajpal et al., ‘Cardiovascular Magnetic Resonance Findings in
Competitive Athletes Recovering from COVID-19 Infection’, JAMA
Cardiology, published online on 11 September 2020. https://doi.org/
10.1001/jamacardio.2020.4916.
150. Michael Marshall, ‘How COVID-19 Can Damage the Brain’, Nature,
Vol. 585 (2020): 342–343. https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-020-025
99-5.
151. Dana Yelin et al., ‘Long-term Consequences of Covid-19: Research
Needs’, The Lancet, Vol. 20, No. 10 (2020): 1115–1117. https://doi.
org/10.1016/S1473-3099(20)30701-5.
152. Yelin et al., ‘Long-term Consequences of Covid-19: Research Needs’,
1116.
153. Thomas Kuhn, The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradi-
tion and Change (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press,
1977), 331; Gabriele Badano and Matteo Bonotti, ‘Rescuing Public
Reason Liberalism’s Accessibility Requirement’, Law and Philosophy, Vol.
39, No. 1: 35–65. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-019-09360-8.
154. Laure Wynants et al., Prediction Models for Diagnosis and Prognosis
of Covid-19: Systematic Review and Critical Appraisal’, BMJ , Vol. 369
(2020): m1328. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.m1328.
155. Melissa Davey, ‘Covid-19 Studies Based on Flawed Surgisphere Data
Force Medical Journals to Review Processes’, The Guardian, 12 June
2020. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/12/covid-19-
studies-based-on-flawed-surgisphere-data-force-medical-journals-to-rev
iew-processes; Melissa Davey, ‘Unreliable Data: How Doubt Snowballed
Over Covid-19 Drug Research That Swept the World’, The Guardian,
4 June 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/04/unr
eliable-data-doubt-snowballed-covid-19-drug-research-surgisphere-cor
onavirus-hydroxychloroquine.
156. Kevin Vallier, Liberal Politics and Public Faith: Beyond Separation (New
York: Routledge, 2014), 106.
157. Matteo Bonotti et al., ‘Public Justification in Times of Emer-
gency: COVID-19 and the Ontology of Everyday Life’, unpublished
manuscript.
158. Jay J. Van Bavel et al., ‘Using Social and Behavioural Science to Support
COVID-19 Pandemic Response’, Nature Human Behaviour, Vol. 4
(2020): 460–471. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-020-0884-z.
159. Geoff Kitney, ‘The Many Prescriptions for Isolation’, The Interpreter,
23 March 2020. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/many-
prescriptions-isolation.
180 M. BONOTTI AND S. T. ZECH
160. Andrew Woodcock, ‘Coronavirus: Boris Johnson Suggests High Coro-
navirus Infection Rates Are Due to UK’s “Love of Freedom”’, The
Independent, 22 September 2020. https://www.independent.co.uk/
news/uk/politics/coronavirus-boris-johnson-infections-freedom-ger
many-italy-b533919.html.
161. Angela Merkel, ‘An Address to the Nation by Federal Chancellor
Merkel’, The Federal Chancellor, 19 March 2020. https://www.bundes
kanzlerin.de/bkin-en/news/statement-chancellor-1732302.
162. Rawls, ‘Political Liberalism’.
163. Kitney, ‘The Many Prescriptions for Isolation’.
164. Tessa Wong, ‘Coronavirus: Why Some Countries Wear Face Masks and
Others Don’t’, BBC News, 12 May 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/
world-52015486; see also Catherine Kim, ‘What a Korean Teenage
Fashion Trend Reveals About the Culture of Mask-Wearing’, Politico,
11 August 2020. https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/
08/11/what-a-korean-teenage-fashion-trend-reveals-about-the-culture-
of-mask-wearing-393204; David Isaacs, ‘Mask Wearing: A Historical,
Cultural and Ethical Perspective’, Journal of Paediatrics and Public
Health, published online on 1 September 2020. https://doi.org/10.
1111/jpc.15162.
165. Colleen Barry, ‘Friendly Kissing Poses European Dilemma as Virus
Spreads’, AP NEWS, 1 March 2020. https://apnews.com/article/b76
b7e97cc6b3da0d2fa40a2e2b49503.
166. Michele J. Gelfand, ‘Differences Between Tight and Loose Cultures:
A 33-Nation Study’, Science, Vol. 332, No. 6033 (2011): 1100–
1104. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1197754; see also Jesse R.
Harrington and Michele J. Gelfand, ‘Tightness–Looseness Across the 50
United States’, PNAS, Vol. 111, No. 22 (2014): 7990–7995. https://
doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1317937111.
167. William Colglazier, ‘Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic: Catas-
trophic Failures of the Science-Policy Interface’, Science and Diplomacy,
9 April 2020. https://www.sciencediplomacy.org/editorial/2020/res
ponse-covid-19-pandemic-catastrophic-failures-science-policy-interface.
168. Specter, ‘How Anthony Fauci Became America’s Doctor’.
169. Cf. Freddie J. Jennings and Frank M. Russell, ‘Civility, Credibility, and
Health Information: The Impact of Uncivil Comments and Source Cred-
ibility on Attitudes About Vaccines’, Public Understanding of Science,
Vol. 28, No. 4 (2019): 417–432. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0963662
519837901.
170. Christian Paz, ‘All the President’s Lies About the Coronavirus’, The
Atlantic, 1 October 2020. https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2020/08/trumps-lies-about-coronavirus/608647/; see also
Daniel Dale, ‘Fact Check: Trump Made At Least 22 False or Misleading
4 CIVILITY AS PUBLIC-MINDEDNESS DURING COVID-19 181
Claims at ABC Town Hall’, CNN , 16 September 2020. https://edi
tion.cnn.com/2020/09/16/politics/fact-check-trump-abc-town-hall/
index.html.
171. E.g. Teresa G. Carvalho, ‘Donald Trump Is Taking Hydroxychloroquine
to Ward Off COVID-19. Is That Wise?’, The Conversation, 21 May
2020. https://theconversation.com/donald-trump-is-taking-hydroxych
loroquine-to-ward-off-covid-19-is-that-wise-139031.
172. Philippe Gautret, ‘Hydroxychloroquine and Azithromycin as a Treat-
ment of COVID-19: Results of an Open-label Non-randomized Clinical
Trial’, International Journal of Antimicrobial Agents, Vol. 56, No. 1
(2020): 105949. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijantimicag.2020.105949.
173. Julia Carrie Wong, ‘Hydroxychloroquine: How an Unproven Drug
Became Trump’s Coronavirus “Miracle Cure”’, The Guardian, 7 April
2020. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/06/hydroxych
loroquine-trump-coronavirus-drug.
174. World News Tonight, ‘President Trump Touts Unproven Drug As
“Game Changer”’, ABC News, 20 March 2020. https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=xAGLGbcQAPU.
175. Libby Cathey, ‘Trump, DeVos Downplay Risks of Reopening Schools,
Claim Children Don’t Spur Transmission: FACT CHECK’, ABC
News, 25 July 2020. https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-devos-
downplay-risks-reopening-schools-claim-children/story?id=71950023.
176. Anonymous, ‘Coronavirus: Outcry After Trump Suggests Injecting
Disinfectant as Treatment’, BBC News, 24 April 2020. https://www.
bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52407177.
177. Nick Valencia et al., ‘Trump Administration Rejects CDC Guidance
on Reopening Us Amid Coronavirus’, CNN , 8 May 2020. https://
edition.cnn.com/2020/05/07/politics/cdc-guidance-coronavirus-reo
pen-america/index.html; see also Noah Weiland, ‘Emails Detail Effort
to Silence C.D.C. and Question Its Science’, The New York Times,
18 September 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/18/us/
politics/trump-cdc-coronavirus.html; Isaac Stanley-Becker, ‘As Trump
Signals Readiness to Break with Experts, His Online Base Assails Fauci’,




178. Andrea Robbett and Peter Hans Matthews, ‘The Partisan Pandemic:
Do We Now Live in Alternative Realities?’ The Conversation, 21 August
2020. https://theconversation.com/the-partisan-pandemic-do-we-now-
live-in-alternative-realities-140290.
179. Ronald Brownstein, ‘Red and Blue America Aren’t Experiencing the
Same Pandemic’, The Atlantic, 20 March 2020. https://www.theatl
182 M. BONOTTI AND S. T. ZECH
antic.com/politics/archive/2020/03/how-republicans-and-democrats-
think-about-coronavirus/608395/.
180. The Editors, ‘Scientific American Endorses Joe Biden’, Scientific Amer-
ican, 1 October 2020. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/sci
entific-american-endorses-joe-biden1/.
181. Monika Evstatieva, ‘Anatomy of a COVID-19 Conspiracy Theory’,
NPR, 10 July 2020. https://www.npr.org/2020/07/10/889037310/
anatomy-of-a-covid-19-conspiracy-theory; see also Adam Satariano and
Davey Alba, ‘Burning Cell Towers, Out of Baseless Fear They Spread
the Virus’, The New York Times, 10 April 2020. https://www.nytimes.
com/2020/04/10/technology/coronavirus-5g-uk.html.
182. UNESCO, ‘UNESCO Provides Ethical Frameworks to COVID-19
Responses’.
183. Hervé Chneiweiss, ‘Scientific and Ethical Research in Times of COVID-
19 Pandemic’, UNESCO, 15 April 2020. https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=rNUmzliqqII&list=PLWuYED1WVJIP0rD8hI7PRkghhLUZY
B4mP&index=5.
184. Vitoria Afonso Langa de Jesus, ‘Ethical and Scientific Communication
in Times of COVID-19 Pandemic’, UNESCO, 15 April 2020. https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Img1h4Zd1Y&list=PLWuYED1WVJIP0r
D8hI7PRkghhLUZYB4mP&index=4.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction
in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the
chapter’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line
to the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons
license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds
the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright
holder.
Conclusion
The human costs associated with COVID-19 have been devastating.
Some countries have done very well in curbing some of these effects
whereas others have failed miserably at containing the virus, and suffered
significant death counts as a result. In addition to the human costs, the
pandemic has had far-reaching economic, social, and political effects. As
we saw in Chapter 1, some of these issues included a global recession,
mass unemployment, severe restrictions on mobility and social relations,
as well as various forms of political conflict and opportunism.
In this book, we have examined these complex challenges through the
lens of civility. As we explained Chapter 2, civility is a contested concept.
In our analysis, we identified two key dimensions of civility: politeness
and public-mindedness. The former relates to good manners and norms
of etiquette that can signal respect and consideration for others and facil-
itate social cooperation. We were careful to highlight both structural and
agential components of civility as politeness, to emphasize the need for
individuals to navigate complex and evolving social environments. The
latter involves treating others as free and equal, by refraining from racist,
hateful, and discriminatory speech and behaviour (moral civility), as well
as from the pursuit of self-interested or sectarian policy goals (justificatory
civility).
In Chapter 3 we examined many ways in which COVID-19 might
impede or confound people’s ability to be polite and to engage in proso-
cial and cooperative behaviour. We focused on four problems that have
emerged during the pandemic. One concerns the difficulty people face in
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identifying norms of politeness when they are contested or become prob-
lematic. Another involves the signalling function of politeness: words,
gestures, or actions aimed at communicating respect and consideration
for others may often misfire in times of uncertainty and crisis. Relatedly,
absence of clarity regarding politeness norms can create barriers to social
cooperation and exchange. Finally, citizens and politicians can capitalize
on this uncertainty to act in ways that under normal circumstances would
be seen as impolite.
In our analysis of these problems we also identified potential solutions
that can mitigate their negative effects. These might include government
actions—e.g. signs and information campaigns—aimed at informing the
public about new expectations of appropriate behaviour that align with
public health goals. Citizens also have an important role to play in helping
one another to behave politely in this new social landscape. They may
need to both learn and develop new norms related to issues like greet-
ings and interactions with others in online and offline spaces, e.g. using
more words or body language to get around limitations that result from
social distancing requirements or mandatory mask wearing. Breaches of
politeness norms can contribute to the breakdown of social cooperation
and exacerbate tensions between individuals and groups alike. Govern-
ment and private actors (e.g. businesses and civil society organizations)
can help to prevent this by using both informal and formal mechanisms
to encourage polite behaviour and punish transgressors. In international
politics, changes to decorum and etiquette may be necessary as diplomats
and political leaders adapt to new public health concerns and policies.
Furthermore, any challenges to cooperation that might arise from impo-
lite actions between states could be remedied via pre-existing institutions
that are designed to promote peaceful relationships.
In Chapter 4 we shifted our attention to the challenges posed by
COVID-19 to civility as public-mindedness. We examined four prob-
lems related to civility as public-mindedness that have arisen during the
pandemic. First, we addressed how COVID-19 has exacerbated various
types of morally uncivil behavour—such as discrimination and hate in
workplace and educational settings, as well as in the public sphere—that
have undermined the free and equal status of many citizens, espe-
cially among vulnerable groups. Furthermore, we highlighted how the
pandemic has enabled some political actors to put forward sectarian
agendas that breach the demands of justificatory civility. We saw that some
have appealed to partial interests and controversial beliefs, or assigned
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too much importance to some political values at the expense of others.
Additionally, we stressed how some policies have resulted in unreasonable
‘strains of commitment’ for members of marginalized sectors of the popu-
lation—e.g. racial minorities, women, the LGBTIQ+ community, and
older people. We argued that governments cannot overlook the dispro-
portionate negative effects that some policies may have on some members
of the public in relation to others. At the very least, they must recog-
nize these disparities when they provide justifications for these policies
and attempt to minimize their unequal effects. We concluded the chapter
by addressing the role of science in relation to justificatory civility. We
identified numerous obstacles to the science-policy interface during the
pandemic, including uncertainty around particular aspects of the virus
itself as well as social and cultural factors that may affect public responses.
The politicization of science for personal or partisan advantage during
COVID-19 has emerged as another prominent issue that needs to be
addressed.
In response to these challenges, we advanced numerous suggestions to
counteract many threats to moral and justificatory civility. Both govern-
ments and citizens alike can play a key role in defending and recovering
civility in moments of crisis. Measures to protect moral civility include
more inclusive policies; consistent messaging and translation; and mecha-
nisms for consultation and policy co-design with members of marginalized
communities. It will also be important for governments to monitor,
analyse, and counteract threats to moral civility like racism and hate
speech. This could include developing and employing media and tech-
nology resources as well as appropriate and effective legal mechanisms.
Governments should also strengthen and put trust in institutions that can
both offset sectarianism and foster the values of justificatory civility among
the public. Furthermore, they could rely on ethics frameworks in order to
better understand and address tensions and trade-offs between different
political values during public justification. It is also essential for policy-
makers to acknowledge and rectify the uneven impact of government
interventions on different social groups (especially vulnerable ones) via
policies informed by the voices of those most affected as well as through
measures that mitigate some of those effects. Lastly, there is an urgent
need for evidence-based policies grounded in natural and social science.
Ensuring justificatory civility may also require additional resources aimed
at facilitating communication between scientists and governments as well
as improving the scientific literacy of policymakers and the public.
186 CONCLUSION
In this book we looked at COVID-19 through the lens of civility.
However, based on our analysis, we find that there is a broader appli-
cability beyond a global pandemic. The civility lens can help to provide
insight into social problems that emerge in other types of crises. For
example, rapid-onset natural disasters, famines, and ongoing armed
conflicts also cause major disruptions to social life. The civility lens can
provide a useful framework to guide the way we analyse the economic,
social, and political consequences in these contexts. It can also help
scholars and policymakers to understand and respond to disruptions to
social and political practices, and perhaps help to improve policies that
advance governance guided by moral principles and public-minded goals.
Second, there is a general need to apply theoretical analyses of civility
to other real-world contexts beyond crises. Political theorists and philoso-
phers who work on civility mainly focus on conceptual and normative
questions like ‘What is civility?’, ‘Is it always wrong to be uncivil?’, or
‘Should the state promote civility?’. They tend to analyse the concept in
very abstract terms and disregard empirical evidence relevant to under-
standing civility and its effects on society. This constitutes a significant
shortcoming. More specifically, relating the theoretical analysis of civility
to empirical findings can help to contextualize it in real-world terms and
to ensure that the normative analysis and the policy proposals resulting
from it are not grounded in empirically flawed assumptions. Conversely,
much of the empirical work on civility—in diverse disciplines such as polit-
ical science, sociology, and linguistics—tends to focus on pressing practical
problems and policy issues such as ‘Is anonymity on social media a barrier
to civility?’, or ‘Does an increase in incivility damage trust in institu-
tions?’. However, these studies tend to disregard the more theoretical
work. This can result in a lack of conceptual nuance, flawed measurement,
and unsound conclusions. The potential for mutual learning and improve-
ment is obvious: what people perceive as civility should not be neglected
in theoretical discussions, and empirical studies need to acknowledge that
establishing whether there is an ‘increase in incivility’ strongly depends
on how we define the concept.
Finally, from a theoretical perspective, our book has shown that while
civility presents distinct dimensions, these may often be interrelated.
Impolite actions, for example, may hinder the process of public reasoning
that is central to justificatory civility. Conversely, political actors may
sometimes use impoliteness to foster public-mindedness among citizens,
especially those who act in self-interested ways and advance sectarian aims.
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Politeness too can be used to achieve different goals. On the one hand,
it may help realize moral and justificatory civility. On the other hand, it
can be used strategically by various actors to promote their own interests,
sometimes in ways that conflict with the goals of moral civility—as in the
case of ‘polite Nazis’ or men who advance sexist worldviews in a polite
way. There is a need for more work examining these and similar instances
where the different dimensions of civility interact, by either reinforcing or
undermining each other.
During the pandemic, the state government of Victoria, Australia
adopted the motto that ‘Staying apart keeps us together’. This simple
statement captures many of the important points addressed in our
book. It communicates norms of behaviour based on scientific evidence
about physical distancing (i.e. ‘staying apart’) and helps to advance
public-minded goals like improved public health and a socially cohesive
community (i.e. ‘keeps us together’), thus providing a public justifica-
tion for the very restrictive policies implemented by that state during the
pandemic. The best way to move forward in light of the challenges posed
by the pandemic remains uncertain. However, it is clear that recovering
civility should play a central role in this endeavour.
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